“My only comfort in life and death is that I belong, body and soul, to my faithful Savior Jesus Christ.”¹ This confession is grounded in two historic and prevalent Christian beliefs:²

**Bodily Resurrection**: We, human persons, will exist in the life to come with a glorified and incorruptible resurrected body.

**Mind-Body Dualism**: We, human persons, are not identical to any purely physical thing, but are or have an embodied immaterial soul.

Although most Christians throughout the history of the church have maintained both beliefs, some Christian materialists argue that these two doctrines are in conflict. Some argue that bodily resurrection is trivialized by substance dualism (hereafter, dualism), that dualism makes expiations of why bodily resurrection is truly difficult, or that dualism should be rejected as bodily resurrection is better accounted for by Christian physicalism. Let’s call such arguments resurrection objections.

These criticisms are somewhat understandable. Dualism is often stated with little to no mention of the body. Regarding the core commitments of dualism, Dean Zimmerman observes,

(a) they believe that, for every person who thinks or has experiences, there is a thing—a soul or spiritual substance—that lacks many of the physical properties the body shares with unthinking material objects; and (b) they believe that this extra thing is essential to the person, and in one way or another responsible for the person’s mental life.³

The emphasis is on the soul, with only passing mention of the body. This too is somewhat understandable as arguments for dualism are often framed in debate with physicalism. Christian dualists agree that embodiment is a crucial aspect of human persons. Alvin Plantinga observes that

...on the traditional Christian view, God has designed human beings to have bodies; they function properly only if embodied; and of course, Christians look forward to the resurrection of the body. My body is crucial to my well-being and I can flourish only if embodied.⁴

Likewise, for Dallas Willard, “the body lies at the center of the spiritual life…”⁵
and is “an essential part of who we are and no redemption that omits it is full redemption.”

Nevertheless, contemporary dualist accounts of embodiment or bodily resurrection are scarce. Kevin Corcoran observes:

Yet it is plausible to believe that it is precisely that doctrine that needs to be addressed by Christian Dualists, for none of the ecumenical creeds of the church confesses belief in a doctrine of soul survival. The Christian doctrine has been understood as the doctrine of bodily resurrection.

It is worth briefly explaining that Corcoran’s interpretation of the creeds is problematic. The creed makers, like most at the time, assumed dualism of one kind or another. With no need to defend dualism, their goal was to emphasize the uniquely Christian claim of bodily resurrection. There is a fundamental assumption of dualism evident in the Apollinarian controversy surrounding Chalcedon and neo-Chalcedonian Christology. The central debate was whether or not the Son needed a soul in addition to him or his mind. Chalcedon explicitly rejects the Apollinarian and Arian “God with a body” Christology, yet affirms that the Son has a rational soul, meaning Christ assumed a soul and a body. The Cappadocian fathers reject Apollinarius and Arian Christology, yet affirm that the Logos must assume a soul and a body. Further, the Cappadocians continually argue that the Logos’ relationship to his human nature is just like the relationship between the body and the soul. Moreover, the rejection of Origenism at the Fifth Ecumenical Council is telling. On one version of Origenism, possibly affirmed by Gregory of Nyssa, a soul lives on without a body. In response, the Council sought to affirm the body, but did not deny the soul. Moreover, Fourth Council of Constantinople states: “the old and new Testament teach that a man or woman has one rational and intellectual soul, and all the fathers and doctors of the church, who are spokesmen of God, express the same opinion.” Hence, Corcoran’s use of the early creeds is misleading.

Still, Corcoran is right about the lack of dualist work on embodiment. Although, Corcoran, and every other Christian physicalist I am aware of, overlooks the works of Charles Taliaferro, Howard Robinson, and Richard Swinburne. Still, inattention to embodiment is a weakness in contemporary dualism. There are, of course, other theological objections to dualism, but those have received substantive replies. While dualists and Christian materialists have raised resurrection objections against various forms of Christian materialism, Christian materialists have responded. The same cannot be said of dualists. This chapter is intended to help move this conversation forward.

Bodily Resurrection, What’s the Problem?

According to Lynne Rudder Baker, Christian views of the resurrection must account for three doctrines.
EMBODIMENT: Resurrection requires some kind of bodily life after death.
IDENTITY: The very same person who exists on earth is to exist in an afterlife.
MIRACLE: Life after death, according to Christian doctrine, is a gift from God.\textsuperscript{22}

These doctrines are largely uncontroversial.\textsuperscript{23} Trenton Merricks, however, defends a moderately controversial criterion.

