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### LOCKE AND MIND-BODY DUALISM

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THE WORD 'dualism' can be used to pick out at least four different theories concerning the relationship between mind and body.

(1) A mind and a body are two different entities and each is "had" by a man. A man is thus a composite being with two components, one "inner", the other "outer". You, for example, are a man and your mind is "inner" in the sense that you alone can reflectively experience yourself thinking, or feeling pain, or seeing colours (or at least that you alone can reflectively experience your own thoughts, feelings and visual experiences). I can in a sense observe you thinking, but only by observing you use your body in certain ways—e.g. to make certain sounds, write certain things, look at the pages of an open book and frown. My "experience" of you thinking (or of your thoughts) is thus not a reflective experience. Your body is "outer", on the other hand, in the sense that you cannot experience it or its (non-relational) properties in any exclusive way. That is, in whatever sense you can be said to experience your body, someone else can equally be said to experience it.

(2) A mind and a body are different but they are not two different entities, since a mind is merely a collection of mental "properties" which are linked to a body in a certain fashion. There is no real owner for mental items like thoughts, feelings and visual experiences. We cannot say that a thought is owned by a body in the sense that extension and figure are owned by a body. Nor can we find anything in addition to bodies to fill such a role. Thus, in so far as a man is regarded as someone who "has" both a mind and a body, he is simply a body to which certain mental items are linked in a certain way. The mental items are "inner" in the sense indicated (1), but there is no "inner" being which has such items.

(3) A mind and a body are different entities such that a man *is* a mind and therefore not a body. The word 'mind' in this context refers to a mental being and it is not the case that a man *has* a mind in this sense. He is a mental being and therefore he is a mind. Of course, he can be said to "have a mind" in the sense that as a mental being he has certain

## PHILOSOPHY

mental facilities, and in this sense we can talk about how good, or alert, or mature, his mind is. But this is to introduce a quite distinct use for 'mind', and it is definitely not the case that a man has a mind in this sense by virtue of having as a part of him a being with certain mental properties. He simply is such a being. Moreover, since a mind in the sense of a being with mental properties is not a body, a man is nothing more than a mind. His "essence" consists in thought in the generic Cartesian sense and excludes body. He therefore has nothing more than "inner" mental properties. When we talk about a man deliberately running, therefore, we must be making a concealed conjunctive claim; one conjunct ascribes inner items like intentions, deliberations, and decisions to a man; the other conjunct ascribes outer items like a certain pattern of motion to a body.

(4) A mind and a body are different entities such that a man *is* a mind and therefore not a body. But a man can be something more than a being with mental properties. Although he is not a body, he may still *have* a body. Consequently, when we talk about a man deliberately running, although we may thereby implicitly ascribe to him inner items like intentions and decisions, we also thereby ascribe to him a largely outer item like moving his body in a certain way.

### I

John Locke is a dualist with respect to mind and body and, for the most part, his dualism falls into the first category sketched above. He never advocates (2), since for him a mind is always a substance with certain attributes (or which performs certain "operations"). Granted, he is openly critical of the idea 'substance' since for him it is an idea of something which is fundamentally unknowable. But he is not sufficiently critical to stop using the idea. Indeed, he thinks that as long as we are prepared to accept the existence of corporeal substances, there is no good reason to reject the existence of mental substances, and he believes that a recognition of bodies entails the recognition of corporeal substances.

Nor does he go so far as to maintain (3). The division between a mind and a body is not so sharp that a mind cannot have spatio-temporal properties. And he clearly acknowledges a causal relationship between the two, although he finds it difficult to see *how* they can interact. Consequently, when we talk about a man running, we are not simply implying a conjunction, where one conjunct ascribes solely inner things to a mind, and the other conjunct ascribes solely outer things to a body. We imply that the man's mind is located literally somewhere inside the man's body, and that certain volitions occur within the man's mind which produce, in some mysterious way, a certain effect in some part of the man's body, eventually resulting in the body's moving in a certain manner. Although a mind is not a body, then, it is definitely closely tied to the corporeal world as far as Locke is concerned.<sup>1</sup>

