This text gives popular summary of
main arguments against materialism (physicalism), in favor of pluralism. The
author asks reader’s excuse for his English, which is far from being perfect.
You can e-mail the author: sepety@yahoo.com
Dmitry Sepety
Refutation of Materialism
Every one of us have consciousness:
we think, believe in something and doubt, feel pain and pleasure, grief and
joy. Our consciousness is something we are most familiar with – it is the world
of our feelings, emotions, thinking, experiencing and understanding of our
existence – it is our own self as something which feels and thinks.
At the same time, consciousness and
all which belongs to it are very mysterious ‘things’. It isn’t possible to
observe them from outside, to see or touch them; they have no size, form or
colour; they can’t be measured by ruler or scales or any complicated apparatus.
Throughout many centuries philosophers are debating about what consciousness is
and what are its relations with the material world – the world of things and
processes, which are situated in the certain place, have certain size, form,
colour, which can be observed from outside, seen, touched, measured,
photographed, painted etc.
We all know, thanks to science, that
our consciousness is connected with some physical structures and processes in
our body – the nervous system and the brain. But, if we could observe (with the
help of some complicated apparatus) how the nervous system and the brain work,
we would see some physical objects, which move, change their form, contract and
widen, - but we wouldn’t see feelings or thoughts. Feelings can be only felt as
your own feelings, thoughts can be only thought as your own thoughts – it is
impossible to observe the ones ore the others from outside. They are known to
us immediately – without seeing them (or observing from outside in any other
way).
Certainly, we can observe outward
manifestations of feelings. But, outward manifestations are not the things
which are manifested (feelings). If we see somebody’s face, we can guess by its
expression what he (she) feels. But we don’t see pain, grief or joy – we only
guess about these feelings as far as we know from experience how man who feels
pain, grief or joy looks or behaves. We wouldn’t have any idea about pain or
joy if we only observe people’s looks and behaviours – having no own (internal)
experience of feeling pain and joy.
Many people (especially, scientists)
by some reason think that feelings and thoughts, which can’t be observed from
outside but are experienced (felt, thought) immediately (from inside), and
those processes in the nervous system and the brain, which can be (in
principle, with the help of some complicated apparatus) observed from outside
but aren’t experienced immediately (from inside) – are the same things. They
think that humans are nothing very complicated automatisms – physical systems,
which are operated entirely by the physical laws. This position is usually called
materialism;
sometimes the name
physicalism is used. Materialists believe that consciousness is
nothing but work of the brain (physical processes in the brain). We will call
this theory –
the brain theory.
There are also many other people,
who think that consciousness can’t be “nothing but work of brain”, that
consciousness is something non-physical. This “something” usually is called
soul. We will call this theory –
the soul theory. People who think so
are usually called in philosophy
dualists for they believe that there
exist two various “substances” – spirit and matter, soul and body. Really, it
will be more correctly to use word ‘pluralists’ for some philosophers
who adhere this position think that there are more then two substances or basic
types of reality.
The Remark about the Content of the Notion of
Matter
The notion of matter in the common,
traditional sense is usually defined in one of two ways – we can call then
sensual and physical.
In the first case matter is defined
as some reality, which is characterized by two properties: 1) we
perceive it by external senses and 2) it
exists objectively – beyond, independently of our consciousness (perception,
knowledge, ideas) and have objective properties (which don’t depend on our
perception, on our knowledge or ideas about them etc.). There can be serious objection
against this definition: as it states that matter is something which exists
objectively, independently of perception, so it is logically incorrect to
define this “something” by subjective, perception. If existence and qualities of
matter don’t depend on perception, they would be the same even if we or anybody
who have ability of perception never existed. So, matter have to be defined by
objective qualities.
If our perception is definitive for
the notion of matter, it means that matter is something secondary with respect
to perception. Such definition is acceptable only from the idealistic point of
view; it presupposes definite answer on the question about relation of the
consciousness and the matter – idealistic answer. If we want to have some neutral
starting point for discussion of the question about relation of the matter and
the consciousness, we must define matter not by perception, but by
objective properties.
The sensual definition gives quite
adequate idea as to what we understand under the notion of matter. But defining
matter through consciousness it mixes exactly those notions, which have to be
accurately separated.
To investigate the problem of relation
between the matter and the consciousness, we need to understand not how
the matter is perceived, but
what is the matter itself, independently of
perception.
This problem is resolved by physical
definition of the matter:
matter is physical reality –
everything (and nothing more), that can de described by physical properties, –
such as coordinates in space, size, form, direction and velocity of movement,
acceleration, mass, electrical charge etc. (The question: “is there any other
reality?” is open to discussion.)
This definition can also give rise
to some objections. For example, A.F.Losev had pointed out existence of various
physical theories of matter and succession of such theories in the process of
historical development of the physics. But it seems to me that such objection
doesn’t hit the mark. Existence of various physical theories of matter – those
about the structure and organization of matter – doesn’t make impossible common
notion of matter, which is presupposed in all these theories and remains
invariant (unchangeable) in the process of development of the physics. Some
time ago it was believed that atoms are the smallest indivisible parts of
matter; later it was found out that atoms consist of smaller particles, which,
it their turn consist of yet smaller particles – and no one knows if there is
any limit to this divisibility. Some time ago no one knew about such property
of matter as electrical charge; it is possible that once scientists will find
out some new properties of matter which are unknown now. But, notwithstanding
all this, we can say that in its foundation the notion of matter remains the
same in all modern physics and even earlier – at least from the times of
Descartes (ÕVII century).
Descartes had defined this notion in
the very simple way – as
everything, which is characterised by the
attribute of extension (to distinguish it from the consciousness, which
is characterised by the attribute of thinking) – it means space properties,
such as space coordinates, size, form, changes of these characteristics in time
(velocity, acceleration etc.). Let’s remark, that all other physical properties
(such as mass or electrical charge), are only intermediaries, which
characterise influence of some object on the spatial properties of other
objects. So, if development of the physics
will show the need to introduce some other physical characteristics, they won’t
differ from the old ones essentially (as far as it concerns our problem) – the
first as well as the second can be reduced to the space properties (the
attribute of extension). So,
notwithstanding historical changes
(development) of the physics, there remains something unchangeable, invariant,
which is definitive for the notion of physical, matter. This invariant –
spatial properties (in Descartes’ terms – the attribute of extension).
On this foundation we can make such
definitions:
Material object
– the object occupying certain place in the space.
Material process
– The process of changing the place in the space, which is occupied by
some material objects.
Matter
–
totality of material objects and processes.
Let’s remark, that
although the sensual and the physical definitions of matter are different
logically, they agree
in practice: we perceive things by
external senses due to their physical properties, because they occupy certain
place in the space.
Nonetheless, this logical
distinction have essential meaning: physical properties, place in the space
play the role of the primary properties
of material things, properties of material things as they are (≡ as
physical objects), while our perception of these things have to be considered
as something secondary, derivative – really, it is not property of material
things as they are, but our property (property of our consciousness) to feel
and perceive them in a certain way.
The physical
definition, unlike the sensual one, makes it possible to make accurate
distinction between physical (material) properties and their perception.
Let’s take, for example, such a
property as colour. Is colour physical, material property or perception
(sensation)? Prima facie it seems that colour is property of material thing,
but really it isn’t exactly so. The notion of colour, as it is used in common
language, means not physical properties of the thing, but rather our
perception, sensation caused by some physical properties of the thing.
We have to distinguish 1) physical
properties, which cause some sensation of colour, and 2) sensation of colour.