BODILY IDENTITY: An individual’s resurrected body must be numerically identical to their pre-resurrection body.\textsuperscript{24}

Taken together, this four-part desideratum rouses the strongest resurrection objections to dualism.
Frequently, the objection is that dualism cannot account for at least one of the resurrection desiderata, while Christian materialism can. At other times the stronger objection is that dualism makes explaining these criteria impossible. But how so? According to Baker,

The best that metaphysics can do is to show how resurrection is metaphysically possible. That is, any candidate for a metaphysics of resurrection must conceive of human persons in such a way that it is metaphysically possible (even if physically impossible) that one and the same person, whose earthly body is corruptible, may also exist with a post-mortem body that is incorruptible.\textsuperscript{25}

If this is the best that metaphysics can do, then resurrection objections should attempt to show that the conjunction of dualism and bodily resurrection is metaphysically impossible. In reply, dualists need only show that this conjunction is metaphysically possible.

While I find Baker’s criterion undeniable, I am skeptical of BODILY IDENTITY. Yet there is, I will argue, no reason to think that dualism is at odds with BODILY IDENTITY. My goal is to show that not one of these criteria provides a definitive or even serious problem for dualism, which in turn undermines a common motivation for Christian physicalism.

Resurrection Objections from EMBODIMENT

According to EMBODIMENT, resurrection requires a bodily afterlife. Those in Christ will be raised by God with a physical, glorious, incorruptible, powerful, and immortal body (cf. 1 Cor. 15:42–43, 53–54) like the resurrected body of Jesus (Phil. 3:21). Paul expected this to happen not at death, but at the advent (1 Cor. 15:20–24, 51–54; 1 Thess. 4:14–17), as part of Christ’s renewal of all things (Phil. 3:20–21). So, how is EMBODIMENT a problem for dualism? Merricks and Baker offer slightly different objections. Let us take them in turn.
Merricks: EMBODIMENT is Not Necessary for Dualism

Merricks’s objection from EMBODIMENT begins with a question: “But if dualism were true, it is hard to see why our resurrection would be a big deal.” He then argues,

Now the dualist might object that a soul in Heaven without a body is somehow mutilated or incomplete, and so the dualist might, therefore, insist that resurrection is a blessing. But it is hard to know just how much stress should she put on the value of resurrection, since stress on what we gain in resurrection is by its very nature, stress on what we lack before resurrection. Pre-resurrection existence united with God in Heaven is not supposed to be too bad; indeed, it is supposed to be very good.

Merricks assumes that souls in the intermediate state are conscious. That isn’t something dualism entails, and those who hold that souls “sleep” until the body is resurrected easily avoid this problem. Secondly, the claim is not that resurrection cannot be a great good given dualism. Merricks’s claim is much weaker: given dualism, it is difficult to assess how valuable resurrection is because embodiment is not needed to enjoy the greatest good of being united to God. But what follows from this cannot be that embodiment is not a great good! It does not follow from the fact that $x$ is a great good, that $x$ in conjunction with $y$ is not an even greater good.

Merrick’s makes the further point as to what the dualist cannot argue.

And however the dualist might deal with this problem, one thing is certain: The dualist cannot say that resurrection is necessary for eternal life...one cannot maintain both that life after death occurs before resurrection and also that life after death requires resurrection.

This needn’t worry the dualist. First, Merricks shifts between talk of eternal life and life after death. These notions, though, are not equivalent. For example, if annihilationism is true, then one can have a life after death without an eternal life. Likewise, if the doctrine of eternal hell is true, one can have an eternal life in terms of duration, but not in terms of quality. What this means is that eternal life is not reducible to life after death or the persistence of identity. Once we distinguish Merricks’s conflation of these two doctrines, his objection is less plausible.

Eternal life in the biblical sense is much more than unending postmortem existence. Eternal life is resurrection, as N. T. Wright notes:

The meaning of “resurrection” as “life after ‘life after death’” cannot be overemphasized, not least because much modern writing continues to use “resurrection” as a virtual synonym for “‘life after death’ in the popular sense.”
Eternal life is one overarching event with present and future aspects. In the present, eternal life makes available a renewed or resurrected life, the sign of which is to trust and be permeated by agape love.\textsuperscript{30} Death begins now, as does life in the Spirit.\textsuperscript{31} According to Jesus, those who believe have eternal life now.\textsuperscript{32} The future aspect of eternal life includes a distinctive kind of survival of death which includes the righting and overcoming of sin and its consequences, touching the body before and after death.\textsuperscript{33} This process of glorification starts before death.\textsuperscript{34} So, eternal life refers both to duration as well as quality of life. According to several New Testament authors, eternal life, in terms of quality, can begin in this life. “The new life,” Wright notes, “which will be consummated in the resurrection itself works backwards into the present, and is already doing so in the ministry of Jesus.”\textsuperscript{35} Resurrection is something that has become available now. Wright observes,

Resurrection in John continues to be both present and future, and we should resist attempts to flatten this out by marginalizing the “future” emphasis of overemphasizing the “realized eschatology”. It is, of course, true for John, as for Paul, that “eternal life” is not simply future, but already to be enjoyed in the present.\textsuperscript{36}

What this means is that eternal life is not mere postmortem existence, but requires resurrection, a part of which is bodily resurrection. So Merricks is mistaken. One can maintain both that eternal life begins before bodily resurrection and that eternal life, in the qualitative sense, requires bodily resurrection.

