We must now speak of the creation of man: not only because among all God’s works here is the noblest and most remarkable example of his justice, wisdom, and goodness; but also because, as we said at the beginning, we cannot have a clear and complete knowledge of God unless it is accompanied by a corresponding knowledge of ourselves.

(Calvin’s Institutes, Book 1 chapter XV.1)

Summary: Due to the rise in philosophical anthropology and the philosophy of mind there is a need to re-consider afresh the theological debate surrounding the origin of the soul. I address this particular issue in the context of the recent philosophical and theological literature that is also conversant with Ecclesiastical literature surrounding the topic by suggesting that there are, at least, three distinct options within the theology of origins. I proceed in two sections. First, I lay out the variety of positions on the soul within the philosophy of mind literature often called substance dualism. In this section, I suggest there are broadly three variations of substance dualism. These include pure substance dualism, composite or compound substance dualism, and emergent substance dualism. I compare and contrast these variations, discuss the particular problems related to each, and argue that each ‘naturally’ coheres with a particular view of origins based on the metaphysical relationship between the body and soul. Second, I lay out the three positions on the soul’s origin in the remainder of the paper. I put forth that there is not only traducianism and creationism the two most obvious positions within Ecclesiastical history, but also emergent substance dualism with materialist origins deserving further consideration in the theological literature. Furthermore, within the positions, excluding emergent substance dualism with materialist origins, there is variation within each yet still naturally falling under the particular said category. This, then, contributes to literature not only by drawing from recent philosophical literature in the fortification of the Christian view on origins, but, additionally, by putting forth one relatively new position that has not been systematized in the theological literature. Finally, I offer that theologians will benefit in three specific ways from the discussion over substance dualism and the theology of the soul’s origin.
The theology of the soul’s origin has received its fair share of systematic treatment in the history of Christian thought. Interestingly, it has not received a great deal of contemporary attention. However, the subject of the soul’s origination is implicit in recent discussions on human origins, science, and ethics. In fact related to the discussion on origins, substance dualist anthropology has received a great deal of criticism in the theological literature, as of late. My hope is that this article will offer some contribution to the debate over ontological dualism in theological anthropology. I suggest that the doctrine of the soul (i.e., substance dualism) has occupied a significant place throughout Ecclesiastical discussion on the origin of human persons and its implications.

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for other doctrines.\(^3\) As a result, theologians would benefit from engaging with ontological dualism as it relates to the variety found within the theology of origins. Thus, my task here is to delineate substance dualist views and the relationship these have to the theology of the origin of the soul for equipping constructive theologians.\(^4\)

Traditionally, there have been three broad views on the origin of souls with variants in each; these include the pre-existence view, creationist view, and traducianist view. Here I am interested in the creationist view and the traducian view. These views have historically elicited the most attention.\(^5\) I am also interested in one new view on origins that has received attention in the philosophical literature, but deserves additional attention in the theological literature.

Due to the rise of research in the philosophy of mind, there is need to explore the options on the origin of the soul and its limitations on which substance dualist options are available within those views of origins.\(^6\) In this article, I answer the important question: What views on origins are available and how do they relate to particular varieties of substance dualism in a comprehensive contemporary Christian anthropology? I answer by offering a description of the relationship on the body and soul according to the respective views of origins.

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\(^3\) The theology of origins gets to the heart of man’s (as a souled being) relationship to other humans and to God. It, also, has implications for original sin, the nature of corruption, and how we read the Scriptures concerning man as an image bearer in relationship to Christ.

\(^4\) One example of a theologian doing something similar to what I am putting on the table for the theologian is seen in Susan A. Ross’ recent book. See Susan A. Ross, *Anthropology Engaging Theology: Catholic Perspectives* (Collegeville, Minnesota: Liturgical Press, 2012), 144–148. In it she draws from Philip Clayton’s philosophical work on emergent monism, but she is generally critical of substance dualism throughout her work.

\(^5\) I am using this in reference to the Origenist view. Origen is the most prominent defender of this view throughout Ecclesiastical history. See Origen, *First Principles*, 1. 8, 2; 2. 1, if; 2. 9, 1; *Against Celsus*, 7, 50. It says that souls exist in some heavenly realm prior to embodiment and the creation of the world. So, when speaking of this view I am using it in reference to the more refined sense within Church history (e.g. Origen, early Augustine and others that are heavily platonic in their understanding of the soul). Most would consider the pre-existence view to be unbiblical and unorthodox. I agree with this and see no reason for affirming a pre-existence view of the soul. I have no reason for thinking that I existed in a heavenly state either philosophical or theological apart from the difficulty of conceiving my non-existence.

\(^6\) These two issues are related and have implications for the other.
1 Defining terms

Creationism is the view that God creates the individual soul directly and immediately. God is directly the cause in the sense that he utilizes no other cause to bring about the soul. Thus, God is the terminus of the causal chain. By immediate, I mean that Divine action is without mediation through other causes or events. For the creationist, the creation of the soul is directly rooted in a Divine choice-event, not a process that exists prior to the choice-event.7 Traducianism is the view that God creates one soul immediately and each successive soul, secondarily or medially, through the generative process from one generation to another. One’s metaphysical assumptions about the relationship between body and souls will lend itself to interesting implications concerning the theology of the soul’s origin.8 Let us turn now to consider these assumptions in more detail.9

7 I was particularly helped by Daniel von Wachter, “Free Agents as Cause,” in On Human Persons, ed. by Klaus Petrus, (Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag, 2003), 183–194. Von Wachter also calls this an initiating event, which brings about more precision to the libertarian sense of causation than others that root it in some sort of determinism, indeterminism, or no cause. A choice-event is not the notion that the agent intends, which causes my arm to rise. The arm rising is an event that is not caused by anything else, but my choice that just is an event. The two are co-joined and we have a distinct category for this sort of event than what one normally thinks of as an event-cause. Thus, this sort of event is not caused by another event nor is it random, but is the choice of the agent. Somehow, the agent has the instantaneous power of bringing about an immediate event. This notion of a choice-event splits the dilemma of the two-horns between determinism and indeterminism and roots the control of the event directly in the agent. It does so in that an agent with free-will has no preceding cause, either deterministic or indeterministic, but the agent begins the causal chain. This is different from the issue of agent-causation where an event could be rooted, metaphysically, in a deterministic process or an indeterministic process (which both are not directly in the control of the agent). This does not bring precision to the agent him / herself, but gives more precision to the notion of a free-action in terms of events. This also does not mean that the initiating event or choice-event cannot be the cause of other events in a causal chain, it can, but it is distinct from the notion of an event-process whether determined or indetermined.

8 This has been called ‘emergentism’ by some and essentially means the same thing, but emergentism is a more generic term that can refer to the doctrine of emergence whereby sui generis things, properties or laws emerge from a base. Thus, this term can be used in reference to a physicalist view of the mind. I will use this term later as a kind of short-hand for the doctrine of emergence.

9 Generally, I am speaking in terms of the phenomena of emergence and sui generis entities or natures. Specifically, I am speaking in terms of the growing literature in substance dualism like emergent substance dualism and the literature on Thomistic hylomorphic substance dualism.
2 The Mind-Body Problem, Substance Dualism, and implications for origins

The mind-body problem has a long history of variegated discussion on the nature of the mind\textsuperscript{10} and its relation to the body.\textsuperscript{11} In other words, what follows is not a piece of historical philosophy, but an exercise in the metaphysics of the mind in relation to the theology of the soul's origin.