We can call these properties (1) colour in the purely physical sense, which is
distinct from the common language sense (already embracing perception). Colour
in the physical sense – is property to reflect light (stream of
microelements-photons) in such a way, that causes acceleration of some material
objects having electromagnetical properties (in particular those, which are
contained in eyes), which value (that of acceleration) is changing with time
sinusoidally with certain frequency; so the difference of colours, from the
physical point of view, is difference of these frequencies of sinusoids of
acceleration.
It is clear, that all that physical
wording says nothing about colour in common language sense – property of thing
to cause our colour sensation. In their turn, our colour sensations say nothing
about any sinusoids and accelerations – about colour in the physical sense. At
the same time, we know, thanks to physics, that our colour sensations are
caused by those physical properties, which we named colour in physical sense.
But, on the other side, it is caused not only by these physical properties, but
also by sensitive constitution of our consciousness.
The discussion between materialism
and its opponents is revolving on such questions as: is it possible to reduce our sensations,
emotions, thoughts, and our own selves as some entities possessing abilities of
having sensations, feeling emotions, thinking thoughts, our consciousness – to
physical objects and processes (movements of physical bodies in the space and
their interaction by physical laws), to their own, “primary” (not relational to
consciousness, perception), spatial properties.
The Soul Theory vs. the Brain Theory
To understand argumentation of both
sides let’s imagine dialogue. Its participants:
Mike is physiologist. He had often made post-mortem
examinations of human bodies and vivisections of some animal’s bodies and he
never saw any such thing as a soul. So he thinks that soul is old women’s tale.
Peter is philosopher. He believes that
consciousness can’t be physical and that theory of brain is nonsense.
Mike.
I am sure that there is no such
thing as a soul. I and my colleagues made millions post-mortem examinations and
vivisections, – but soul was never found.
Peter. You talk nonsense. Soul isn’t
physical. It can’t be seen or touched. No wonder you didn’t found it, for you couldn’t
found it, in principle. You could found only physical things, and whatever you
found couldn’t be soul.
Mike. It seems to me that you, not me,
are talking nonsense. You talk about something no one have ever seen or
touched; something ‘in principle’ unseeable and undiscoverable by any apparatus
possible – so there is no reason to believe it exists; and there ‘in principle’
can’t be such reasons. You soul is pure mystification.
Peter. It is not so. There are strong
reasons to believe it exists. And there is no mystic in it. We have not only
external feelings – that of sight, touch, hearing, smell, taste, – but
also internal feelings of pain, pleasure, grief and joy, immediate knowledge
our thoughts, beliefs and doubts.
Mike. The science has found out that our
feelings and thoughts are nothing but physical processes in our brain and
nervous system.
Peter.
Nothing of the sort! The science
didn’t and couldn’t find out such things. All the science has found out (and
all it can find out) is that our feelings and thoughts are connected with
processes in brain and nervous system; that some processes in brain or nervous
system can evoke some feeling or some changes in the way of our thinking. So
the science has found out that there is
connection between processes in our
brain and our consciousness. But you say something quite different: that
processes in our brain and our consciousness
is the same thing. Your
view can’t be deduced in logically correct way from what the science has found
out; moreover, there is
direct logical contradiction between
the one and the other.
If we say that there is connection
between processes in our brain and consciousness, it means that processes in
our brain and consciousness are not the same, but different things. And vice versa, if we say that our
brain and consciousness is the same thing, there is no sense to speak about
connection. The statement about connection between
A and B can have sense
only if A isn’t
B. There is no sense to say that
A is connected with B
(or that A evokes
B) if
A is B.
Mike. Well, I don’t say that our feelings
and thoughts
are connected with processes in brain. I say that our feelings
and thoughts
are processes in brain.
Peter. But you were appealing to the
authority of the science. And now we see that the science doesn’t confirm your
view – rather on the contrary.
And … how can’t you see that
materialistic view is unreasonable?! Processes in my brain are some physical
objects moving, changing form, contracting and expanding. It is something we
can (in principle, with help of some apparatus) scan and see. But we can never
scan and see our feelings as they are, for they are felt, not seen.
Really, I never have seen processes
in my brain, but I always know what are my feelings and thoughts. So my feelings
and thoughts aren’t something to see or touch, they are given to my
consciousness immediately, as something which have no physical features.
Mike. But if we would get scientific
knowledge that some processes in brain corresponds with some feelings?
Peter. It would only confirm my theory. To
get such knowledge we need to have information, on the one side, about some
processes in brain, and, on the other side, about feelings man feels when such
processes occurs. To establish such correspondence we need information about
human feelings, and we can’t get such information by observation of processes
in human brains, – we can get it only by asking man what he
really feels. So we see that two sides between which we try to establish
correspondence must be really two sides, two various things, not one thing.
Mike. Hm-m-m. I am not sure yet.
Peter. Well. Let’s consider argument from
Stephen Law.
Let’s imagine that somewhere far
away there is planet Zet. It is inhabited. It’s inhabitants – we’ll call them Zetians
– are intelligent beings like us. They can think. They also have external
feelings similar with ours. But these feelings aren’t exactly same – they are
similar to that of humans only in so far as to give any physical information –
about place, size, temperature etc. For example, they can by touch to find out
all we can about form, roughness of surface, temperature. But they have no
feeling of pain, grief, joy – really, this feelings aren’t needed to get any
physical information.
Let’s imagine than Zetians have
powerful techniques that allows to scan any processes in the human bodies, to
get any knowledge about physical structures of human body and physical
processes that happens there.
So they take human and try to
understand what it means to feel pain or joy. They got all information about
physical processes in human bodies. They even got exact knowledge about what
physical processes happens in human body when humans feel pain and what
processes – when humans have joy.
But – if they haven’t anything like
feeling of pain and joy themselves – can they really understand what it means
to feel pain or joy?
Mike.
I think they won’t.
Peter.
But, as we suggested, they have all
knowledge about everything that is physical and concerns with these feelings.
So, if, having this knowledge, they
don’t understand what it means to feel pain or joy, – we
must make conclusion that feelings pain or joy isn’t physical – they belong to
some other, non-physical reality – we call this reality the soul.
Mike:
But there are no Zetians; they are
mere fiction!
Peter: It doesn’t matter – we are having
imaginary experiment!
If you don’t like idea with Zetians,
you can imagine physicist-daltonian, who knows everything about physical
structures and processes of nerve-brain system of humans, which is responsible
for feelings of colours, but have no idea as to what feeling of red or green
colour is like, how it is felt subjectively.
Or you can imagine another man. He
wears – beginning from his birth – special contact lenses, which can lengthen
out as he and his eyes grows and which make his vision black-white. He had
never taken them off. And he is physicist and knows everything about physical
structures and processes of nerve-brain system of humans, which is responsible
for feelings of colours. Nonetheless, he don’t know what feeling of red or
green colour is like; he can get this knowledge only id he take off his contact
lenses.
Mike: May be, there is some error in your
arguments…
Let’s suppose, Zetians have got
knowledge, what processes are happening in the nerve-brain system of humans,
when humans, by their own evidences, feel pain or other feelings.
If we now ask Zetian: what is
feeling of pain? – he will answer: feeling of pain is such and such complex of
processes in the nerve-brain system. And he can describe the difference between
this complex of processes and the complex which corresponds with other
feelings.
Let’s ask common man the same
question. I guess, he’ll be at a loss… May be, he will answer that pain is one
of the feelings he feel sometimes; but he hardly can explain what is feeling
and how feeling of pain differs from other feelings.