Consequently, the dualist can hold that bodily resurrection is necessary for eternal life, when we understand that an eternal kind of life is necessarily a bodily resurrected life. Furthermore, we have no reason to think that disembodiment is anything other than a natural consequence of sin, just as death is (Rom. 6:23). Hence, a disembodied life is a soteriologically incomplete life. It is a great good, but not the greatest good. Moreover, resurrection, the righting and overcoming of sin and its consequences, demands re-embodiment. As such, bodily resurrection is needed for the defeat of sin and death. Without it, God’s mission of resurrection in the full sense is not fulfilled.

\textit{Baker: Disembodiment Excludes an Explanation of EMBODIMENT}

According to Baker, “Mind-body dualism would provide no obvious explanation of why resurrection should be bodily (since, according to mind-body dualism, we can exist unembodied).”\textsuperscript{37} This assumes that if a theory holds that human persons can exist unembodied, then that theory provides no obvious explanation for EMBODIMENT. What seems to motivate this is a reductive theory of bodily resurrection. Like Merricks, Baker reduces bodily resurrection to the persistence of personal identity. Her argument assumes that if we get an explanation of resurrection as persistence after death that does not require EMBODIMENT, then that explanation offers no obvious explanation of
EMBODIMENT. But this assumes that bodily resurrection is reducible to postmortem persistence. However, I have shown that is false. Consequently, Baker’s objection from EMBODIMENT fails.

Medieval & Contemporary Arguments for EMBODIMENT

Often Christian physicalists proffer less of a criticism and more a shifting of the burden of proof. They claim that dualists have failed to offer a reason for EMBODIMENT. This claim is easily rejected once we recognize the extensive medieval literature on why the human soul needs a body. My point here is not to develop or defend these accounts beyond chapters two and three of this volume. I simply wish to show the burden-shifting move is illegitimate as there are many arguments for why a soul needs a body. In turn, the burden is on the Christian physicalist to show how these accounts fail.

Not all medieval thinkers held the same ontology of the human person, although they uniformly rejected physicalism, arguing that thinking things must be immaterial. Many adopted a neo-Aristotelian metaphysics making use of hylomorphism, a view not obviously at odds with dualism. So, while not every argument from the medieval era would aid dualism, at least the following can:

1. **Appetite Satisfaction and Perfect Happiness**: Bonaventure, Aquinas, and Scotus recognize that our desire for our body is so powerful that we would not be perfectly happy without, not just any body, but our individual body.

2. **Metaphysical Completeness**: According to Bonaventure, the human soul perfects the body, and is, therefore, naturally inclined to be joined to its body. This inclination is frustrated when the soul is disembodied. Therefore, in virtue of the fact that resurrection is fundamentally about bringing creation into perfection, the resurrected person must be an embodied soul.

3. **Metaphysical Perfection**: Aquinas argues that embodiment is part of God’s soteriological plan. Being disembodied is not a perfected state, but a punishment for the fall. However, Christ’s passion merits the permanent restoration to God’s original intent for human persons as embodied souls. If that is how God made us, then that is how he will perfect us.

These are only a few of the arguments made by Bonaventure, Thomas, and Scotus, among others. The claim that dualists lack reasons for EMBODIMENT is just historically naïve.

While most of the medieval arguments appeal to our desire and inclination to have a body, they do not obviously explain why it is good that we should have such a desire and inclination. Contemporary dualists offer such explanations. Taliaferro argues that being an embodied person consists in the exercise of six types of virtue: sensory, agency, constitutional, epistemic, structural, and affective. Swinburne argues that having a body makes possible great goods, including the ability of free choice between good and evil and the ability to influence others and the inanimate world.
Gordon Barnes argues that the telos of the human soul, as created by God, is embodiment. Consequently,

If we take this telos of a particular human soul to be constitutive of its very identity, then its embodiment in a particular parcel of matter is also constitutive of its identity, even if the soul and that parcel of matter are really distinct and separable.\(^{42}\)

Maximus the Confessor offers alternative teleological arguments for dualism.\(^{43}\) God, argues Maximus, created us as embodied souls as an ontological preparation for the eschatological mystery of the incarnation of Christ. Our ontology is set up, as it were, for the incarnation. Maximus also argued that God creates us as embodied souls so that our ontology reflects and aids us in serving as a mediator in relation to God and his creation. Lastly, Maximus argued that we are a microcosm reflecting elements of the entire world, in body and soul. Without being comprised of both body and soul, human persons would not truly reflect the world in its relationship to God. We would not be a true microcosm or mediator.