## LOCKE AND MIND-BODY DUALISM

As far as I know, there is only one place where Locke comes close to suggesting (4). It occurs in his discussion of the question 'Is a man's will free?'.<sup>2</sup> He there argues that unless such a question amounts to 'Is a man free?', it is as "unintelligible", or "improper", or "insignificant", or "absurd" as 'Is a man's sleep swift?' or 'Is a man's virtue square?'. The human will for him is simply a power to purport to act or refrain from acting and therefore it is nothing more than a property of an agent. It is not itself an agent. Freedom, on the other hand, is also something which properly belongs to agents, since it consists in the power to act or refrain from acting as an agent purports. Consequently, freedom properly belongs to a man, not to his will. From here Locke moves on to criticise any view which presupposes that a faculty (e.g. the will, the understanding) is an agent, accusing it, in current terminology, of committing a category mistake: "we may as properly say that it is the singing *faculty* sings, and the dancing *faculty* dances, as that the *will* chooses, or that the understanding conceives" (II xxi, 17). And in this context he identifies the proper agent as the man or *the mind*: "these being all different powers in the mind or in the man to do several actions, he exerts them as he thinks fit" (II, xxi, 18); "in all these it is not one *power* that operates on another, but it is the mind that operates and exerts these powers; it is the man that does the action, it is the agent that has power, or is able to do." (II, xxi, 19).

This discussion contains the ingredients for the following argument: "To say that a man thinks by virtue of having within him an immaterial substance which thinks is like saying that a man acts by virtue of having within him a will which acts, or like saying that he understands by virtue of having within him an intellect which understands. Just as the intellect and will are not beings which understand and act, but are powers of the man to understand and act, so "the mind" here is nothing more than a power of the man to think. Granted, we may use 'the mind' to refer to a being which thinks, but in that case it does not refer to something a man *has* which thinks and thereby enables him to think. It is nothing more than the man himself. A man, then, *is* a mind, i.e. a mental being, which *has*, and not *is*, a body of a certain kind."

Although the ingredients for such an argument are there, however, Locke fails to make use of them and his explicit dualistic remarks place his view in (1) rather than (4). He constantly talks of minds as something which we have and which exist in us: "For whilst I know, by seeing or hearing, etc., that there is some corporeal being without me, the object of that sensation, I do more certainly know that there is some spiritual being within me that sees and hears. This . . . cannot be the action of bare insensible matter; nor ever could be, without an immaterial thinking being." (II, xxiii, 15).<sup>3</sup>

Granted, his dualism is put under considerable pressure by what he says when he discusses personal identity. In particular, his remarks there imply that a man might be made up of three things—a mind, a body, and a

## PHILOSOPHY

“person”—and not just two. It is not a compositional view of man which thereby comes under heavy pressure, however. It is the view that the number of components is limited to two. Thus, he continues to talk about minds, in the sense of immaterial thinking substances (although in this context he uses ‘soul’ or ‘spirit’), as *belonging to men*.<sup>4</sup> And even though he admits that it is possible to use ‘man’ in such an eccentric way that a “man” is simply a soul, he would insist that it is also possible (indeed, that it is normal) to use ‘man’ in such a way that a man is a being who has a soul as well as a body, where either the identity of the body through time determines the identity of the man or the identity of the body and the identity of the soul together determine the identity of the man.<sup>5</sup> Similarly, although he admits that ‘man’ may be used interchangeably with ‘person’ (indeed, that it is often so used), he would insist that either a person is simply a composite of soul and body or ‘man’ may also be used in such a way that a man is composed of at least a soul and a body (where a person is either a third component or a being who exists in addition to a man).<sup>6</sup> I shall return to consider the implications of Locke’s discussion of personal identity in section VI.