I assume that there are two types of concrete particulars. One is physical and the other that is non-physical.\textsuperscript{12} As a result, it would not serve our purposes here to delve into the variety of positions falling under the mind-body views known as materialism. The reason for this is that it affirms that broadly speaking mental properties either reduce to physicality or logically supervene on the material body. The problem for the materialist is accounting for the apparent distinctness in mental and physical properties and supplying a bridge to move from properties of a material kind to properties of a mental kind.

The problem for a substance dualist is different. Substance dualists assume at the outset that there are distinct kinds of property-bearers. Minimally, there are mental or immaterial property-bearers as distinct from material property-bearers. How might one characterize these property-bearers? Let us begin with mental property-bearers. Mental property-bearers have certain characteristics that distinguish them from material property-bearers. Mental property-bearers have descriptive characteristics of subjective \textit{qualia}, privacy, internal access, and first-person awareness. Material property-bearers are radically different. Public access or public knowledge, third-person knowledge, and characteristics predicated from the physical sciences characterize property-bearers of a material kind. Material things or properties are accessible by anyone and everyone. They are thus distinguishable from property-bearers of a mental kind.

\textsuperscript{10} I am largely using the terms mind and soul as synonyms although these are not strictly identical depending on the variation of substance dualism one affirms.


sort.\textsuperscript{13} The problem faced by the substance dualist is that both property-bearers are radically different. The two are not different in the same sense that two colours are different or in the sense that flowers are distinguishable by differing characteristics, but property-bearers of a mental kind and property-bearers of a material kind are fundamentally different. The two do not overlap. For the mental and the physical there is not merely a lack of physical and spatial overlap, but a seeming lack of fundamental ontological overlap.

Now, establishing the dis-similarity between the two sorts of property-bearers is only one part of the problem. The other part of the problem is one of influence. That is the two seem to interact causally. For instance, when I bump my knee on the chair I not only have observable sensations and effects on my physical body, but my mind thinks new thoughts of ‘ouch’ or at least this is an internal sensation that is distinct from the observable aspects in terms of my body. What is more, when I have thoughts or intentional states of mind it seems to affect or causally influence my body. So, when I have the intentional state of desiring to have a cup of coffee and intend to make a cup, then my body moves when I bring it about as a choice-event. The fundamental cause seems to be my mental state of intending to enjoy a cup of coffee not the physical sensation that then causes the mental state following with other physical causes.\textsuperscript{14} When I intend to make a cup of coffee and do so, my body acts. Other physical sensations follow from this act. Thus, the two seemingly distinct kinds of things interact in a deep and intimate manner. David Robb and John Heil state the problem in terms of causation quite well, when they say:

\begin{quote}
The philosophical significance of mental causation goes beyond general concerns about the nature of mind. Some philosophers (e. g., Davidson 1963; Mele 1992) insist that the very notion of psychological explanation turns on the intelligibility of mental causation. If your mind and its states, such as your beliefs and desires, were causally isolated from your bodily behavior, then what goes on in your mind could not explain what you do. (For contrary views, see Ginet 1990; Sehon 2005).\textsuperscript{15}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{13} This is not an uncommon characterization of these distinct properties of material and immaterial things. See Richard Swinburne, \textit{The Evolution of the Soul}, rev. ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), 6–7.

\textsuperscript{14} In the literature mental intendings or doings have also been called ‘tryings’. See Wachter (see above, n. 7).

The ensuing dilemma for the substance dualist is that the two property-bearers never seem to meet, so how could the two interact in any causal sense? The problem seems to require some sort of bridge between the two kinds of things to allow some sort of interaction. If one does not supply a bridge, then there is not a solution to the mind-body problem for the substance dualist.

Most substance dualists would agree that the objector grossly overstates his case, for the materialist must provide a bridge between the mind and brain, as well, in addition to providing a reason for thinking that material and immaterial kinds of property-bearers are actually part of one ontological kind of thing or stuff. According to Hasker, “This argument may hold the all-time record for overrated objections to major philosophical positions. What is true about it is that we lack any intuitive understanding of the causal relationship between Cartesian souls and bodies.” The motivation behind this common objection is from a humean view of causation, roughly, that there is a continuous regularity of succession between objects, but this theory cannot satisfy itself in terms of causation because it lacks the metaphysical explanation for why there should be continuous regularity. Additionally, Hasker states this is not a decisive problem for the proponent of substance dualism because the materialist has similar problems. Both materialists and dualists articulate metaphysical theories of how minds and bodies interact, yet each requires an explanation. Thus, in this way the problem of interaction is a theoretical issue for both and, more fundamentally, causation is an issue that both must come to terms with. While my concern is not explicitly causation, causation helps to shed light on the deeper problem of two distinct things that are united and able to interact. Nonetheless, substance dualists have a response to this problem.

The problems raised for ontological dualists concerning causation commonly crop up in the theological literature in two ways. First, it is not uncommon to reject dualism as an unviable option given the lack of intuitive accounting for soul and body activity. But, as stated above, this is not merely a challenge for dualists it too is a challenge for materialists. Second, and more interesting, is a common objection that the Christian Scriptures yield a view of human nature that is functionally integrated and holistic. Having stated this, the Scriptures often

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16 See HASKER, Emergent Self (see above, n. 1), 150.
17 Hasker does proceed to raise the question that if we can offer a solution to the mind-body problem that sheds some light on the relational union of the mind-body, then we have reason for accepting it instead. This serves as a part of the movement toward his case in favour of Emergent substance dualism.
speak less in terms of ontology and more in terms of relational, dynamic, and existential categories. As such, human nature is described in a much more fluid manner. By way of response, nearly all contemporary dualists affirm that the soul and the body are holistic and integrated in functioning and phenomenology and this is precisely because the soul and body are somehow fit for the other and actualize certain properties and powers in the other.\textsuperscript{19} In the end, these are not obvious theological reasons to reject substance dualism outright. I suggest that there is good reason to consider substance dualism, and for that matter, below, I suggest that traditional views of origins are still on the table for discussion.

Substance dualists agree that minds and bodies interact, generally speaking.\textsuperscript{20} This means that substance dualists, generally, do not deny causal realism or causal powers respective of both material bodies or of souls. Causal realism is the view that an entity or concrete part has the power to act, and this entity or concrete part that seems to be the direct cause is the cause.\textsuperscript{21} This is not the notion that this entity seems to have causal powers, but instead is the appearance of something more fundamental. An example would be the event of raising my arm. So in the case of raising my arm, I am the direct cause, or so it seems, not something else undergirding either my choice or the event of the arm raising. Substance dualists agree there is a fundamental relation that ties the two substances together. This provides the ground for interaction. The interactive relation


\textsuperscript{20} The only exception to this general rule is parallelism and mental and physical occassionalism. On the latter view, it just is that when I have an intention this provides the occasion for the body to behave in a corresponding manner, but it does not mean that my mental act of ‘trying’ is the direct cause of the body behaving in the manner that it does. For example, the occasion of my arm rising in conjunction with my intending to raise my arm is rooted in a Theistic causal explanation of the relationship.

\textsuperscript{21} Robert C. Koons develops something like this in \textit{Realism Regained: An Exact Theory of Causation, Teleology, and the Mind} (Oxford: OUP, 2000), ch.16. He offers a theory of the mind whereby the mind is a higher-order reality of material configuration whereby mental is latent in physicality – a kind of Hylomorphic monism. I would argue that this could be articulated in terms of substance dualism whereby body and soul is functionally one unit yet ontically distinct whereby the reality of the mental is a soulish matter that is realized or teleologically fulfilled in the body, but this is beyond the scope of this article.
depends upon the version of substance dualism one subscribes.\textsuperscript{22} I shall begin with pure substance dualism.