Again, my point is not to defend these arguments, but to point out that these arguments have not been addressed by those defending resurrection objections against dualism. The common claim that dualism has no account for EMBODIMENT is simply false. There are many accounts. Taken together they help explain why dualists embrace EMBODIMENT.

Bodily Resurrection Objections from IDENTITY

According to IDENTITY the very same person who exists on earth is to exist in the afterlife. This is far from controversial. However, Christian physicalists argue that the conjunction of IDENTITY and dualism is somehow problematic. Baker offers both a diachronic and a synchronic version of problem.

*Baker’s Diachronic IDENTITY Problem*

Here is Baker’s diachronic IDENTITY objection:

There is a metaphysical problem with immaterialism: in virtue of what is a soul the same soul both before and after death? Perhaps the best answer is that souls are individuated by having a “thisness” or haecceity. This is an intriguing suggestion that I cannot pursue here. A haecceity view, if otherwise satisfactory, may well be suitable as a metaphysics of resurrection—if it did not leave dangling the question of why resurrection should be bodily.\(^{44}\)

Note that the first sentence is not an objection, but merely a question. Posing a question does not by itself produce a problem. What we need is a reason to think that dualism cannot answer the question. Baker does not provide one. In fact, she admits that souls could be individuated by having a “thisness” or haecceity.
However, she faults such an account as it presumes another doctrine that is problematic for dualism: EMBODIMENT. But faulting an account of persistence for leaving open the question of EMBODIMENT is not an objection from IDENTITY. It certainly cannot be the case that if a theory satisfies IDENTITY it must also satisfy EMBODIMENT unless one assumes Christian physicalism. Baker has, by her own admission, simply stated that even if dualism can satisfy IDENTITY, the problem of EMBODIMENT remains. However, as we saw in the previous section, the objection from EMBODIMENT fails.

Baker later observes that a soul must be subject to change in virtue of the fact that religious practice involves conversion. From this she argues:

Consider Augustine before and after his conversion—at t1 and t2, respectively. In virtue of what was the soul at t1 the same soul as the soul at t2? The only answer that I can think of is that the soul at t1 and the soul at t2 were both Augustine's soul. But, of course, that answer is untenable inasmuch as it presupposes sameness of person over time, and sameness of person over time is what we need a criterion of sameness of soul over time to account for. So, it seems that the identity of a person over time cannot be the identity of a soul over time.

The dualist has several responses. First, for independent reasons, one might deny there is such a thing as criteria of diachronic identity. Merricks defends such a view. Following Lowe, one might hold that persistence is “primitive or ungrounded, in that it can consist neither in relationships between non-persisting things nor in the persistence of other sorts of things.” On such views, Baker’s demand for criteria in virtue of which a soul at t1 is the same soul as the soul at t2 is in principle impossible regardless of one’s ontology of the human person.

Secondly, Baker suggests that a haecceity view might work. According to this view, a soul has a non-qualitative property which is responsible for its individuation and identity. I will offer another account in section 3.4.2. There are, as it turns out, many ways to avoid Baker’s diachronic IDENTITY objection.

Baker’s Synchronic IDENTITY Problem

Additionally, Baker offers a synchronic IDENTITY objection. Here the idea is that without a body the individual person cannot satisfy IDENTITY. Baker argues,

In virtue of what is there one soul or two? If souls are embodied, the bodies individuate. There is one soul per body. But if souls are separated from bodies—existing on their own, apart from bodies—then there is apparently no difference between there being one soul with some thoughts and two souls with half as many thoughts. If there is no difference between there being one soul and two, then there are no souls. So, it seems that the concept of a soul is incoherent.
This seems right. If the body is the only thing that can individuate the soul, then a soul without a body cannot be individuated. What she is mistaken about is that this objection renders the concept of a soul incoherent. The most obvious way out of this problem is to reject the notion that a soul is individuated by a body. Baker has already given the dualist a way out by admitting that the soul could be individuated by a haecceity. Consequently, it is difficult to see this objection as having much force.

Bodily Resurrection Objections from MIRACLE

According to MIRACLE, life after death must be understood as a miraculous gift from God (cf. 1 Cor. 15:38). One is hard pressed to find an objection from miracle among contemporary Christian philosophers, although some theologians press this objection. Baker mentions such an objection regarding the dualism of the ancient Greeks. 51

First, I am unaware of any contemporary Christian dualist who holds that the soul is naturally immortal. 52 Richard Swinburne, for example, rejects this thesis and considers arguments to that conclusion fallacious. 53 He recognizes that such a view is “out of line with the Christian emphasis on the embodiment of men as their normal and divinely intended state.” 54 In fact, dualists like Karl Popper are skeptical of mind’s existence after death, 55 while Robert Audi thinks it cannot be guaranteed or ruled out. 56

Secondly, objections from MIRACLE rest on a false assumption. “The possibility of immortality,” says Reichenbach, “should not be confused with the actuality of it.” 57 Likewise, Swinburne argues, “even if the soul is simple and separable from the body, it does not follow that it will continue to exist after death, let alone exist forever with a mental life, with thoughts, feelings, and sensations.” 58 That a soul continues to exist after its body dies does not mean there are no other conditions under which a soul could cease to exist. Why not think that the death of the body would, save for God’s miraculous intervention, result in the death of the soul? The metaphysical possibility of disembodied existence may very well be made actual only by the miraculous activity of God.