If we compare these answers, we’ll
see, that the answer of Zetian is more concrete, exact, informative. So, we can
infer that Zetian really knows, what is feeling, while common man doesn’t know?
Peter: It is interesting… But I think this
inference won’t be correct. You can give on any question the concrete, exact,
informative answer, which will be false. At the same time the less concrete, exact
and informative answer can happen to be true.
We, humans, know, what is pain,
grief or joy, for we have emotional experience of pain, grief or joy. When
someone says: “I am grieved” or “I am happy”, we understand the meaning of
these statements, even if we can’t explain it to someone who never was grieved
or happy. We can say, that feeling of pain, grief or joy is elementary
experience which can’t be further separated into its constituent parts or
reduced to some other experience, – and that is why it is impossible to
explain, what does it mean to feel pain, grief or pay, to those who had never
felt it.
We all know the meaning of the words
“pain”, “grief”, “joy”, “happiness” etc. To know it we needn’t to be
scientists. It is not scientific terminology, but the notions of common
language, which have the meaning, understood to everybody. They mean exactly
that, what they mean in common language, for common man. Really,
scientist-physicist or Zetian can use the same words in different (physical)
meanings, but in this case these words won’t mean the pain, grief, joy and
happiness we feel.
When we feel grief, we know
what we feel, although we know
nothing about physical structures and
processes of our nerve-brain system.
And vice versa. If we scrutinize through
some scanning device physical structures and processes in the nerve-brain
system of man, we won’t know what he feel.
Surely, we can get such knowledge if
we have some table of correspondence between physical processes and emotional or
mental states. But such table can’t be worked out on the basis of physical
information only – it can be worked out only if we confront physical
information with evidences of man about his feelings.
So, we can know
everything about what man
feels, while knowing
nothing about physical structures
and processes in his nerve-brain system. And vice versa – we can know
everything
about physical structures and processes in man’s nerve-brain system, knowing
nothing
about what he feels.
It follows as
logically necessary inference,
that
feelings
and emotions are not physical objects, structures and processes.
Variation.
When man says: “I feel pain” or “I
am happy”, he
says nothing about place, size, form, movement in space of some
bodies, - i.e. he says nothing about physical objects, structures and
processes; he communicates no physical information. But he says about something!
Exactly – he says about his feelings and emotions. So,
feelings and emotions aren’t
physical objects, structures and processes.
Me Friend Joe and the Man in the Mask
Mike: But nevertheless I think that there
is an error in your arguments. Let’s consider analogous example.
Let’s suppose, I have a friend. His
name is Joe. And, let’s suppose, I have heard in the news, that yesterday some
man in the mask had robbed the bank “Imperial”. It seems there is no connection
between these two facts. But let’s suppose, that this man in the mask – Joe,
but I know nothing of it. There is nothing impossible in it.
I can make such inference:
My knowledge about Joe contains no knowledge about the man in the mask.
So, Joe isn’t the man in the mask.
But such inference will be obviously
incorrect!
Your arguments have the like
appearance:
Knowledge about physical processes contains no knowledge about feelings.
(Or vice versa: knowledge about feelings
contains no knowledge about physical processes.) So, feelings aren’t
physical processes.
So, may be you make “the error of
the masked man”?
Peter: I don’t think so. These two
inferences only seem to be analogous. Really, there is essential difference,
which make the first inference incorrect, and the second – correct.
In the first case (that of Joe) we
have
some
knowledge about Joe and
some knowledge about the man in the
mask. And the first doesn’t contain the second. This really doesn’t allow to
make any inference on question: is Joe the man in the mask or no?
In the second case situation is
essentially different. It has to do not with
some knowledge about
physical processes in the nerve-brain system, but with
all such knowledge. We
can get
any knowledge about physical processes in the nerve-brain
system, but whatever such a knowledge we have, it won’t contain knowledge about
feelings.
If I could get all knowledge about
Joe, and if he really is the man in the mask who had robbed the bank, these
full knowledge about Joe would surely contain knowledge about the man in the
mask who had robbed the bank. For example, if I get video record, where all
life of Joe is written, I would see on it the man in the mask who is robbing
the bank.
And vice versa: if all possible
knowledge about Joe doesn’t contain knowledge about the man in the mask who had
robbed the bank, (for example, if video record of all life of Joe doesn’t
contain the fragment with the man in the mask robbing the bank) it would make logically necessary the
inference that Joe isn’t the man in the mask who had robbed the bank.
The Same Thing Seen from Various Standpoints?
One of the methods of defence of the
monism against the arguments of dualists
and pluralists is the next: the consciousness and the body is the same thing,
but seen from various standpoints. The simplest illustration we can use the
example, given by Stephen Law: traveller, who had seen the same mountain from
various sides can think that he had seen two various mountains...
Holland philosopher of XVII century
Benedict Spinoza was one of the first who proposed this idea, - he was neutral
monist and believed that the soul and the body, God and nature are the same,
only perceived through prisms of various attributes – that of thought and that
of extension. In ÕÕ century some philosophers-newpositivists had proposed
analogous theory – the theory of two languages – “position, according to which physics and
psychology are two ways of making theories, or languages, which deal with some
neutral «given» material;
statements of physics and of psychology are (shortened) statements about this
given material…; they are
merely two various ways to express the same facts”.
We can propose such arguments against
this theory.
In the case with mountain traveler
really had seen
the same mountain, but he had seen
not the same. Let’s
suppose, he had seen the western and the southern mountainsides. It is sure,
that the western mountainside isn’t the southern, and vice versa.
Let’s consider here also the case
with my friend Joe. My friend and the man who had robbed the bank is
the same person. But my friend Joe
is not the same with the man who had
robbed the bank. I can know everything about Joe as my friend and know nothing
about Joe as a robber. To be my friend Joe needn’t to be a robber, and to be a
robber he needn’t to be my friend. Really, to
be a robber isn’t the same with to be
my friend, and not a part of it. So, Joe as my friend and Joe as a robber
are “different things”, although the same person.
Mountain is a complex object which
has many
various parts and
aspects (such as various
mountainsides), properties, and this doesn’t make these various parts, aspects,
properties the same. This is true also about Joe who has such different aspects
as my friend and a robber.
In the same manner we can unite
under one notion – that of man – phenomena of mental and physical types (the
consciousness and the body), but they will remain
phenomena of various types.
Man is consciousness and body. But consciousness isn’t body.
I wear a red cap and a black boots.
Both are united by the same notion – “that, which I wear”. But this doesn’t
means, that my red cap and my black boots are the same. If I haven’t convinced
you, try to put on the boots instead of the cap.
But there is objection possible: it
isn’t always that various perceptions relate to different objects (different
aspects, parts, properties etc.). There are situations, when the same object is
given in various perceptions and is perceived differently.
Let’s take any material thing. If we
look at it with the naked eye, we won’t see that, which we will see
scrutinizing it through super-powerful microscope. In this case we see, that
the same seen through different prisms can look differently, although remains
the same.
Material thing is characterized by
space properties – place, size and form. We can get not only various
perceptions (for example, visual and tactile) of this thing (this various
perceptions could relate to various properties or aspects of the thing), – we
can get the same information about it through various perceptions – for
example, it is possible to define form and size of the thing not only visually,
but also (with closed eyes) tactilely. So it is possible to perceive the same
(the same parts, aspects and properties of the same thing) through various
perceptions, which are in no way similar to one another.