Pure substance dualism otherwise called Cartesian substance dualism is the most radical form of substance dualism in terms of the distinctions between bodies and souls.\textsuperscript{23} Olson defines this view according to which persons as souls intimately relate to a particular body, yet bodies are not parts of persons.\textsuperscript{24} The proponent of this view would say that the seeming distinction between the mind and body is real. The two do not mix or intermingle. The two are fundamentally different. I, as a person am a soul or directly supervene on a soul contingently related to a body. I do not have extension in space nor am I spatial in any sense of the term. My body is spatial and has extension. I act and interact with the physical world via my body. Thus, the proponent of this view maintains this fundamental distinction, but this does not undermine the reality that minds and bodies interact. In fact, the objector to substance dualism must pre-maturely assume something about the soul in order to argue that it cannot interact with the body.\textsuperscript{25} Proponents of substance dualism have argued for the relationship between the mind and the body as a brute reality that obtains based on a law or based on a personal explanation.\textsuperscript{26} Connected to this, substance dualists can respond by stating

\textsuperscript{22} See Dean Zimmerman, Art. “Dualism in the Philosophy of Mind,” in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy 2\textsuperscript{nd} edition (New York, U.S.A: MacMillan, 2006), 113–122. Here Zimmerman goes some way to highlight the differences in the varieties of substance dualism. He particularly distinguishes pure substance dualism with composite substance dualism, but he holds emergent versions of substance dualism to be sufficiently distinct from the other two. He refers to Descartes as a composite substance dualist, who, as I have stated in a previous chapter, is vague and deserves distinction from say Thomistic hylomorphic varieties of composite substance dualism. The two are not the same and in fact, a Cartesian variety is similar to pure and composite versions, thus I helpfully refer to it as Person-body substance dualism. It seems that some terms will have a remnant of vagueness.

\textsuperscript{23} See Eric T. Olson, “A Compound of Two Substances,” in in Soul, Body, and Survival: The Metaphysics of Human Persons, Ed. by Kevin Corcoran (Ithaca / London: Cornell University Press, 2001), 73–88. Olson works through the difficulties of articulating a compound or composite version of substance dualism, and argues that if you are going to be a substance dualist of a Cartesian sort, then you ought to be a pure dualist.

\textsuperscript{24} Ibid. 73.


\textsuperscript{26} See Richard Swinburne for a distinction between event causes and personal causes in The Existence of God (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004). Also, see Swinburne in The Evolution of the Soul (see above, n. 13). Here he makes a distinction between scientific explanations and
that for there to be a problem one must assume a specific kind of knowledge of souls and their causal powers in relation to the body. I do not see why there is such a problem. For the objection to go through one must assume a theory of causation that precludes soul’s interacting causally with bodies or with that which is physical. Apart from Hume’s theory, there is not a reason to suppose that souls cannot interact with bodies. Simply because the soul is not physical or spatial does not preclude it from interacting with a body. One can assert the reality of soul-body interaction based on our experience that I seem to interact with my body. However, the experience of interaction is not the metaphysical explanation of it. My experience of this interaction is the source of my knowing that souls and bodies interact. Rather, people attribute the causal power of interacting with bodies based upon one’s epistemic situation of experiencing it directly. The metaphysical ground is distinct from our knowing and experiencing this interaction. The metaphysical explanation is the seeming problem of two distinct sorts of things causally interacting. A defender of substance dualism can proffer a response to this objection. Namely, that there may be a brute relation between the body and soul or the fact may be that we do not have the requisite knowledge to understand how it is possible that the soul and body interact, a relation that does not undermine the possibility of this interaction from occurring. The reality of souls and bodies interacting is unrelated to our knowing how the two interact. This causal relationship between body and soul may be rooted directly in Divine arbitration as the only plausible personal explanation for mind-body interaction. Alternatively, it may be that God sets up the physical world in such a fashion that when souls begin, they causally function and interact in terms of a law-like relation with the particular hunk of matter. The only difficulty for the pure substance dualist is accounting for an intuitive sense of soul-body interaction. Although, lacking this intuitive sense does not imply the two do not interact.

The defender of composite substance dualism proposes a second option concerning the mind-body relationship that may provide a more plausible intuitive personal explanations or physical causes and agent causes. John Foster makes an argument that the interactive relation is directly rooted in Divine causation as a personal explanation in John Foster, “A Brief Defence of the Cartesian View,” in Soul, Body, and Survival: The Metaphysics of Human Persons, ed. by Kevin Corcoran (Ithaca / London: Cornell University Press, 2001), 28–29. Foster’s defence contributes to the discussion by arguing that the Cartesian view requires a “personal explanation” (although he does not use this term) where God establishes an appropriate functional attachment between the soul and the body. There could be other ways in which God personally establishes this connection. One would be that he creates bodies and brains with suitable structures that host souls whereby the body / brain has a teleological structure that gives rise to a law-like relation (regular patterns of succession) between the body and soul.
accounting. This view says that immaterial things relate to physical bodies in that the natures of the soul and body have an overlap of certain properties, like concrete nature with structure, temporal existence, and teleological capacities. It is difficult to see how Cartesian views could be composite given the distinctness of substances, but if one has, a broader view of substance such that a human being is at core a soul as substance that has a sub-set of properties contingently – namely a body – then this could be broadly taken to be composite in nature.

A third solution is proposed called emergent substance dualism. This is the most recent and radical of all three varieties of substance dualism in the sense that it posits a view that is similar to non-reductive materialism, yet remains a live option in substance dualism. On this view, souls are synonymous with minds or selves. The proponent of this view puts forth that where other views seem to fail with respect to the intimacy of the mind on brain dependence and evolutionary theory this view succeeds. The defender of the emergent view also contends that it is more economical than the other substance dualist positions. On this view, the soul emerges from a suitably complex neural structure, thus accounting for a deeper intimacy between the mind and brain than other substance dualisms – thereby offering a more satisfying metaphysical explanation for soul and brain interaction. There is a distinction in virtue of the doctrine of emergence of the mind as a concrete part from the brain. This view proposes that the soul/self/mind is a new sui generis substance, thus it is not accurate to

27 The proponent of this view can very easily incorporate the previous response.
28 Dean Zimmerman argues that most substance dualists affirm something along these lines in Zimmerman, Dualism (see above, n. 22), 116. He also states that most affirm the spatiality of the soul in contemporary times, but I am sceptical about this claim and do not see how souls could be spatial.
29 Swinburne in The Evolution of the Soul (see above, n. 13) holds to something like this. Also see John Hawthorne, “Cartesian Dualism,” in Persons: Human and Divine, Ed. by Peter van Inwagen / Dean Zimmerman (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), see especially the concluding section. Most Cartesians today would consider themselves to be composite or compound dualists this lends itself to some confusion and deserves dis-ambiguation from other variety’s that are composite in nature. This composite view is different from hylomorphic varieties where either the soul is the form that always has material properties of potency intrinsic to the soul or the notion that a soul as form normally informs a material aggregate.
30 See Hasker, Emergent Self (see above, n. 1) and ‘Souls Beastly and Human,’ ‘Souls of Beast and of Men’. Hasker is famous for this novel position in the literature on philosophy of mind. In the past he referred to this position as ‘emergerntism’, but this did not sufficiently distinguish it from varieties of non-reductive physicalism that are also versions of property dualism. Now, he refers to his position as emergent substance dualism.
31 HASKER, Emergent Self (see above, n. 1), 188–189.
categorize it as non-reductive materialism with property dualism. On this view, the soul is conceptually and modally distinct. It is accurate to say that it has some sort of dependence relation now of its origins and continuance that maintain a point of contact for causal interaction between the two parts.