Finally, suppose the dualist cannot cite the continued existence of the soul after death as a miracle. It does not follow that life after death, in the full biblical sense of resurrection, is not a miraculous gift from God. That one receives a glorified, incorruptible body is not a consequence of dualism. Hence, one will receive a resurrected body only if God makes it so. These arguments taken together undermine the objection from MIRACLE.

Bodily Resurrection Objections from BODILY IDENTITY

The final resurrection objection is made in terms of numerical identity. According to BODILY IDENTITY, an individual’s resurrected body must be numerically identical to their pre-resurrection body. There are at least two ways one could reply: reject BODILY IDENTITY or show that it is not incompatible with dualism.
Some Christian philosophers do not believe that strict philosophical identity is taught in Scripture or required to preserve important Christian teaching about resurrected persons.\textsuperscript{59} In fact, many Christian materialists reject BODILY IDENTITY,\textsuperscript{60} as do most contemporary theologians.\textsuperscript{61} So, we may have good reasons to reject BODILY IDENTITY. However, we needn’t make this move to avoid Merrick’s objection. In what follows, I will simply assume BODILY IDENTITY but argue that it is not inconsistent with and can be accounted for by dualism.\textsuperscript{62}

**Merricks: No Parthood, No BODILY IDENTITY**

Merricks’s objection to dualism from BODILY IDENTITY presses the following dilemma.

Some might suggest that my current body will be identical with whatever resurrection body has the same (substantial) soul as is had by my current body. But a soul is not part of a body. And I doubt that the identity of one physical object (such as a body) might be entirely a matter of the identity of a second object (such as a soul) when that second object is not itself a part of the first object. In this regard, taking a soul to be the guarantor of bodily identity is less plausible than taking the bone from the base of the spinal cord to be that guarantor. For at least that bone is a part of the relevant body.\textsuperscript{63}

On the one hand, says Merricks, the dualist may argue that (i) if a soul is a part of the body then perhaps the body could persist if the soul persists. However, Merricks points out that the soul is not a part of the body, so the body is not the only or best means of accounting for BODILY IDENTITY.\textsuperscript{64} On the other hand, the dualist may argue (ii) that a body can persist in virtue of a soul’s persisting. However, Merricks rejects this claim by appealing to a thesis I state as follows.

*Part Identity*: the identity of one physical thing, B\textsubscript{1}, at some time, t\textsubscript{1}, cannot be identical with a physical thing, B\textsubscript{2}, at another time, t\textsubscript{2}, in virtue of some further thing, S\textsubscript{1}’s, persisting between t\textsubscript{1} and t\textsubscript{2} (if S\textsubscript{1}, in our case the soul, is not a proper part of B\textsubscript{1} or B\textsubscript{2}).

It is unclear what physicality is doing in this principle other than ensuring it does not entail that it is impossible for God to guarantee the identity of anything that is not a proper part of God. Still, I have a hard time seeing how Part Identity could be defended. Regardless, considering how the soul can guarantee the identity of the body across time even though the soul is not a part of the body will be enough to answer Merricks. Although it is beyond the scope of this chapter to defend a full dualist account of bodily persistence, I offer the following sketch as a plausible view.

**Excursus: Bodily Souls, the Body as a Mode of the Soul**
C. Stephen Evans and I have defended what we call the bodily soul view. On this view, the human person is identical to an immaterial substance: the soul. However, the person, as embodied, is a bodily soul, where the soul is in a sense the form of the body. As Edmund Husserl says, “the soul...be-souls the Body.” Hence, the body is not merely another object in the world, but the mode in which we manifest our presence in the world and exercise our agency and relationality. “To live as a person,” says Husserl, “is to posit oneself as a person, to find oneself in, and to bring oneself into, conscious relations with a ‘surrounding world’.”

I suggest this view be infused with a robust neo-Aristotelian metaphysics of substances and modes, especially that of the late medieval Aristotelians, and the work of E. J. Lowe, J. P. Moreland, and others. Although I find this view extremely interesting, philosophically fruitful, and underexplored, I offer it only as a plausible view of mind-body dualism. There are other ways a dualist could answer Merricks. I simply offer this as one possible and interesting dualist model that can answer Merrick’s objection.