Isn’t the situation with feelings
and physical processes in nerve-brain system analogous?
I think, no. These situations are
essentially different. In examples above there is something which serves as
the
reason for ascription of various perceptions to the same object (the
reason for
identification the object given in the first perception with
the object given in the second perception), and which is lacking in the case
with feelings and physical processes in nerve-brain system. This
reason
for ascription of various perceptions to the same object is (and can only be)
the same properties, given in these perceptions.
The first and foremost, we take as
the reason for ascription of various perceptions to the same physical object
the property, which is (by definition of physical object as occupying some
place in the space) deciding for identification of physical objects – place in
the space. If we see water in the glass with the naked eye and then through
microscope, the reason for identification is the fact that we look at the same
place – on the supposition that during the time between various perceptions the
object in this place wasn’t substituted.
This case is like that with mountain
which is seen at first from afar and then from a very close distance. It is
obvious, that looking at it from a close distance we’ll see more details of
that part of the mountain which is within our field of vision, (larger number
of various parts and properties), but at the same time some parts of the
mountain which were seen from afar will now be out of our field of vision.
We can take as the reason for
ascription of various perceptions to the same physical object also the other
physical properties, which are common in these perceptions. For example, we see
some thing and so get knowledge about its size and form. Then we close the eyes
and we are given some thing (we don’t know if it is the same thing or no) and
we tactilely try to get idea about its size and form – and it seems that they
are the same as those of the thing we saw. This can serve as the reason to make
supposition that this thing is the same with the thing we saw. Surely, this
supposition can happen to be false, even in the case of two very similar
perceptions of the same type. (For example, I see the chair; then I close the
eyes; someone substitute the chair with the very similar one; I open the eyes;
it seems to me, that I see the same chair, although it is not so.) But in any
case, the reason for identification is the
sameness of some properties or the
absence of essential differences in properties – although we can get
information about these properties in various ways, through different
perceptions.
There is nothing of this kind in the
case with feelings and physical processes in the nerve-brain system. There is
no
reason for identification: feelings as such (as they are felt
subjectively) have no common features with that, which can be seen, if we
scrutinize physical processes in the nerve-brain system through some scanning
device. (It logically follows from the fact we already referred to: in the
common language statements about feelings bear
no information about physical structures and processes in the
nerve-brain system, although we understand very well the sense of these
statements, i.e. they bear other information.)
With the same success we can defend
statement which says, that my red cap and my black boots is the same thing
although it is perceived differently.
Now it is easy to show that the
theory of two languages (that of physics and of psychology – speaking about the
same facts) is false. Really, the facts concerned are those, which are given in
various perceptions, have no common features, and so there is no reason to
identify them.
If we get in some foreign country
and don’t know its language, to learn it and to get skill of translation (from
this language to ours and vice versa), we need to confront with one another the
means of expression
the same experience in foreign and our languages. But in the
case of physical and psychical phenomena we have to do with completely
different
experiences. (I’ll remind: if we have no special knowledge, our
knowledge about feelings says nothing about physical processes in the
nerve-brain system; and our knowledge about physical processes in the
nerve-brain system says nothing about feelings).
If we understand the foreign
language, we can make reciprocal translation between it and our language – we
can translate the statements of the one language (the statements, which express
certain facts) into the statements of the other language with the same sense
(the statements, which express the same facts). We understand the sense of
statements about physical processes and the sense of statements about feelings
and thoughts, but we can’t translate the ones into the others – because they
speak about different facts.
So, when we speak about physical and
psychical phenomena, we speak in the same (common – Ukrainian, English or
French) language about the different facts, – not in the different languages
about the same facts.
Is Soul-Body Interaction Possible and Does It
Needs Explanation?
Mike. Hm-m-m.
I don’t see how to refute this argument.
But, if there is such thing as a
soul which isn’t physical, how can it influence body which is physical? I think
you must explain how this soul works, how it make our body to move.
Peter. Really, I can’t explain it. And I
doubt if such an explanation is at all possible. But I think we can do without
such an explanation.
Mike. But it shows you position is week.
Really, you don’t resolve problem of consciousness, you only contrived some
trick to shun problem.
Peter. If you are right, then no science
resolves problems.
Mike.
Why so?
Peter.
That’s why. Any explanation has
form: Why
A? Because
B. We can explain any
A
only by reference to some
B. And to explain
B
we need some
C. So, ultimately we will come to some
Õ, which isn’t explained.
May be, it can’t be explained at all – it must be taken as “rough fact”,
without any explanation. In any case, at bottom of all our explanations there
always necessarily remains something unexplained.
So, I think that existence of soul
and the fact of its interaction with body is limit of explanation which can’t
be explained further.
Mike.
It’s strange. You talk about
sciences. Can you suggest any example?
Peter.
Surely, I can. I think there is no
natural science more developed and trustworthy than physics.
Mike.
I agree.
Peter.
So, let us take physics. You see
that ball? Let me lift it and let it go. How do you think, will it fall?
Mike.
Surely, it will.
Peter. But why? Can you explain?
Mike. Yes, of cause. There is gravitation
and it acts upon ball so it falls.
Peter.
Hm-m-m. Do you think it is good
explanation?
Mike.
Yes, I do. It accords with
gravitation theory of
Newton which is universally recognized to
be one of the best scientific theories.
Peter. I am surprised you are satisfied
with such mystical explanation and such shunning the problem. Really,
Newton himself thought it mystical and
tried to find something which better agrees with common sense. But neither he
nor his any other physicist couldn’t propose some better and non-mystical
theory?
Mike.
But why it is mystical and shunning
the problem?
Peter. Really, I don’t think it is. I
only repeat your words about the theory of soul, – for
situation with the gravitation theory is the same.
Mike.
Explain, please.
Peter. OK. Can you explain what
gravitation is and how it works? Really, have anyone ever seen such “thing” as
gravitation (or forces or fields about which physics says)? No. But all
scientists believe that it exists. So, if we’ll judge by your criteria we must
say that all these scientists are mystics.
And no one knows how this
gravitation works. Physics only takes existence of gravitation as a “rough
fact” and describes (not explains!) gravitational interactions by means of
mathematics.
Mike.
But can you at least describe
soul-body interaction?
Peter. Surely, I can – only not by means
of mathematics and not by one or some small number of formulas.
For example:
When my hand is beaten (body), I
feel pain (soul).
When I decide to lift my hand and
make volitional strain to do it (soul), my hand lifts (body).
And so on.
The Computer Analogy
Mike. But can’t we explain human
consciousness by analogy with computer? Really, there are many scientists who believe
that human brain is very complicated computer.
Peter. May be they are right in some
sense. I think it’s probable that brain works on the principles similar with
that of computer. But nobody really has proven it. As for me, I think that the
consciousness and the brain are different things which interact. So brain isn’t
self-sufficient and is in some way operated by consciousness (it is so with
computer also – for it needs programming and reprogramming by someone who have
consciousness).
In any case, the computer analogy
doesn’t explain consciousness.
Mike.
Why not? Isn’t our thinking just
processing information like that executed by computer?
Peter. I think it is not exactly it.
Really, our thinking isn’t only processing information, but also
understanding
its sense (meaning) and the sense of processing. We have no reasons to
believe computer can understand anything. Understanding,
being aware of sense – is
what distinguishes consciousness from simple processing information.