Having established three main positions as substance dualism, I argue that each has a distinct view on the metaphysical relationship between the body and soul that entail options within the theology of origins.

### 2.1 Substance Dualist Solutions and the Theology of Origins

I propose that the metaphysical relationship between the body and soul on some of the versions of substance dualism lend themselves to distinct and interesting implications in the discussion over the theology of the origin of the soul. I am not attempting to offer a complete definition or explanation of each view on origins, but simply to show the relationship between the substance dualist options and reasons why each might coherently fit with a particular view of origins.

I contend that one can define Pure Substance Dualism along the lines of traditional-traducianism and traditional-creationism. Pure substance dualism co-joined with traditional-traducianism requires that the defender give up a traditional assumption that souls are simple and assumes that souls are either par-turient or fissile. Pure substance dualism co-joined with traditional-creationism is the most natural position on origins for PSD to take because of the radical distinctions in natures both on the mind-body problem and on the radical distinction in origins.

Composite substance dualism commensurate with or can coherently fit with traditional-traducianism, and traditional-creationism (some construals). While it most naturally appears to be a species of traditional-traducianism because of the intimate nature of the body and soul as having an overlap of fundamental properties and the potentiality for mixed properties, it could be categorized under traditional-creationism. One could say this based on whether or not one

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32 Ibid. 190 and 194.
33 Ibid. I take this from page 192 where Hasker discusses the spatial nature of the mind as encompassing the parts of the brain.
34 Ibid. 192 and 193. Hasker says, ‘the theory makes intelligible, as Cartesian dualism does not, the intimate dependence of consciousness and mental processes on brain function.’
35 See SWINBURNE on mixed properties in *The Evolution of the soul* (see above, n. 13), 7. This is a rather perplexing issue and debatable or deserving further attention.
can maintain a strict distinction between property-bearers of a mental sort and a material sort or maintains that each property-bearer is not a part of the other.

Emergent substance dualism as I am construing it, according to William Hasker, is a position all on its own distinct from the others in terms of origins. The relation it posits between the mind and the body seems to imply a view of origins that does not cohere with traditional understandings on the origin of the soul within Ecclesiastical history. One could think of this as a variation of Cartesianism – a deviant one – that is far from what Descartes would have envisioned given the distinction of the nature of body and soul. Nevertheless, the relationship between the soul and body is the reason why it does not cohere with traditional views on origins even if a form of Cartesianism. It is a form of generationism because the body generates the soul, and in this way, one might argue it is similar to traducianism – yet not appropriately a form of traducianism.

What I have shown in this section is the relationship between the mind-body solutions and the views of origins that they are naturally related. Thus, I believe that the discussion on the mind-body relation relates to the discussion on origins. I will consider this in more depth below by laying out a variety of substance dualist views within each view on the soul’s origin.

3 The Origin of the soul, options, and contemporary concerns

3.1 Traditional-Traducianism

It is not uncommon to identify traditional dualism with creationism, but this does not capture the panoply of options reflecting traditional views of souls. There are versions of traducianism that one might consider as traditional in nature. One divine in Ecclesiastical history that affirmed traducianism is Tertullian who

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36 HASKER, Souls (see above, n. 1), 209. Also see IDEM, Emergent Self (see above, n. 1), 170 and 196. This is not a criticism of Hasker, but simply pointing out that there may be other traditional options that are non-creationist construals of souls.

37 Traditionally, Lutherans were traducians barring Philip Melanchthon. Augustus H. Strong, W. G. T. Shedd, Gordon Clark, Lewis Sperry Chafer all support traducianism. Contemporary support includes but is not limited to the following: Millard Erickson, Norman L. Geisler, Robert Culver, and Robert L. Reymond.
said that parents generated new souls. He also stated that this occurred originally from one created Soul – Adam. Many others, in Ecclesiastical history, affirmed the basic traducian positions one created soul generates other souls. Here are some traditional possibilities that, arguably, have Ecclesiastical support and Scriptural support.

A traditional-traducian view says that God created one human soul directly and immediately that somehow contains all other un-individualized human souls. Souls propagate through a generative process becoming individualized souls.

Traditional-Traducianism: the notion that a parent or at most two parents generate a soul that ultimately derives from creating one soul directly and immediately. All successive souls obtain as individual souls from the first created soul. The process of generation is not all at once (i.e. synchronic), but it is across time (i.e. diachronic).

As stated above, pure and composite varieties of substance dualism could coherently work with traducianism. In what is to follow, I discuss two variations of traditional-traducianism: fissile variations and parturient variations.

The first variation is the notion that the soul is fissile in nature. To say that the soul is fissile is to say that souls or persons fissile or split-off and fuse with other material to form a person and/or soul. The mental picture of a lump of clay illustrates fissile traducianism. The lump of clay represents one soul that can become more than one soul as when clay divides. With the lump of clay, one can take a piece of clay from it, and, then, take a piece of clay from that piece of clay and one can repeat the process. Souls work in a similar fashion according to the fissile traducian view. God creates one soul that generates other souls similar to a lump of clay. Souls on this view split-off and become new souls from the previous soul. The new soul has the potential, again, to split-off. Souls do not

38 TERTULLIAN, On the Soul, 100.27.
39 Ibid. 275.
41 This Scripture has been used throughout Ecclesiastical history as support for traducianism. I am not arguing that Scripture yields this, or that this position is implied by these Scriptures, but one might argue that these Scriptures fit best with or are accounted for by traducianism.
42 Possibly, this is traditional in the sense that these conceptions of souls have some historical precedence.
split-off directly from Adam each time a soul begins to exist. Instead the process works a different way, souls split-off from the first soul, Adam, becoming other souls, then succeeding souls split-off from the newly existing souls. New souls do not obtain directly from Adam although they exist as non-instantiated souls in one metaphysical substance, Adam, now of Adam’s creation. New souls come into existence at the moment of conception or some later moment in procreation after conception.

A second variation of Traducianism is parturient in nature. The idea here is that somehow souls give off parts, and generate new souls not that a soul split-off. The one created soul generates new souls. The gamete-like view holds that the parents generate soulish parts that persist through human seed. The notion here is that the parents in virtue of the gametes through the seed carry on souls and DNA. Additionally, souls and persons are compound and complex in nature not simple in nature.44

Within parturient traducianism, the process by which persons come into being could be something along the following lines. The unifying process of the soul and / or person takes place in the process of gestation in the mother’s womb when the proper parts come together in syngamy. The proper parts include the soul-part and the body-part. These parts comprise a substance or two substances that unify as one. Therefore, there is still a clear distinction between the two parts. Immaterial or mental substances are distinct from physical or bodily substances. Parturient variations of traducianism seem to be emergent in nature, as well.

One example of an emergent and parturient form of traducianism is a version of hylomorphism (e. g. composite substance dualism).45 Hylomorphism that is also a kind of substance dualism does not entail traducianism. This much is true, but it does not mean hylomorphism cannot be a form of traducianism. Let me lay out how this is possible. Hylomorphism is a form of constituent ontology. The necessary constituents include the biological organism that has latent active capacities and passive liabilities and the soul. According to hylomorphic-traducianism, soulish stuff depends upon the gametes that give rise to some new emergent person resulting from the occurrence of syngamy.46 There

44 A soul might be a simple in a very tenuous sense whereby it has essential parts that are necessary and the person cannot be reducible to those parts.