What is most important for my reply to Merricks is the essence of the soul and its relation to the body and the body’s persistence. On the proposed view, the essence of the soul is ontologically fundamental, such that facts about the essence of the soul determine, among other things, the soul’s natural kind. In the terms of late medieval Aristotelians, the essence of the soul is a thin particular, which includes the essence/form, the nexus of exemplification, and prime matter. On Moreland’s view, it is a bare particular, not prime matter, that individuates the soul. Like Augustine, Aquinas, and Suarez, this view takes from Aristotle the notion that the soul is “the cause and source of the living body.” The essence of the soul contains, as a primitive unity, powers for developing the body. The essence of the soul is both the internal efficient cause of and teleological guide for the internal structure and development of the body. That is, the essence of the soul is both the first efficient cause of the body’s development, as well as the final cause of its functions and structure. Consequently, the body is an ensouled physical structure, not a mere physical machine or aggregate of separable parts standing in external relations. The body is merely a physical thing but has both physical and non-physical aspects. The body is a complex structural mode of the soul.

Back to the Objection

With the previous model in mind, it is plausible, contrary to Merricks’s claim, that facts about the soul ground facts about BODILY IDENTITY. Because the body is a mode of the soul, fundamental facts about the body obtain in virtue of facts about the soul. Without the soul, there is no body. Hence, the body persists just in case the soul persists. Of course, one might reject the view I’ve sketched. However, this would not undermine my reply to Merricks’s objection from BODILY IDENTITY. I have offered this bodily soul view only as a possible model for dualism, and I remain open to other types of mind-body dualism.
However, all I need to reply to Merricks is a metaphysically possible account that can explain BODILY IDENTITY. To that end, this bodily soul view succeeds.

**Dead Souls Cannot Be Resurrected?**

Merricks offers a further objection to dualism from BODILY IDENTITY:

What if we were not identical with our bodies? Then it would be hard, if not impossible, to make sense of the idea that dead people will be resurrected. Moreover, the importance of the doctrine that, on the Day of Resurrection, one gets a body identical to the body one had in this life would be difficult to explain. Indeed, I cannot think of any plausible explanation at all, much less one that rivals the very straightforward and absolutely compelling explanation that flows directly from the claim that each of us is identical with his or her body.82

The fact that dead people will be resurrected, says Merricks, is explained much better if we are identical to our body, such that when our body is resurrected we are resurrected. But if we are not identical to our body, then we will not be resurrected; only our body will be resurrected. So, the fact that we are resurrected can only be explained (or, at least, is much better explained) if we are identical to our body.83

Again, the hidden assumption is that resurrection is nothing more than post-mortem survival, which I have shown is false. In terms of God’s overall project of resurrection, the dualist should hold that a soul undergoes its own kind of resurrection. In fact, on the bodily soul view sketched above, the resurrection of the body, in terms of restoration, will include the soul, as the body is a mode of the soul. Resurrection will include restoring the soul-body relation. Certain deficiencies in the soul, as well as the soul’s relation to the body, will be transformed, recovered from death, and made alive. Re-embodiment does not leave the soul unchanged. Contrary to Merricks’s assumption, the dualist can argue that the whole person, not merely their body, is resurrected.

Still, it is unclear what Merricks is actually arguing here. In what follows I raise objections for various interpretations of Merricks’s argument. Perhaps he is arguing something like the following. We must account for this fact: it is very important that on the day of resurrection one gets the body that is identical to their pre-mortem body. It is very important on the view that one is identical with one’s body because one’s pre-mortem body is needed for one to persist after death. Any reason the dualist gives for BODILY IDENTITY will not be as important as the Christian physicalist’s reason. Bodily resurrection is a matter of existence given Christian materialism, but not for dualism. Understood this way, Merricks’s argument is that the value of resurrection is higher on physicalism than it is on dualism.84

But what follows from this argument is not that dualism is inconsistent with or cannot account for BODILY IDENTITY. What follows is that the materialist account has greater value. But that one account is more valuable than
another certainly does not mean that the more valuable account is the correct or more justified account. Of course, that I exist is very important, at least to me! However, it is not important enough. Many have this intuition about eternal hell or Sisyphus. The value of resurrection is not merely that I exist, but that I exist in a resurrected state where the damages of sin are overcome. Mere existence does not get us resurrection. Resurrection requires much more. This point seems to be lost on Patrick Lee and Robert George, who write,

> If I just were a soul, even though I had a natural orientation to union with my body, then the nonexistence of the resurrection might be disappointing, but it is hard to see how it would render the faith futile (as St. Paul argues). And it would be difficult to explain why bodily resurrection would be at the center, rather than, say, “icing on the cake,” for the central teaching about life with Christ.85