Information has sense (meaning) only
for humans, who understand it. As for computer, information is only combination
of physical (electromagnetical) states. (In the same way the ‘information’ in
the book, as it is by itself, without its understanding by somebody, is only
some configuration of black paint on paper.) Such combinations of physical
(electromagnetical) states (input information) evoke some physical
(electromagnetical) processes inside computer and these processes results into
other combinations of physical (electromagnetical) states – output information.
People found the way to use their
knowledge of physical (electromagnetical) laws so that they constructed complex
physical systems (computers) which after some adjustment (programming) could
imitate some processes of thinking – mathematical and some other formal
operations. But this imitation consists only in producing some combinations of
electromagnetical states (which are understood by people as numbers and letters
– output information) when they are influenced by other similar combinations of
electromagnetical states. Computers have no understanding of what their
electromagnetical processes and states mean – only humans have it because they
have consciousness.
So, thinking (as reality of
consciousness) is not only processing information, calculation, but also
understanding. Computers don’t think – for they have no understanding. Humans
made them to do some processing in certain way – so they do it without being
conscious of what they do and why they do it, of any information and of
themselves.
It is possible that human brain’s
organization is
largely similar with that of computer’s and uses the same
principles. But there is no reason to think that human brain’s organization is
completely
identical with that of computer, that it is self-sufficient for
thinking and leaves no place for influence of (interaction with) some
unphysical entity (the soul).
Really, computer analogy in no way
explains consciousness in its primary meaning – being conscious, aware of
something.
The Theory of Reflection
Mike: But our consciousness reflects the
world outside of it. So, isn’t it true that our consciousness is only the form
of some universal phenomenon of nature – reflection; that it is the highest form of
reflection which evolutionarily develops from the lower forms present in
inorganic nature – such as footprints or reflection in water? Famous German philosopher of XIX
century, Karl Marx, have written that “ideal is nothing but material
transplanted into human head and transformed there”. May be, he is right?
Peter:
Let’s consider simple example. Do
you see, there is an apple on the table?
Mike. Yes, I do.
Peter.
It is red and round, isn’t it?
Mike.
Yes, it is.
Peter.
So when you look at it you have
feeling of something red and round, haven’t you?
Mike.
Yes, ² have.
Peter. But, if we will scan you brain now
we surely won’t find anything red and round there.
Mike.
I think we won’t.
Peter. So, your feeling of red and round
isn’t red and round.
Mike.
Surely, it isn’t.
Peter.
So, how can your idea of apple be
reflection of apple? Is idea of wooden table wooden?
Mike.
Surely, it isn’t.
Peter.
Or, maybe the word ‘man’ has head,
body, arms and legs – like a man? Can idea of man go to and fro or speculate
about philosophy matters?
Mike.
What nonsense!
Peter.
So, I don’t see any sense in
statement that our feelings or ideas are reflections of things.
Mike.
But, you don’t understand the sense
of the theory of reflection. Really, you mustn’t take word ‘reflection’
literally! It means only that there is evolutionary development from simple
reflection through irritability and perceptibility to consciousness…
Peter.
I see. Ludvig von Mises was right
when he wrote that materialists never prove or concretize their theses and “put
forward nothing but metaphors and analogies” which “aren’t essential and
explain nothing”! Play on words – instead of
explanation.
I just imagine Karl Marx cutting
someone’s head, transplanting there red round apple and saying: “Now it will be
transformed and I will see what idea of apple is like!” It is far better then those
‘vulgar’ materialists who vivisected frogs in searches of soul and believed
that “the brain produces thoughts in the same way as the liver produces bail”!
Mike. But let’s return to the reflection theory…
Peter.
It is really very good theory which have only
one fault – it doesn’t explain what it pretends to explain.
Mike.
Why so?
Peter.
Because it only makes some tricks
with words instead of explanation. It uses some word (reflection) in the sense
which unites phenomena of completely different nature (although connected
functionally in living nature) and on this reason declares these phenomena to
be only various forms of the same phenomenon – reflection, which is declared to
be universal property of matter.
I’ll remind that in this theory the
word ‘reflection’ notifies:
1) reflection in the proper,
literal, narrow sense (pictures, footprints etc.);
2) physical processes in bodies
which are evoked as reaction on the outer physical influence;
3) components of consciousness
(feelings, ideas).
But it is obvious that footprints,
pictures etc. (reflection in the proper sense) are something quite different
comparing with the processes of reacting on the outer physical influence; and
that consciousness is something which is quite different comparing with the one
as well as with the other.
Phenomena of first two types belong
to physical world – they are something that can be seen or imagined by analogy
with visible objects and processes. They are physical objects (characterized by
such features as size, form, space position, color etc.) and physical processes
(changes of size, form, space position, colour etc.).
Phenomena of third type – feelings,
thoughts etc. – have no physical features. They have no size, form, space
position, colour etc. We can’t see or touch them – we can only feel or think
them. They constitute peculiar reality of consciousness, of subjectivity.
Theory of reflection doesn’t explain
how this consciousness, subjectivity, can ‘develop evolutionary’ from something
which has no consciousness, subjectivity – it only postulates. It is easy to
understand (in general outline) how physical transformations occur, how our
feelings and thoughts change, how our consciousness interact with our body. But
it is impossible to understand how consciousness can ‘evolve’ from something
(matter) which has no common features with it.
Followers of the theory of
reflection unite by one word things which are completely different by nature
(though connected functionally – which gives to this operation appearance of
validity) – and they think that by this verbal trick they have settled problem
and proven that all these things have the same (material) nature. But really it
is nothing but mere verbiage. It is as if we think that if we call two
different things by one name they will become the same thing.
We can say that our consciousness
reflects things only in very commonplace meaning – that it have to do with
outer world and can get knowledge about it; that our ideas about physical
world can be true – ‘reflection’ in this sense means only correspondence. In
any other, more concrete and ‘material’, sense identification of consciousness
with reflection is sheer nonsense.
The Dialectical Materialism
You can call cat by name ‘dog’ and
the Sun by name ‘Moon’, if you like it. But such perversion of common and
understandable language will do no good and only aggravates misunderstanding.
Ludvig von Mises. Socialism
Mike: It seems, your arguments against
materialism are correct, - but, it concerns only traditional materialism. But
there is another form of materialism – the dialectical one, - and it gives
answer on all your arguments.
Peter: I would like to know, how it does.
Mike: You see, your starting point is supposition
that matter is something which is described entirely by physical features. But
dialectical materialism says that matter can have various levels of
organization – and on the higher levels it obtains some new features which are
irreducible to the physical ones. Did your ever hear about Friedrich Engels’
theory?
Peter: I have heard something, but you
better remind me.
Mike: Engels says that ‘there is nothing
in the world but moving matter’; but there are several levels of its
organisation and special ‘forms of movement’ which are peculiar to these
levels. Engels distinguishes such levels of organisation of matter and
corresponding ‘forms of movement’: mechanical, physical, chemical, biological,
social. Social level is the level of
humans as social beings. And this theory contains three principles:
1)
forms of movement are peculiar to levels of
organisation of matter; every level is characterised by its own form of
movement;
2) forms of movement on various levels are
connected genetically; the higher ones emerge on the basis of the lower ones;
3) the higher forms of movement are peculiar and
irreducible to the lower ones.
Consciousness is the form of
movement of matter on the highest, social level of its organization.
Dialectical materialism admits that consciousness can’t be reduced to physical
features (although it emerges on their basis), so it can reject your arguments.
Peter: It seems to me that it is very
strange and unreasonable theory.