45 Hylomorphism could be worked out as a fissile variation.

46 James P. MORELAND / Scott B. RAE, Body and Soul: Human Nature and the Crisis in Ethics (Downers Grove, Illinois: IVP, 2000), 221. Something like this is Moreland’s version of Thomist dualism. It might be objected that Aquinas explicitly stated he was a creationist, but his Thomist
are two constituent parts, body and soul, that constitute the composite person. On a hylomorphic variety of substance dualism the person is a composite of both the body and the soul, such that the two substances are modally distinct from the other, but ontologically comprise a human person as substance. On this view, physical matter is the potency for form, and form is the actuality of physical matter. The soul exists in physical matter. According to this view, the soul does not comprise a complete human substance, but the human substance is a body and soul composite.

The picture of origins on hylomorphism may be something like the following. One could view the soul and body as spatially present with the other, but two different things. If a proponent of hylomorphism construes natures as powers, then natures are complex things made up of parts. When various parts come together those parts, become a new nature. A rational soul with a body composes human nature. When these parts unite, a new nature comes to exist. Both the soul and body are able to self-breed or reproduce under certain conditions in a similar fashion. Alternatively, it could be that the gametes carry soul-stuff. It is not that rational souls have always existed dependent upon physical organisms, but exist dependent upon the successive pattern of generation (i.e. diachronically) all the way back to the first created soul. Thus, on this view a distinction is clear between souls and physical matter.

The picture of a Cartesian-traducian with modification might also be a form of traducianism and parturient emergentism. Cartesianism seems to entail creationism and most Cartesians are also creationists, but the position does not entail creationism. Cartesianism, generally speaking, is distinct in that souls are persons and souls are simple things that are not divisible. On a parturient modification of Cartesianism, souls are still persons but persons carry soulish stuff along with the gametes and give rise to distinct individual souls. It is still Cartesian in the sense that the persons are souls. Yet, on this modification of Cartesianism, a soul is a complex rather than a simple. This is distinct from the above dualism could be worked out as a kind of emergent-traducian view and Moreland provides an example of this sort that might be a version of traducianism or emergent-creationism.

47 The age old expression: 'more than the sum of its parts,' applies to this position. Hylomorphism contends that there are two parts constituting persons, but persons are not reducible to those parts.

48 A modified Cartesian traducianism could be fissile in nature or parturient in nature.

49 See Oliver D. Crisp, An American Augustinian: Sin and Salvation in the Dogmatic Theology of William G.T. Shedd (Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock, 2007), 30–32. Here Oliver Crisp gives a useful discussion of modified Cartesianism and how it might fit with traducianism. He also mentions how souls might not be fissile, but could be parturient wherein souls extrude themselves.
hylomorphic variety of substance dualism in part because it does not contend that the person is essentially composed of two substances, both body and soul. Essentially, the person as substance is his soul that has a body whereas on a hylomorphic view the person as substance is a body and soul composite.

Philosophically, the advantage of this view for theology is that it offers us a clear and coherent view on how individual souls unite to other souls. As shown above, it is plausible to suggest that all human souls unite in virtue of a generating mechanism, fissile or parturient. Souls, potentially, unite because each soul is successively generated by a previous soul (e.g. synchronically). This has important implications for theology, which I will briefly discuss toward the end of the article. Having this advantage also lends this view to a particular disadvantage.

The downfall of this view is that souls have the potentiality to divide. One could argue that traducian-souls bear the essential property of being potentially divisible. The reason for this is that divisibility follows naturally from the fact that traducian-souls are either fissile or parturient. While there may not be an actual division it is strongly conceivable that the soul divide – hence a modal reality. This too has ramifications for one’s theological construction. I will address this, briefly, below.

In view of the preceding discussion, it should be clear that there are some alternative options construed as traditional-traducianism that are distinct from a contemporary view known as emergentism or emergent substance dualism whereby the soul somehow emerges from a physical base. By way of establishing the discussion, I have suggested a few views on souls that are traditional and traducian in nature. Now I turn to consider another position on the soul that is both traditional and creationist with respect to the soul’s origin.

3.2 Simple or Traditional-Creationist Soul (Special Creation)

The traditional-creationist\textsuperscript{50} view might also be termed the “Special Creation” view. This view finds much support in Ecclesiastical history and, arguably, Scriptural support.\textsuperscript{51} Cartesian dualism is naturally a form of traditional-creationism, and most Cartesians are creationists.\textsuperscript{52} It seems that a simple or pure form of Cartesianism

\textsuperscript{50} This is the default view throughout Church History. Traditionally, Roman Catholics and the Protestant-Reformation generally tended toward accepting a creationist view of souls.

\textsuperscript{51} See Gen. 2:7; Num. 16:22; Ps. 12:7; 139:13–14; Ps. 104:30; Eccl. 12:7; Isa. 42:5; 57:16; Jer. 1:5; Zech. 12:1; Heb. 12:9. These are scriptural passages that have been commonly used throughout Ecclesiastical history in support of Creationism whether a simple or special creation.

\textsuperscript{52} Or this could apply to platonic souls. Platonic and Cartesian souls are not exactly the same, but for purposes here I simply refer to Cartesian souls. Both views hold that the person is
entails some sort of creationism, but it may be that some variations of composite substance dualism cohere with a simple-creationism or traditional-creationism. Cartesianism is not the only creationist view. There are similar views I discuss this as a live possibility reflecting a traditional-creationist view of the soul’s origin. For my purposes here, I intend to give a picture of how these souls originate. Let me first offer a tentative definition of traditional-creationism.

Traditional-Creationism: As a matter of logical priority not temporal priority, God creates the soul as the primary cause of the concrete part/soul. He, then, attaches the soul to the concrete part-body that is generated by a parent(s) at the moment the body begins to exist. Alternatively, it could be that God creates the soul, and at the moment, God creates the soul it is causally interactive with the body and/or immediately unites with the body. The soul is not generated or emergent from a subvenient base of physical matter and/or non-physical stuff.

Peter Lombard, it seems, articulates something along these lines, “The Catholic Church teaches that souls are created at their infusion into the body.” A contemporary example of this kind of creationism that might fit with much of Ecclesiastical tradition is John Foster. John Foster in pressing in on the metaphysical relationship of the body and soul as a brute grounded in a personal explanation and argues further for the view that it must be Divinely caused not generated. Thus, there is a direct and vertical link/relation between the Divine and human on this view of origins. Foster explains it this way,

An apparent difficulty for the Cartesian view is that there seems to be no remotely plausible way of accounting, in natural terms, for the existence and functional role of the postulated nonphysical subjects. Biological life begins at conception, when an ovum and a sperm

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54 Human bodies are only secondarily caused by God unless one is a concurrentist wherein God would be directly involved somehow in the process. This could be in terms of ratifying.
55 The only emergence may come from the unity-relation between the body and soul that ensues new properties that would probably be structural or some how deducible from the unity-relation of the two substances. Some examples would include sensation, some feelings and knowledge of other bodies.
56 Peter Lombard, Sent. II, d. xviii. Quote taken from Siegfried (see above, n. 53).
fuse to produce a new unitary organism. However, it is hard to see how this process, or the subsequent development of the organism, could create an additional nonphysical substance and functionally attach it to the organism in the relevant way. The answer, it seems to me, is that we should explain these things by appeal to the creative role of God... it is God who creates the nonphysical subjects and arranges for their functional attachment to the appropriate organisms; and, at least in the case of human beings, theology can offer some account of God's purpose for doing this, and of why that purpose is rationally appropriate to his nature... Theism enables the Cartesian to explain the existence and role of the non-physical subjects; and, because this is the only satisfactory explanation, the argument for the Cartesian view becomes itself a powerful argument for the existence of God.57

It is important to note that in Foster's novel argument, he begins with the relationship between the body and soul, and then moves to the actual existence of the soul as explanatorily grounded in God. On this view, there is not an obviously natural connection between the two such that the further removed problem of the soul requires an explanation outside of the physical domain and its processes. This explanation is rooted directly in a Divine choice-event one might argue. This furnishes a connection between simple/pure substance dualisms in the mind-body literature with that of origins, and it becomes a distinctive theoretical option.