Far from “icing on the cake,” the cornerstone of resurrection is God’s redemption of creation by restoring the conditions under which it flourishes, including our body (Rom. 8:18–25). I see no reason why the dualist cannot account for their continued existence as a miraculous act of God that is partly constitutive of the resurrection. True, their sustained existence does not require BODILY IDENTITY. However, as Merricks admits, being present before God is a great good. This great good is missing for the Christian materialist who holds, as Merricks seems to, that resurrection requires that one go out of existence. While the Christian materialist does not exist and can enjoy nothing, the dualist enjoys the great good of being in the presence of God. So, how do we evaluate which view entails that resurrection is more valuable? Merricks’s view works on the presumption that dualism cannot include existence as a great good of resurrection. But this is false. Perhaps the dualist can argue that BODILY IDENTITY is part of the conditions under which we flourish. Some might think the medieval arguments mentioned in section 3.3 might bolster this view. Metaphysical perfection, for example, might require BODILY IDENTITY. Likewise, it may well be that the God-given telos of human persons includes embodiment.

The human soul is created by God for embodiment in a particular parcel of matter...It is constitutive of the human soul, per se, that it is naturally directed towards embodiment. Thus, part of what it is to be a human soul is to have this telos. Thus...each and every individual human soul is naturally directed towards embodiment in a particular parcel of matter.86

This alone gives the dualist reason to think that BODILY IDENTITY is true, provided this teleological fact is true. Such a teleological fact can be disputed. But that is not the point. What this shows is that dualism is not at odds with BODILY IDENTITY, but has a possible reason for thinking it is true.

*Corcoran: Reassembly & Gappy Bodies*
Corcoran presses another issue, arguing that BODILY IDENTITY poses a difficulty for both dualism and Christian materialism. He asks,

How can a physical object that exists in the hereafter be numerically identical with a physical object that has either radically decayed or passed out of existence under more gruesome circumstances?

Corcoran uses van Inwagen’s reassembly argument to show that sameness of parts is not sufficient among the persistence conditions of bodies. According to van Inwagen’s argument, the reassembly of your body cannot ground personal identity over time, because God could reassemble all the material particles of my 5-year-old body alongside all the material particles of my 25-year-old body. But clearly, these two bodies cannot be the numerically same body. Therefore, reassembly of parts does not give us BODILY IDENTITY.

Perhaps this is, as Corcoran claims, a genuine problem for Christian materialism, but it needn’t be for dualism. Recall the bodily soul view sketched above, where a body is not merely an aggregate of material parts standing in external relations. So, God couldn’t reassemble my 5-year-old body alongside my 25-year-old body, because my body is necessarily ensouled by me. My soul is what makes my body a body. Hence, mere reassembly of material parts will not get you a body. You would need a single soul to ground the nature of two bodies. But, that certainly isn’t entailed by dualism, and I see no reason for adopting such a view.

Furthermore, suppose that a body at $t_1$ can remain numerically identical with a body at $t_3$ even though at $t_2$ that body did not exist. The dualist might hold that the body is a mode of the soul, where a mode is a concrete particular, a specific way something is. A red vase has both a shape and a color, each of which are modes, ways the vase is. Likewise, for a human body to be a mode just is for the human body to be a way the person our soul is. Accordingly, I needn’t be bodily. I can go from being embodied to being disembodied.

On this view, my being embodied is a modification that I undergo. Given this, one could adopt a type of immanent causal view that Corcoran defends, but with one important qualification. According to Corcoran,

A human body $B$ that exists in the future is the same as a human body $A$ that exists now if the temporal stages leading up to $B$ are immanent causally connected to the temporal stage of $A$ now.

I am not convinced that immanent causal connectivity is plausible, as it is not sufficient for numerical identity. However, here is an interesting possibility: a dualist could hold that BODILY IDENTITY is maintained in virtue of the immanent causal connectivity between the soul and body through time. One advantage of this view over Corcoran’s view is that one of the relata, the soul, never goes out of existence. Alternatively, the dualist might hold that bodily continuity is maintained as follows. At death, my physical body is modified into or perhaps replaced with a non-physical body. What I leave behind is a corpse,
while I gain a non-physical body, which will, at the resurrection, once again be modified to a physical body.\textsuperscript{92} So long as either of these accounts is logically possible, and that is all I am suggesting, the dualist avoids Corcoran’s objection.