You have to be completely ignorant
in chemistry to assert that the chemical processes are irreducible to the
physical ones: the chemical processes are nothing but complexes of the physical
movements (joining and disjoining, moving closer and farther, regrouping in new
molecular structures) of physical objects (atoms, ions), which are described in
the language of chemistry (the way of description which is simpler and less
exact comparing with that of physics).
The same situation is with biology:
if we don’t admit that animals have subjectivity, consciousness, we have to
consider their life processes as nothing but physical movements of the parts of
their bodies, which are completely reducible to the physical and chemical
processes.
In fact, ‘irreducibility’ have place
only in relations between material (physical) and spiritual (non-physical).
According to Engels’ theory, matter
on higher levels (at least, the highest – social level) of organisation obtain
some new features which
1)
can’t be reduced to those features,
by which the concept of matter is traditionally defined (physical features);
2)
are just those characteristics which
are traditionally opposed to the concept of matter – non-physical, spiritual
features.
But if it
is so, this ‘matter’ isn’t already matter in the common sense of word.
Mike:
May be, the problem will be solved
by the other, untraditional definition of matter, which was given by V.I.Lenin?
Viz: “The only ‘characteristic’ of matter, which is essential for philosophical
materialism, is the characteristic of being the objective reality, of existing beyond
our consciousness.”
Peter: Don’t you see that such
‘definition’ deprives such ‘materialism’ of any traditional sense and also of
the sense which dialectical materialists themselves attribute to it? Don’t you
think that any materialism must be something distinct from idealism, dualism,
pluralism?
Mike:
Of cause, it must be.
Peter: So, the sense of materialism always
was determined by opposition to idealism, dualism, pluralism. Dialectical
materialists make stress on this opposition as well as traditional ones. But,
if we accept definition of matter as ‘objective reality’, the distinction
between materialism and its opponents loses any sense.
Opponents of materialism believe
that such non-material entities as soul, God, ideas, spirit etc. are objective realities
which exist beyond our consciousness – so, if we define matter as objective
reality, we must qualify them as materialists. But it is absurd, for sense of
any materialism (dialectical as well as traditional) consists in rejection of
such things’ existence, – which is quite contrary to recognition them as
objective realities!
I think that so called dialectical
materialism is nothing but humbug.
Dialectical materialists begin with substituting
the meaning of the word ‘matter’ – from traditional meaning of physical (or
sensual) reality to that of objective reality. And from this they make
‘inference’ that the only reality which exists objectively is matter. But this
‘inference’, if we mean by matter any objective reality, means nothing but
tautology: “There exists objectively only that which objectively exists”.
But, dialectical materialists make
it other way. When they got ‘inference’ “The only reality which exists
objectively is matter” they don’t understand it as tautology, but make backward
substitution of the meaning of the word ‘matter’ – they understand it not as
any objective reality (be it material in traditional sense or spiritual) but as
specific
reality which corresponds to traditional meaning of the word ‘matter’. And, on
this ground, they reject existence of anything which is not material in
traditional sense.
Materialism and Rationality
Famous Austrian philosopher of ÕÕ
century, Karl Popper proposed interesting argument against materialism. He
argued that materialism deprives of any sense the idea of rationality, although
it itself pretends to be rational.
Any discussion has sense only if we
admit that some arguments are better then others and that we have ability to understand
these arguments and appreciate their rational force. Materialists believe that
their position is rational, supported by rationally strong argumentation –
stronger then that of any of their opponents.
But, if materialism is right, all
our thoughts are only physical (chemical) structures and processes in our
brain. There are some physical processes in my brain and some other physical
processes in the brain of my opponent. Those in my brain corresponds with the
idea “Materialism is true”, and those in my opponent’s brain – with the idea
“Materialism is false”. My opponent’s disbelief in materialism is as necessary,
determined by physical processes in his brains, as my belief in it. We can’t
appreciate argumentation: physical processes in my opponent’s brain correspond
with conviction that argumentation against materialism is stronger – just as
physical processes in my brain correspond with conviction that argumentation in
favour of materialism is stronger.
Physical processes in one brain
aren’t more rational than those in the other – they are due to the same
physical laws and differences in our ideas are produced by differences in our
brains’ physical structures or outward physical factors which influence our
brains. Those structures and factors can’t be characterised as ‘true’ or
‘false’, ‘more rational’ or ‘less rational’ – these characteristics have no
sense in relation with physical objects.
As it is so, the idea that there are
such ‘things’ as rational arguments, which can have larger or smaller rational
strength, is pure illusion which is due to some physical processes in our
brain. There can be no rationality – there are only physical structures and
processes which can be characterised by such attributes as place, size, weight
etc. but have nothing to do with such attributes as truth or rationality.
Materialist can try to circumvent
the problem proposing some criteria of truth (or rationality) which can be (in
principle) translated into physical terms. For example: true (or rational) is
that which promotes survival. In this sense, materialist can say, our brain’s
structures can be more or less rational – as well as ideas which they
produce. But, in fact, this doesn’t help
to solve the problem. We need to set the question: how it is possible to know that
some system of ideas (≡ brain’s physical structure, if materialists are
right) promotes survival better then the other ones? If we have to compare two ideas
from this point of view – what would be their influence on ability to survive –
we need to consider arguments about the first and the second theory supposed
influence on survival. But in this case we return to that point from which we
started: some physical structures and processes in the brain will determine
decision in favour of the first theory, while some other structures and
processes will determine decision in favour of the second one.
In any case, some people’s belief in
rationality of some theory is as necessarily determined by their brain’s
structures and processes, as some other people’s belief in its irrationality.
Different physical structures and processes appear as different ideas, and
there can be no rational sense to think that one is better (closer to truth,
more rational) then some other – any preference we really do is purely accidental,
depending on some physical structures and processes – if they were different
(as they are with our opponents) our preference would be other. Physical
structures and processes are different and nothing more; any one isn’t more
rational or truer then any other.
Conclusion: materialism, as well as
all other philosophies
“which try to rescue the causal completeness or self-sufficiency of the
physical world” … “are self-defeating in so far as their arguments establish --
unintentionally, of course -- the non-existence of arguments”.
The machine argument
To continue this line of argumentation let’s consider the argument which
Popper calls “the machine argument”.
Let’s take thermometer. It, as any other thing, reacts in some way on (is
influenced by) external conditions – it shows temperature. There are more
complicated devices which can write temperature on the paper. But the first as
well as the second doesn’t understand that it shows temperature and doesn’t
intend to do it – for it have no consciousness. The same thesis will be true in
the case of any other possible behavior of any possible machine, – however
complicated it be.
We can imagine some computer-based machine which can be asked various
questions and which can give answers. In principle, it is possible to construct
such super-advanced machine, which can imitate discussion behavior: when it
gets our arguments as input information it outputs some ‘counterarguments’.
Will we, being serious, have discussion with this machine? May be – but only if
we mistake it for some reasonable being with consciousness, which understands
what we are saying and answers with intention and understanding. If we
understand that it is only machine, which is reproducing some ‘answers’ and
‘arguments’, which are already put into it by programmer, which is executing
some program without understanding its sense and the sense of resulting
‘answers’ and ‘arguments’ and without any intention to answer and argument – we
will understand that discussion with it can have no real sense. We can continue
‘discussion’ from mere curiosity – to know on what answers and arguments it is
programmed; but we won’t try to persuade the machine in anything – for we know
that it understands nothing.
No degree of complexity can make the machine to be something principally
different with thermometer. Surely, we won’t argue with thermometer. But, from
the point of view of materialism we are all only very complicated
‘thermometers’.