The picture that applies to traditional-creationism is the idea that God creates each individual soul directly and immediately and attaches/infuses that soul to a body. God is not the secondary cause with the primary cause being a physical evolutionary mechanism. This soul is a concrete particular or a substance made up of essential properties that internally unite as a substance of an immaterial kind.58 59 Hence, it is distinct from traducianism where the first soul generates other souls.60

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57 See Foster (see above, n. 26), 29.
58 I do not see any reason why God could not create souls either way and how this would drastically affect the arguments I am making here.
59 Physical life is continuous to varying degrees. This certainly rubs against modern sensibilities where physical reality is one unified and continuous whole. On some variations of souls it requires a suitable body, which may require God's power within the created structure.
60 A philosophical/theological objection immediately arises when thinking of parents and their relationship to the generation of the child. The objection says something like parents have a deep connection to their children because of the procreative act. If God directly creates the soul that is identified with the person, then the parents are merely engaged in the procreative act of the animal part of humans. David Albert Jones made me aware of this in The Soul of the Embryo: An enquiry into the status of the human embryo in the Christian tradition, (see above, n. 1), 106. An initial response is to say that there is more to the human body than mere physicality and that the soul is fashioned by God to be embodied. So the significance is that the parents are participating in the act of procreating a human person with God. This is no small matter. Furthermore, I think emergent-creationism may be a more half-way house between traducianism and creationism. I explore this position below. I do not think this poses a problem for creationists. It might also
Therefore, this view of the origin of souls provides a distinct picture not only of souls, but also of God’s relationship to those souls.61

There are two kinds of souls that it would seem might need some kind of direct creative action on God’s behalf. First, an immaterial bare substrata/ particular would require the direct creative action of God. Second, an essentialist view of an immaterial substance might require the direct creative action of God.

The bare substrata or particular view says that there are concrete particulars that have causal powers and are property-bearers, but these particulars are not composed of the said properties. Instead, the substrata or bare particular underlies all properties predicated of it. Michael Loux defines substrata this way:

Substrata are not bare in the sense of having no attributes; they are bare in the sense that in themselves they have no attributes; and what this means, he will claim, is that none of the attributes that a substratum has figures in its identity; it has a “being” independent of all of them.62

Whilst I am referring to the bare particular view, I am not referring to any old bare concrete particular, but, specifically, to a mental/soulish bare concrete particular. What is essential on this view is that there is a substratum or particular that is property-less in abstraction from the concrete world.63 Two substances are distinct in that they have two differing substrates. A substrate to some extent has an existence all on its own distinct from its attributes.64 If mental substrates or bare particulars are coherent and plausible then it seems that there is a need for a creation of these kinds of things.65 It would be the kind of thing created immediately, not mediated via physical processes. These kinds of things are not built from the ground up instead; they seem to be basic brute realities – yet directly contingent upon Divine causation. It seems that these are neither emergent nor complex.

61 A proponent of ‘special creation’ could also affirm a young-earth creation view, progressive creationism or theistic evolution—unless on theistic evolution God is barred from interacting with creation and creating some things after the original act of creation.


63 It is not actually propertyless.

64 LOUX (see above, n. 62), 101–104.

65 Otherwise how would this kind of thing without parts and without properties that is a simple come about through a traducian mechanism?
They are basic brute realities that require some sort of explanation. God as creator seems a plausible explanation of such entities.\textsuperscript{66}

Another option is a form of essentialism with respect to the soul. This view is a middle path between bare particulars and bundle theories. Essentialism is the notion that a subject has essential properties. This is distinct from a bare particular that is not comprised of essential properties. On this view, the picture would look something like God bringing all the necessary and essential properties together to form a soul and when the body reaches some sort of complexity, then God either creates the substance/soul in the body or creates the substance/soul and attaches it to the body.\textsuperscript{67}

Cartesianism might work along the lines in terms of the above-mentioned kinds of substance. Cartesianism would look something like God creating the bare substrata or fashioning the soul with essential qualities, and then attaching it to the body. Moreland defines it this way:

> According to Cartesian creationism, egg and sperm are merely physical-chemical entities and the PR\textsuperscript{68} conditions are sufficient for the generation of a human’s body, which, you will recall, is merely a physical object. On the Cartesian creationist view, at some point between conception and birth, God creates a soul and connects it to a body that results entirely from PR conditions.\textsuperscript{69}

This naturally fits with variations of Cartesian-like views of souls that are traditional and creationist in nature. One could think of the soul as identical with persons that is an indivisible thing. A proponent of simple or traditional creationists-souls holds to such radically different natures between souls and bodies and connected to this radically different origins for bodies in contrast to souls that there is no obvious, necessary or sufficient condition tying the two together. Divine arbitration may ground the relation, but beyond that, there is no clear

\textsuperscript{66} This is not a God of the gaps fallacy. At times God fills an epistemic role in our explanatory process. It seems that in cases like these there is a warrant for positing God as the explanation. Persons are such, on this construal, that they require an explanation outside the spatio-temporal world.

\textsuperscript{67} It could be that the soul itself that is apt for and naturally embodied is a human soul. It seems on this view that the human soul has an essential property or set of properties comprising the \textit{imago Dei} that are then instantiated in the soul and/or soul body union. This certainly fits with Cartesian dualism or potentially other forms of substance dualism wherein the person is identified with his/her soul. Arguably, the \textit{imago Dei} is the set of properties or a property (being universal) of a particular that must be created by God and cannot come about in the natural order according to physical processes.

\textsuperscript{68} PR stands for physical conditions in reproduction and is aptly descriptive using terms of physical science. \textsc{moreland / Rae} (see above, n. 46), 220.

\textsuperscript{69} Ibid. 220.
connection. This does not undermine the validity of the position, necessarily, but for those desiring to unite the two concrete parts he/she should look to alternative solutions. This does not undermine the body’s usefulness to the soul if the body enhances the soul’s powers. Furthermore, there may be some robust relation between the body and soul, but whatever it may be is sufficiently vague or inaccessible. This is where simple or traditional-creationism is distinct from the other three positions on soul’s relation to the body and the origins of the soul.

There are two apparent theological benefits following from creationism. First, given the reality that creationist-souls seem to depend upon God’s directly causing souls to exist there seems to follow a causal link between human souls and the Divine. This causal relation provides a metaphysical basis for man’s transcendence above other created entities in the physical world. Furthermore, it gives the theologian reason to think that human souls are truly unique and reflective of the Divine in important ways, arguably. Second, creationist-souls provide the theologian with the coherent rationale for thinking that souls will persist beyond somatic death. This is so because the soul is not necessarily or essentially divisible. In fact, there is nothing in the makings of the soul that lend it to being divisible. These matters deserve further attention and greater argumentation beyond this one article.