Conclusion

Given my argument in this chapter, we have some important lessons. First, the doctrine of bodily resurrection is not reducible to problems of personal identity. Moreover, contrary to claims from Christian physicalists, dualism has substantive reasons for why a soul needs a resurrected body. These arguments have been repeatedly ignored by Christian physicalists. Lastly, there are currently no good bodily resurrection objections to dualism. We may continue to confess, in spirit and truth, that “my only comfort in life and death is that I belong, body and soul, to my faithful Savior Jesus Christ.”\textsuperscript{93}

Notes:

\begin{enumerate}
\item Heidelberg Catechism, A New Translation (Grand Rapids, MI: Christian Reformed Board of Publications, 1975), Qa1.
\item Regarding resurrection, the Heidelberg Catechism makes this more explicit, stating that “not only will my soul be taken immediately after this life to Christ its head, but even my flesh, raised by the power of Christ, will be reunited with my soul and made like Christ’s glorious body” (Heidelberg Catechism, question and answer 57). Similar confessions are made in other catechisms, including The Westminster Shorter Catechism (question 37 and answer), and The Longer Catechism of The Orthodox, Catholic, Eastern Church (question and answer 366). See also, Luther’s Large Catechism, Q. 34; Westminster Confession of Faith, chapter 32; and To Be a Christian: An Anglican Catechism, Q. 142.
\item Willard, Renovation of the Heart, 162.
\item Kevin J. Corcoran, Rethinking Human Nature: A Christian Materialist Alternative to the Soul (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2006), 121.
\item See, for example, N.D. Kelly, Early Christian Doctrines, 4th ed. (London: Adam and Charles Black, 1968), chapters 6 and 11.
\item The Council, for example, has some anathemas against it, as they affirmed that the soul is given a physical body. See Richard Price, The Acts of the Council of Constantinople of 553 (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2009), 278–79.
\item Fourth Council of Constantinople, canon 11.
\item I am grateful to Ryan Mullins who first drew my attention to these historical points.
\end{enumerate}


16 This has been noted by dualists themselves. See, for example, Keith E. Yandell, “Materialism and Post-Mortem Survival,” in Knowledge and Reality: Essays in Honor of Alvin Plantinga, ed. Thomas M. Crisp and Matthew Davidson (Netherlands: Springer, 2006), 262.


23 Stephen T. Davis lists these doctrines in his own words as assumptions of resurrection theology. See his After We Die: Theology, Philosophy, and the Question of Life After Death (Waco, TX: Baylor University Press, 2015), 49–50.


Treaties Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge, sec. 141.


31 Rom. 6:1–11, 8:5–13; 2 Cor. 3:18, 4:10–12, 16–18; Eph. 2:1–6; Col. 3:1–3.


34 Rom. 8:16–39; 2 Cor. 4:16–18; 5:16–17; Eph. 2:4–7; Phil. 1:6; 3:10–11.

35 Wright, Resurrection and the Son of God, 440.

36 Wright, Resurrection and the Son of God, 441.


41 Richard Swinburne, “What’s So Good About Having a Body?” in Comparative Theology: Essays for Keith Ward, 137.


43 Maximus the Confessor, Epistulae 6; and Maximus the Confessor, Migne, Patrologia, Graecae 91, 429 B–432 A. For helpful commentary, see Lars Thunberg, Microcosm and Mediator: The Theological Anthropology of Maximus the Confessor, 2d ed. (Chicago: Open Court, 1995), 95–143.


47 Oddly enough, Baker recognizes that her own account of personal identity is also circular. Although, she argues that her view offers a non-circular account of human personal identity. See, Lynne Rudder Baker, Persons and Bodies: A Constitution View (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 132–141.


52 There were Christians in the past that denied MIRACLE when arguing for the immortality of the soul on purely philosophical grounds. See, for example, George Berkeley, A Treaties Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge, sec. 141.


54 Swinburne, The Evolution of the Soul, 311.


Most dualists agree that the soul is not a part of the body. Swinburne, for example, holds that the body is a contingent part of the person while the soul is the essential part (Swinburne, “The True Theory of Personal Identity,” 120).


Husserl, Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy, 193.


Augustine, On Freedom of the Will, II, XVI.41; The Trinity, IV, 1.3; Confessions, II, 6.

See, for example, Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologicae, I, Q75; and Thomas Aquinas, Disputed Questions on Spiritual Creatures, trans. Mary C. Fitzpatrick and John J. Wellmuth (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1949), IV.ad 9.


Aristotle, De Anima, 415b.9 (cf. 412a22, 412a27–28).


For more on this as it relates to contemporary biology, see, Thomas J. Kaiser, “Is DNA the Soul?” The Aquinas Review 20 (2015): 90–92.

See Lowe, Subjects of Experience, chapter 2; and J. P. Moreland, “In Defense of a Thomistic-Like Dualism.”
This does not preclude, of course, that facts about the body ground certain facts about the soul. For example, neurological facts likely ground certain developmental facts about the soul.


This objection is also briefly raised by Patrick Lee and Robert P. George in, Body-Self Dualism in Contemporary Ethics and Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 75.

Lee and George offer a similar argument in their Body Self Dualism in Contemporary Ethics and Politics, 74–75.

Lee and George, Body Self Dualism in Contemporary Ethics and Politics, 75.


Corcoran, Rethinking Human Nature, 123.


Corcoran, Rethinking Human Nature, 128.


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