Karl
Popper’s Conception of Three Worlds
Popper affirms that the idea of rationality has sense only if we admit
existence of at least three different realities – “three worlds”: 1) physical
(material) world (‘world 1’); 2) consciousness, the world of human subjectivity
(‘world 2’); 3) the world of ideas, theories, arguments, senses, logical
relations (‘world 3’).
Rationality has sense only if our consciousness (‘world 2’) can perceive
objective (independent of our consciousness) sense of ideas and objective
logical relations between them, if it can appreciate objective logical strength
of argumentation. We (our consciousness), in our turn, can bethink some new
ideas and arguments which, when expressed in language, became the part of the
‘world 3’. So, idea of rationality presupposes interaction between ‘world 2’
and ‘world 3’.
On the other side, our consciousness affects the physical world, for it
sets in motion our body; and the physical world, by mediation of our body,
affects our consciousness. So there is interaction between ‘world 2’ and ‘world
1’.
So, the physical world isn’t self-sufficient: it contains processes which
have non-physical cause. “If we act through being influenced by the grasp of an
abstract relationship, we initiate physical causal chains which have no sufficient physical
causal antecedents. We are then 'first movers', or creators of a physical
'causal chain'.”
The Nightmare of Physical Determinism
If materialism is right, then all
that happens in the world and, in particular, with our body, is either completely
predetermined by physical causes and laws (this point of view is called
physical
determinism) or is partly predetermined by physical causes and laws and
partly is causeless, absolutely fortuitous (indeterminism). Materialism
excludes the possibility of any other causality but physical. Karl Popper calls
it the nightmare of physical determinism:
“I have called physical determinism a nightmare. It is a nightmare because
it asserts that the whole world with everything in it is a huge automaton, and
that we are nothing but little wheels, or at best sub-automata, within it.
It thus destroys, in particular, the idea of creativity.
It reduces to absolute illusion the
idea, that, when preparing this lecture, I, with the help of my mind, had tried
to create something new. According to the principles of physical
determinism, there was nothing but that some particles of my body had left the
black marks on the white paper:
any physicist with sufficient detailed information
could have written my lecture by the simple method of predicting the precise
places on which the physical system consisting of my body (including, of
course, my brain and my fingers) and my pen would put down those black marks.
We can
adduce even more impressing example. If physical determinism is right, then
even entirely deaf physicist, who have never heard music, can write all
symphonies and concerts of Mozart or Beethoven using simple method – exact
examination of their bodies’ physical state and prediction about where they
would place their black marks on lined note paper. Moreover, our deaf physicist
could do even more: after examination of Mozart’s or Beethoven’s body with
sufficient thoroughness, he could write compositions, which neither Mozart nor
Beethoven had never written, but which they would write if some external
conditions of their life were different: for example, if they eat sheep
instead of chicken, or
drunk tea instead of coffee.
And,
having sufficient knowledge about purely physical conditions, our deaf
physicist would be able to do all this. He would have no need of any knowledge
in the theory of music, but, nonetheless, he could exactly predict all answers
of Mozart or Beethoven on exams, if they were asked questions on the theory of
counterpoint.
I believe that all this is
absurd, and this absurdity is even more evident ...if we apply the methods of
physical prediction to determinist himself.
For
according with conception of determinism, all theories, and determinism too,
are considered right in consequence of certain physical structure (perhaps, the
structure of brain) of their adherents. This means that we deceive ourselves
(and this fact of self-deception is also physically predetermined) every time,
when asserting that we have taken determinist position under influence of some
rational reasons or arguments. Or, in other words, physical determinism is the
theory, which, if it is true, doesn’t demand logical substantiation, because it
must explain by purely physical conditions all our reactions, including
those, which we take as convictions, based on arguments. It is purely physical
conditions, including those of our environment, that force us to say or to
believe what we are saying or believing, and highly-qualified physicist, who
doesn’t understand French and have never heard of determinism, could, for
example, predict, what some French determinist will say about determinism on
some debate in France, and also, of course, what his opponent-indeterminist
will say. But this means that if it seems to us, that we agree with theory,
such as determinism, because of logical force of some arguments, in such a way
we, according with position of physical determinism, deceive ourselves, – to be
more exact, we are in a physical state, which predetermines our
self-deception.”
This fragment says about physical
determinism. I’ll remind, that materialism is, in principle, compatible with
indeterminism as the supposition about existence of fortuity. But if fortuity
is the only alternative to physical determination, this alternative is in no
way better: for it means, that adoption of these or those ideas and theories,
our thoughts and actions are (in so far as they aren’t determined physically)
merely fortuitous. For example: Mozart had written these (not any others) marks
in this (not any other) succession by mere fortuity; I had written this text
because my hand had made fortuitously this (not any other) succession of marks
on the paper etc.
To evade these absurd conclusions we
need to suppose, that besides physical determination and fortuity there is also
third alternative – non-physical determination. But this supposition means
rejection of materialism.
Consciousness as the illusion of the illusion of the illusion...
Materialism leads also to other
absurd inferences – although materialists themselves, as a rule, don’t make
such inferences. For example, materialism infers that our consciousness,
subjectivity – thoughts, feelings, will – influence absolutely nothing.
Let’s suppose I want coffee. I
stretch my hand, take the cup of coffee and drink. Why have I done this? Any
sane man would think that I had drunk coffee, because I
wanted to drink coffee.
But if materialism is right, all this is nonsense: really, my wish is of no
significance. It is merely physical processes in my brain are such that they
influence my hand, mouth, throat in such a way that my hand stretches itself
toward the cup of coffee, my mouth opens etc. My wish is of no significance. To
be more correct, my wish is nothing but those physical processes in my brain,
which influence my hand, mouth, throat etc. But there is something lacking in
this explanation: why these processes not merely happen as physical processes,
but are also felt as wanting and come to awareness? How can they be felt subjectively?
If they are, this subjective feeling is something above, additional to physical
processes themselves – for physical processes are nothing but movements of
bodies in the space.
In any case these feelings and
awareness, as such, as something subjectively felt and known, fulfil no
function, influence nothing. Those same processes in the brain would happen
without any change and cause exactly the same movements of my hand, mouth,
throat etc., if they weren’t felt and there was no awareness of them at all.
If, on the other side, we consider
the problem from the position of indeterminism, we can suppose that it is
possible that my hand had stretched itself toward the cup of coffee not as
result of processes in my brain, but fortuitously, – in this case my wish is
also of no significance, influences nothing.
There is widely spread thought, that
feeling of pain fulfils protective function – it informs us about some menace
and compels to protective actions. But if materialism is right, the feeling of
pain (as subjective state, as it is really felt) really fulfils no function.
The same physical processes in the human body (in the nerve system and the
brain), which, from the materialistic point of view, are feelings, would happen
in exactly the same way and have exactly the same influence, if they weren’t
felt at all, but only happened. If my hand got into the fire, I’ll draw it back
not because I feel pain, but because, as result of influence of the fire, there
happen some physical processes in the nerve-brain system, which by physical
laws influence muscles in such a way, that hand draws back. But we have no
answer to the question: why and what for these processes are felt subjectively?
We had adduced above the argument of
Karl Popper: if materialism is right, our ideas, that we hold to some theory or
idea because it is better rationally supported, can’t be anything else, but
illusion (in particular, materialists, who believe, that they adopt materialism
on rational grounds, are deceiving themselves). Really, adoption or rejection
of this or that theory, as well as the illusion of its rationality, is either
entirely determined by physical causes and laws or fortuitous.