## II

The fact that Locke adopts a compositional form of dualism explains, I think, why he is led to claim that a mind is literally located in space even though it is unextended. According to (1), the mind and the body are two different parts of a “single” thing, the man, but because the mind is unextended while the body is extended, it is difficult to see how two such radically different things can be parts of the same thing. This sort of dualism operates with a certain model in view, e.g. the model of a cherry with a fleshy part and a pit, where the pit is inside the fleshy part, but an important disanalogy emerges in so far as the mind, unlike the pit, is unextended. Locke seems to feel, however, that enough similarities are preserved to make the model applicable if we literally locate the mind inside the body. Indeed, he might even feel that a compositional dualist *must* locate the mind literally inside the body in order to make the model work. For a remark like ‘The mind is related to the body in something like the way a cherry pit is related to the cherry’s fleshy part, except that the mind is unextended and is not literally located anywhere’ is scarcely intelligible.

Locke offers two arguments for locating minds in space and hence ascribing literal motion to them.<sup>7</sup>

- (i) Minds act upon bodies and things “cannot operate but where they are”. Therefore minds exist in space.
- (ii) A mind can “move out of the body” at death. Therefore minds exist in space.

Neither argument would convince a dualist who rejects compositionism in favour of (4). The premiss in argument (i) is plausible only so

## LOCKE AND MIND-BODY DUALISM

long as the mind is taken to be the “inner” part of a man and the body his “outer” part. In that case, if a mind is to act upon the body, then it is reasonable to think that it will act at some spot or region within the body, which implies that it is spatially related to that spot or region. But if the compositional model is dropped and the man is taken to be the mind who has the body, then in admitting that the mind interacts with the body, a dualist is simply admitting the truth of statements like ‘He wiggled his toes’ and ‘He feels pain because his arm is arthritic’. The dualist is not obliged to explain a mind’s wiggling the toes of his body by insisting, for example, that the mind first does something internal (exercises his will), that this produces a change in his central nervous system, and that, through a causal chain of events, this in turn eventually produces the motion of his toes. He can simply say that the mind wiggles the toes of his body, although he may want to admit that other events or actions are involved, some of them perhaps causally. But, however he works the point out in detail, it is possible for him to avoid the premiss in (i) in any sense in which it entails (i)’s conclusion. Granted, the non-compositional dualist must admit that *in a sense* the mind must operate “where it is”. For example, if you move your legs while walking in the park, you must in a sense be located in a certain part of the park. But the dualist can explain this sense as one in which ‘You are located in a part of the park’ means ‘You have a body which is located in a part of the park’. A mind is not being *literally* located in space, then, to the extent that ‘is located in space’ as applied to minds has a derivative use and amounts to ‘has a body which is located in space’.<sup>8</sup> Talk about the spatial location of minds is therefore not univocal with talk about the spatial location of bodies but is derivative upon it, whereas (i)’s conclusion wants to secure univocity.

Locke’s second argument is equally unconvincing. Death for a dualist may involve the mind’s metaphorically “moving out of the body” but only in the sense that the mind ceases to have that particular body and either becomes disembodied or acquires a different body. Even this is not necessary, however, since a dualist can insist that death may involve the cessation of the mind’s existence. At any rate, none of the alternative destinies tolerated by dualism entails that minds literally (i.e. non-derivatively) exist in space. Thus, although Locke’s view that minds are literally located in space is a necessary corollary of the compositional dualism which he adopts, it is not a necessary corollary of non-compositional dualism.

### III

Although Locke feels that locating minds in space helps to ease some of the difficulties which a dualist faces, he does not think it removes them all. The two he mentions are the difficulty of regarding a mind as a kind of substance and the difficulty of understanding how an unextended substance can interact with an extended substance.