One potential downfall of a creationist view of souls is that there is not a sufficiently robust relationship to the body — a common objection to substance dualism in general. One might argue that the body is significant and a part of the soul on rational, empirical, and theological grounds. Thus, if the soul does not have a

70 As stated before, John Foster has posited this solution to the mind-body problem and, I suppose, by extension he would posit something similar with respect to the soul’s origin in relation to the body. It is established by Divine fiat.
71 Ecclesiastes 12:7 might be put forward as support for this view in that the soul came from God and goes back to God. Contrast that with the fact that the body came from the ground and will go back to it.
72 This is in seed-form the foundations for an argument for the image of God.
73 Consider the Scriptural teaching on the ‘intermediate state’. If the Scriptures teach that persons persist, then we need a view that will satisfactorily account for this modal possibility. Also, consider that if there is a ‘real’ physical resurrection from somatic death, then something needs to account for the persistence. A creationist-soul would seem to provide this possibility. There are of course two other views that proponents of other varieties of substance dualism might consider, but these have a cost. One could affirm Peter van Inwagen’s ‘body-snatching model’ whereby God takes the body just prior to it actually dying and providing a simulacrum, but this defies our sense perception and makes God out to be a great deceiver. Another view, developed by Dean Zimmerman, is that bodies have ‘budding properties’ and these properties actually give rise to another new body thus establishing causal continuity between the dead body and the post-resurrection body. See both of these views developed in Personal Identity and the Resurrection, ed. by Georg Gasser (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2010).
sufficient unity relation to the body to account for these matters, then the theologian has reason to dismiss this view outright. I am not sure this an accurate portrayal of creationist-souls. Given the state of the philosophy of mind, if one could provide a clear account of composite substance dualism and a natural relation between the body and soul in terms of origins, then one may be able to answer the ‘why’ question behind the soul-body union. The former would require an explanation as to how the soul and body are united as one substance not merely an interactive relation between the soul and the body. The latter would require the body is having some sufficient causal role in the soul’s origination. It may be that the soul has an internal structure with a design for a particular body such that it is ‘realized’ in the particular body within the context of physical evolution or the soul is immediately functionally supervenient upon the body. This means that that lower-level realities of the body and the soul give rise to higher-level realities when the two concrete parts unite given their teleological relationship. This is not to say that the soul comes to exist because of the body causing it to exist, but that the body has some mediating role and provides the functional arrangement for the soul such that the two simply exist as one functional and phenomenological unit. Yet, this too will require further theological reflection.

I have addressed two positions on the soul’s origin. While I believe there are reasons for rejecting traducian views in favor of creationism the arguments in favor of creationism are not decisive. Traditional-creationism, as well is a viable option worthy of consideration. Throughout Christian tradition, there is an inclination toward creationism, which is implicit in what I argue for here. Finally, I put forward one novel view deserving further theological reflection.

4 William Hasker and Emergent Substance Dualism (ESD): Materialist Generation of Souls

Hasker is not the only person contending for emergent substance dualism (hereafter ESD) but he is the recognized authority on this position. To begin let me offer a tentative definition of ESD and materialist origins.

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74 Tad M. Schmaltz offers a useful discussion on the distinction between the interactive relation and union in the context of developing a Cartesian view of psychological causation that is fitting here. See Tad M. SCHMALTZ, Descartes on Causation (Oxford: OUP, 2008), 131–140.

75 There has been a great deal of buzz in the contemporary discussion over emergent dualisms. W. D. Hart would be one example of an emergent substance dualist. See W. D. HART, The Engines of the Soul (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988). Interestingly, Hart does not
ESD and Materialist Generation of Souls: the notion that souls are generated primarily by at least one and at most two parents, and only secondarily created by God via an emergent mechanism whereby God so structures and creates the physical matter with conscious stuff that a soul emerges at some suitably complex neural state. A mechanism directly causes the emergence of a new *sui generis* unified subject that sustains or has mental properties and powers.76

The creation story of persons within emergentism is along the lines of God designing physical matter with the plurality and diversity of different life, such that at some complex level of biological evolution human persons would evolve. Emergent substance dualism is a new view in the discussion on the origin of souls. As a variety of substance dualism, it deserves consideration in the debate over origins in theological anthropology. While it is similar to traducianism, it is not accurate to categorize it as such. It is traducian-like in that a physical-like process generates a soul. Emergent substance dualism is also similar in some respects to non-reductive physicalism in that the mind/person comes about from lower-level physical processes. Emergent substance dualism is distinct from non-reductive physicalist views in that it actually affirms a new *sui generis* substance obtaining from a material substance at some level of neural complexity.77 Emergent substance dualism literally holds to a real mind/soul that is pre-requisite for new properties/powers or obtaining simultaneous with new properties/powers characteristic of persons. Both non-reductive physicalism and emergent substance dualism are similar in that there are law-like connections that establish the intimate connection between body/brain and the mind or physical stuff with phenomenal

endorse dualism in connection with theism, but if he did his might be categorized as similar to the position developed here. I am not sure how Hart accounts for a soul’s contingent existence apart from a supernatural entity with causal agency. Dean Zimmerman has also written on the subject of emergent substance dualism. See a useful and recent article of his ‘From Property Dualism to Substance Dualism,’ in *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society. Supplementary*, Vol. LXXXIV, (2010).

76 This of course is my attempt to codify the essential elements for the purposes of developing a systematic definition. To my knowledge, no one has offered a definition of this view. As explained elsewhere *sui generis* literally means deeply foundational. It is a wholly new thing when categorizing entities in ontology. It is not deducible or reducible to its constituent parts.

77 The non-reductive physicalist of a property dualist sort might speak of the soul loosely or in layman’s terms that refer to the thoughts, intentions and emotions of man, but not literally as if there is an immaterial substance. The person on this view is literally a physical substance with new properties of a different sort than other properties exemplified in the physical world. For an example of this view see Nancey Murphy, “Nonreductive Physicalism: Philosophical Challenges,” in *Personal Identity in Theological Perspective*, ed. by Richard LNTS et al. (Grand Rapids, Michigan/Cambridge U.K.: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 2006), 95.
and conscious experience. However, where does conscious-stuff or qualities of an immaterial thing come? This is essential to understanding ESD.

William Hasker in a recent essay touches upon the relationship of the soul to the body and its implications in terms of human souls and their origins. After working through materialism and traditional substance dualism, he offers a possible solution to both the mind-body problem and the problem of the soul’s origin. Hasker states this:

Here is an initial proposal: a viable solution needs to consider the mental lives of human beings and animals together, rather than separately. The reason for this can be seen in some of the views we’ve already considered. To those who begin by thinking just about the minds/souls of humans, especially when the topic viewed in a religious context, the very idea of “soul” tends to have some rather lofty, “spiritual” connotations... On the other hand, thinkers more inclined to naturalistic or materialistic views tend to start with animals and reduce the psychic life of human beings to what can be explained in the same terms they apply to animals.