In any case, if materialism is
right, our feelings, emotions and thoughts influence nothing. All physical
processes in our body would happen in exactly the same way, if there was no
consciousness, if we felt nothing, didn’t think and had no ideas and theories.
Laws of physics and physical properties are entirely self-sufficient, and in
such world there is no place for feelings, emotions, thoughts, ideas and
theories.
When they equate some physical
processes with feelings and thoughts, materialists don’t explain, how can these
processes not only happen, but be felt and produce awareness of them. In any case,
if materialists are right, this feeling and awareness influence absolutely
nothing. I’ll quote Popper yet once:
“We can
affirm that there is nothing but the brain, and the brain is the machine of
computer type ... and that existence of something non-physical – is, for sure,
mere “illusion”, at least something having no real meaning, for everything
would remain exactly the same as it is, even if these were no such illusions.
…there is no need to worry about “spiritual” status of these illusions. They can
happen to be universal property of all things: the stone, thrown by me, can
have illusion, that it jumps by his own will, in exactly the same way, as I
think, that I had thrown it, and my pen or computer can have the illusion, that
they work because of their interest in problems, that they think and solve,
while I think, that it is me who think and solve, though really there is
nothing essential, but purely physical interactions.”
But even if we suppose, that our
feelings and thoughts have no influence on the physical world, their
identification with physical processes can’t be acknowledged right. Physical
processes only happen according to physical laws. This physical processes are
nothing but physical movements, changes of places of bodies in the space. All
these movements can happen in exactly the same way without being felt and
without any awareness. This means, than feeling and awareness aren’t those
movements (physical processes), but something else.
The statement, which says that consciousness
is only illusion, is obviously absurd. If it is illusion – then whose illusion
it is? Can illusion exist by itself, beyond the consciousness? If something
exists beyond the consciousness, objectively, it can’t be illusion. If
illusions exist in the consciousness, and consciousness is illusion itself, it
means that the consciousness is not merely illusion, but it is the illusion of
the illusion of the illusion … ... … (repeated infinitely).
The Simplest Formal Logical Proof of the
Falsity of Materialism
We have adduced many arguments
against materialism. But we cam remark, that they all are only different
illustrations of one and the same thesis, – very simple and seemingly
self-evident:
The notion of matter, physical can be reduced to spatial characteristics (place in the space, size,
form, direction and speed of movement, acceleration etc.) and
contain nothing presupposing feeling and
awareness. So, physical processes, as physical processes, merely happen
according to physical laws, without feeling and awareness.
Feeling and awareness – in compliance with the sense of these words
in the common language – is something,
which isn’t covered with the notion of physical (matter), which is beyond the
limits of this notion. So, feeling and awareness – aren’t physical
processes, but something above, in addition to them.
We can formulate this in the form of
simple proof, which conforms to all demands of formal logics:
(1) The consciousness and its
constituents (feelings, emotions and thoughts) – accordingly with the meaning
of these words in the common language – have no physical (spatial)
characteristics.
(2) Any material (physical) objects
and processes, by definition, have physical (spatial) characteristics.
Let’s suppose, that (3)
consciousness and its constituents (feelings, emotions, thoughts) – are some
material processes.
In this case, it follows logically
from (3) and (2), that the consciousness
and its constituents (feelings, emotions and thoughts) have physical (spatial)
characteristics. But this inference contradicts with (1). So, supposition (3)
is false.
Per se, refutation of materialism
can be reduced to elucidation of
relation between the content of the notions
of matter and consciousness. When we understand, that the content of the motion
of matter (physical) doesn’t include in itself the content of the notion of
consciousness (subjectivity, feeling, awareness), one of two inferences follows
logically:
either
1)
there exists something, which isn’t
covered by the notion of matter, – so, materialism is false;
or
2) there exists nothing, which isn’t
covered by the notion of matter, – so, the consciousness doesn’t exist; the
consciousness is the illusion of the illusion of the illusion … ... … (repeated
infinitely); we feel nothing, think nothing, are aware of nothing.
Materialism
as Form of Scientism
Progress of natural and technical sciences (physics, chemistry, biology,
computer technology) in XVIII-XX centuries have made great impression on the
minds and led to propagation of the belief in the omnipotence of science – that
there are no limits for the natural-scientific cognition; that methods and
explanatory principles which are productive in the area of natural sciences,
can give answer to any meaningful question. Such belief is called
scientism. Scientists who work in
the natural and technical sciences are especially prone to scientism, for it
imparts the highest prestige to their profession. Besides it, man who is used
by his profession to think in categories of the physics, the chemistry, the
biology, the computer technology is naturally prone to consider everything
through the prism of these categories without critical examination of the due
limits for this way of thinking.
This belief in the omnipotence of the natural sciences is uncritical,
irrational, - it doesn’t rest upon rational examination of capabilities and
limits of scientific cognition on the whole, main constituents of any
scientific activity (which must be distinguished from the main theoretical points of any separate
science or scientific branch in the present situation), specifics of various
branches of scientific cognition.
Scientism was sharply criticized by many scientists and philosophers of science.
In particular, prominent economist and philosopher of XX century Friedrich von
Hayek characterized scientism as “position which is, surely, unscientific,
which presupposes mechanical and uncritical transfer of some way of thinking,
which was formed in one area, on entirely different areas. Unlike to
scientific, scientistic view is not unbiased, - in fact, it is very biased
approach, which – before examination of its subject – pretends on exact
knowledge of how it must be explored.” Scientism is nothing but “slavish
imitation of the method and the language of science”, – in contrast to science
as activity which is directed by the spirit of unbiased examination. Other prominent philosopher of science of XX century, Karl Popper,
writes that it would be more accurate to say that scientism is “imitation of
something which is wrongly believed by some people to be the method and the
language of science.”
Scientism is uncritical belief in the unlimited capabilities of science
(and by ‘science’, in fact, it means natural sciences) without understanding
how science really develops.
Propagation of materialism and its popularity with scientists don’t
testify to its scientific character or rationality; they are only
manifestations of scientism. Pretensions of materialism on truthfulness and
scientific character aren’t based on
good rational grounds. In fact, materialism is
irrational belief, which is based on authority. The fact that
it is natural sciences that serve as authority doesn’t make materialism
scientific or rational. Really, it is not science which supports materialism –
it is materialism which supports itself by alleging the authority of science
without due grounds. Materialism speaks in the name of science, using its
authority, just as religious preachers speak in the name of God, using His
authority. The problem is: do we have to believe their words? can they prove
them? how to distinguish true God’s heralds from deceivers and lunatics? If we
take into consideration numbers of the followers of religions and branches
which combat one another, we must make conclusion that people are ready to
trust the second at least as well as the first (if there are any).
Science (just as philosophy) is – the first and the foremost – rational
critical activity. Ideas and theories have scientific character only in so far
as they are based on the rational critical examination of all arguments and
testimonies available. Ideas and theories which aren’t based on such
examination but allege the authority of science aren’t scientific – they are
quasi-scientific – deceitful superficial resemblances of science. This is the case with materialism.
Reality isn’t such simple and
uniform, as materialists think it to be. Capabilities of the natural sciences
are limited and leave the space for unscientific ideas. And this unscientific
character doesn’t always means falsity or irrationality. Sometimes it is on the
contrary: inflexible intention to hold only to those ideas and theories, which
conform to the standards of natural sciences, leads to adoption of rationally
unjustified, absurd and anti-human theories.
@ Dmitry Sepety