## PHILOSOPHY

As far as Locke is concerned, a substance is an unsupportable support for qualities, powers or mental operations. Consequently, it is something which both is related to qualities and the like by virtue of supporting them and has a nature of its own. The problem is that it is impossible to discern what a substance's *intrinsic* nature might be like. If we try to say 'It is something which is F', where F is not a relation, then we merely introduce a species of substance. Or, if we maintain that we can at least in theory experience the intrinsic nature of a substance, and try to describe what we might thereby experience, we shall again have to say something like 'It is something which is F' in order to avoid introducing a mere quality or mental operation; but this again introduces a species of substance and fails to tell us what a substance as such is like. In this sense, then, our idea of substance is necessarily "relative" and not "positive". Indeed, for Locke, it draws harsher epithets like 'obscure' and 'confused' because it is an idea of something which has an intrinsic nature but the intrinsic nature of which is beyond human understanding.<sup>9</sup>

I feel it would be inappropriate in this context to spend time showing how Locke might defend the idea of a substance against his own charge of obscurity. I do think he underestimates the seriousness of the problem since if his charge held up, it would be impossible to apply the idea of a substance to anything correctly. The idea of something which has an intrinsic nature but the intrinsic nature of which is *theoretically* indescribable is an incoherent idea and cannot have instances. He fails to see such a consequence, however, and thinks that he can continue to apply the idea correctly. He compares it with the idea of God in so far as the latter idea is of a being whose nature is fundamentally unknowable to man and yet it does not follow from this that there cannot be a God.<sup>10</sup> The difference, however, if Locke's charge is correct, is that the idea of a substance is the idea of something which is unknowable to anyone, human or divine, and this is a contradiction.

The other defence which he offers for calling minds 'substances' consists in the point that the only way to dispute the existence of mental substances plausibly is by insisting on some form of radical materialism and that, in the final analysis, this involves the introduction of corporeal substances. Consequently, the problem of 'substance' is something which haunts the dualist and his plausible opponents alike.<sup>11</sup>

Locke thinks it is impossible to see how an immaterial substance can act upon a material substance and vice versa. He thinks that there clearly is interaction between mind and body but he is unable to discern a *modus operandi*. Now, I think in this case his problem is aggravated, if not entirely created, by the compositional model of a man. If the mind is a part of a man along with his body, and if the mind is located somewhere inside the body, then, if the mind is to act on the body it would seem to have to do it in some way. To borrow an example from Wittgenstein, if a fly is trapped inside a bottle, then to have an effect on the bottle, it must

## LOCKE AND MIND-BODY DUALISM

do something like strike against the bottle's insides, or emit an acid which creates holes in the bottle, or produce a sound loud enough to shatter the bottle. The trouble with applying this model to the mind, however, is that the *way* in which something inside something else has an effect on its container requires the inner thing not simply to be located in space, but to be extended: nothing strikes something else, or emits an acid, or produces a sound, unless it is extended. And this condition is violated by dualism. Once again, then, I think Locke underestimates the seriousness of the problem he is prepared to recognize. He feels it is sufficient to say 'We can see that mind and body interact although we cannot see how they do it'. What he fails to realize is that, so long as the mind is inside the body, there must be some mode of interaction, and that such a mode of interaction requires a condition which dualism cannot tolerate.

I think a non-compositional dualism as in (4) above escapes this type of problem, or at least goes a long way toward escaping it. Once a man is no longer regarded as something composed of a mind and a body, with the former inside the latter, but is regarded as a mind which has a body, then the need for a *modus operandi* vanishes. The mind is not conceived as being spatially related to the body in any way and therefore it does not have to move the body by first doing something to, say, its pineal gland. Granted, in order to move its body, a mind must *have* that body, but whatever the concept 'having a body' involves exactly, it does not involve the mind's being spatially located in, on, or near that body. The relationship is of an entirely different sort.

## IV

Although Locke continues to hold a dualistic position in the face of acknowledged difficulties, he offers relatively little argument for doing so. As I have mentioned, he gives arguments designed to show that the difficulties are not sufficiently serious to make anyone abandon the theory. And he does try to account for the unity of a man by locating the mind literally inside the body. Moreover, he rejects any extreme form of materialism which claims that there are no minds and that only bodies exist, on the ground that such a theory wrongly implies that, e.g., I never think, feel, imagine or remember anything. But he does very little to show that minds are not bodies, either conceptually or factually.