It seems that these qualities or conscious-making stuff comes about from previous organisms in the physical universe through the evolutionary process. Somehow, conscious-making mechanisms reside in physical matter, but this is not the same as saying conscious subjects exist from previously existing stuff in the natural world. Something new comes from natural physical stuff, but the new thing is distinct from the previously existing stuff. It is not something that, as of yet, is empirically verifiable but it is a theoretical hypothesis given what we know about the physical universe in conjunction with what we know about persons – that come about later in the evolutionary process. One might think this, then, leads to the organic relationship between kinds in the ‘continuity of species,’ if

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78 The advantage of emergent substance dualism is that there is actually a new substance that is distinct from the material substance. With property dualism that holds to substance materialism there is a great deal of ambiguity as to what the person as a material substance is. All of our common sense objects seem to fall short of being identified with persons. Whereas, with emergent dualism there is a substance that has conscious experience. Zimmerman insightfully develops this in his recent article, 'From Property Dualism to Substance Dualism.'


80 Hasker, Souls (see above, n. 1), 211–212. While the theological issue of origins is closely and intimately related to the mind-body, problem and its solutions due to the relationship between the mind and body the two are not the same and deserve some clear dis-ambiguation. Hasker’s essay, while very good, tends to blur these issues.
in fact there is no outside influence of creation ex nihilo after the original creation of the world.\textsuperscript{81} On this view, it is true that physical stuff is fundamental and physical mechanisms bring about various kinds and species of things. On ESD because a conscious making stuff exists in physical matter there is an ontological link between a variety of species connected to the origin of physical life, hence common ancestry. This leads to the next tenant of ESD concerning the metaphysical relationship between humans and other animals.

The notion of an ontological link between dogs and humans seems to presuppose a connection between species and the idea that consciousness is a scaling or a degreed property. Hasker does not use these terms, but he implicitly makes this link when considering the conscious life of higher-level animals and humans.

Hasker also argues that this presumes a fine-grained dependence of mind/soul on brain, which the empirical data supports. This is not to say that the soul and body/brain simply influence the other, but that there is an intimate dependence of the soul on brain. If the brain is not properly functioning, then the soul will not function properly.

On the dualistic view, why should consciousness itself be interrupted by drugs, or a blow on the head, or the need for sleep? And why should reasoning, generally thought of as the distinctive activity of the conscious mind, be interrupted by such physical disturbances? The natural conclusion from Cartesian dualism would seem to be that consciousness should continue unabated during such times.\textsuperscript{82}

This gives the theologian reason to think that on this view there is an actual union between the soul and the body not simply an interactive relation. On this view, the emergent relation between soul and mind establishes a more intuitive and natural relationship between the two entities and seems to unite the two intimately.

The theological benefit of this view is two-fold. First, it offers a view on human persons that gives us a coherent understanding on the relational union of body and soul, yet maintains a distinction between persons as mental substance that is a body. In contrast to more pure/simple varieties of creationist-dualism where the nature of the union between the human soul and the human body is not entirely clear. Second, ESD with materialist origins has the resources to tell a

\textsuperscript{81} Creation out of nothing may only be an event at the moment the world comes into existence. Once, physical matter comes into existence, it seems, all of life seems to emerge through physical evolution.

\textsuperscript{82} IDEM, Emergent Self (see above, n. 1), 154. Also see Peter van Inwagen’s ‘remote controlled airplane’ thought experiment.
story whereby all humans are relationally united. This view, potentially, shares this benefit with traducianism.

Two problems seem to follow for ESD with materialist origins. First, this view has virtually no support in Ecclesiastical tradition. In fact, all the views on souls and/or persons included the notion of some sort of direct Divine creation concerning a soul. Both creationist and traducianist affirm that God created at least one soul. Depending on one’s assumptions about tradition as a source of theological authority, this has the potential of being a strong mark against such a view. Second, materialists and dualists argue that ESD may not be a genuine variation of substance dualism. Some argue that ESD may not be a species of substance dualism because it does not hold a strong enough distinction between physicality and spirituality, but this is beyond the scope of objectives in this article.

4.1 Synopsis

What I have shown in this section is the relationship between substance dualist solutions and the theology of origins. Considering both substance dualism and the theology of origins will have implications on theology and ones reading of Scripture. My hope is that theologians will draw from the resources of philosophy of mind and resurrect the discussion on the theology of the soul’s origin. There are three areas that I see one’s personal ontology/anthropology and origins as having massive theological ramifications.

4.2 Origins and Theological Anthropology

First, theologians must come to grips with personal ontology in relation to the natural world. How human persons relate to the rest of Divine creation will necessarily involve appropriation of anthropological models with the doctrine of creation as the reader finds it in Scripture and the natural sciences. William Hasker, as seen above, has put forward substantial data that deserve further reflection not only for philosophers, but also from theologians. Additionally, one’s particular model of anthropology will look different in light of the data. This is not to

say that each model will cohere with the natural sciences or that integration is possible, but that theologians must engage these very questions.

Second, theologians will find that the above discussion have important implications for the doctrine of original sin and corruption. Specifically, how individual souls/persons unite to their bodies and, by extension to other human beings will provide reasons for thinking the doctrine of original sin is coherent and justified. Historically, traducianism has offered a solution by way of suggesting that souls unite to other souls in virtue of the souls generating new souls in a successive manner. Thus, on this view, there is a ground for understanding the transmission of original sin via a ‘generating mechanism’. I put forth two ways in which a soul generates another soul, as seen in the philosophical literature. These two views on generation include parturient souls and fissile souls. In a similar way, it appears that a proponent of ESD with materialist origins could affirm the coherence of original sin along with traducianism. This is so in terms of the ‘emergent mechanism’ that unites the soul to its respective physical organism in evolution. Creationism is a different matter. With respect to creationist-souls, historically speaking, there is not a coherent manner in which to ground the transmission of original sin. On a creationist understanding, the originally created soul (e.g. Adam-soul) can only ‘represent’ successively existing souls – or so this is the argument. This objection to creationist-souls will depend upon the nature of the relation between the body and soul. This will require that theologians interact with the variations of substance dualism and creationism. The intricacies of the nature of union may have significant ramifications for the debate.

Third, and finally, personal ontology and the theology of origins have significant implications for personal eschatology. Any view that is to account for personal eschatology must be able to account for the state between somatic death and somatic resurrection, personal continuity, and the continuity between the person and the resurrected body. Both ESD with materialist origins and traducianism seem to be at a disadvantage with respect to personal eschatology. The reason for this, as seen above, is that each view posits a view of souls and/or personhood that is potentially divisible. If the soul/person is divisible, then it is natural to question whether the soul/person will cease upon somatic death. In contrast, creationist-souls have the potential to persist through somatic death to somatic resurrection – arguably. It is in virtue of the souls being either simple or indivisible and its being sufficiently distinct from material parts that safeguard it from this danger. Specifically, how the soul re-unites to the resurrected body will depend upon the model of substance dualism and the view of origins one affirms. While interesting, these matters are beyond the scope of this particular article and require further engagement among theologians.
5 Conclusion

What I have hoped to have shown is the intimate connection between substance dualism in the philosophical literature and origins in the theological literature. The two are so close that one tends to bleed into the other, thus requiring cross-disciplinary discussion. Furthermore, the intricacies of personal ontology and origins seem to have important and significant implications for other doctrinal loci – as has been clear throughout Ecclesiastical history. These models of anthropology serve to clarify positions on origins offering the theologian greater variety in our contemporary times due to advances in the philosophy of mind. Whilst the philosopher has gone to great lengths to provide us with a variety of substance dualist models, it is important that this work not stop here. Instead, the theologian must take up these models and with greater facility address the problems surrounding the origin of souls in our contemporary times.