In this respect Locke's position differs strikingly from that of Descartes. Descartes seeks to establish 'My essence consists solely in thought' with as much certainty as he possibly can and offers a number of arguments to this end. Unfortunately most of them are unsound if they are taken to have 'A mind is not a body' as their conclusion. Consider the following.

- (a) It is possible for any mind to know that it as a thinking being exists and yet not know whether any body exists. Therefore a mind is not a body.<sup>12</sup>

## PHILOSOPHY

(b) Each mind knows only that it is necessarily a thinking being. It does not know that it is necessarily anything else. Therefore no mind is a body.<sup>13</sup>

(c) For each mind the proposition 'I exist' is certain only so long as it thinks. If it ceased entirely to think, then it might cease to exist. Therefore a mind is not a body.<sup>14</sup>

(d) A mind is indivisible whereas every body is divisible. Therefore a mind is not a body.<sup>15</sup>

Argument (a) shows only that if a mind is a body it might not know it, even though it knows its own existence as a mind. It does not show that a mind is not a body. Argument (b) shows only that if a mind is necessarily corporeal, it does not know it. It does not show that a mind is not necessarily corporeal, much less that a mind is not in fact corporeal. The first premiss in (c) is true only to the extent that being certain of anything involves thinking. But this fails to establish that a mind is not a body. The second premiss in (c) would remain true if we replaced 'think' with 'walk' and therefore it adds nothing in support of dualism. The question of whether a mind is indivisible can only be settled after the question of whether a mind is a body is settled. Consequently, argument (d) begs the question.

A more promising argument is suggested by a remark like 'I supposed that there were no bodies and yet still felt certain of my existence as a thinking being'.<sup>16</sup> The argument might be put as follows.

(e) The supposition that I exist as a thinking being and that the body called 'my body' ceases to exist contains no contradiction. Hence it is possible for me and the being called 'my body' to be separated such that it is destroyed while I continue to exist. Therefore I as a thinking being and it cannot be the same substance. Nor can I be identified with any other body, since, whatever body is introduced, separation is possible. Moreover, if I as a thinking being am not the being called 'my body', then there is reason to believe that no thinking being is a body, since there is reason to believe that the same possibility of becoming separated from a given body is open to any thinking being. Therefore no mind is a body.

This is an argument which Locke might well have used, particularly in view of the body-swapping possibilities he tolerates in his treatment of personal identity. Yet he does not actually use it. One possible reason for his reluctance to draw on Cartesian arguments in this connection is that Descartes sometimes formulates his dualistic position in terms of what his own "essence" consists in and Locke is suspicious about claims like 'My essence consists in such and such'. His suspicion is founded on two views. First, he thinks that individuals do not have essences except in a derivative sense. For example, this individual square is "essentially" an equilateral rectangle only in the sense that it is conceived under the abstract idea of a square and the general proposition 'A square is



## LOCKE AND MIND-BODY DUALISM

essentially an equilateral rectangle' is true.<sup>17</sup> Second, he thinks it is possible for an individual mind to be so unconscious that in no sense is it actually thinking of anything and 'I am essentially a thinking being' could be taken to imply otherwise.<sup>18</sup> An advocate of 'My essence consists in thought' could easily accommodate these two views, however, by admitting that his thesis is elliptical for 'I am conceived under the abstract idea of a mind and a mind is essentially a thinking being and is not essentially anything else' and that 'thinking' here includes 'being able to have occurrent thoughts'. Descartes himself might want to go further than this and at least say that I *must* be conceived under the abstract idea of a mind, however else I am conceived, and then Locke might or might not have reservations. But such an extension of the point is not a necessary concomitant of the dualism which arguments (a)—(e) purport to establish. Therefore Locke's views about "essences" do not constitute good reasons for refusing to embrace argument (e).

### V

Locke not only refrains from trying to establish his dualism on a strong basis. He expressly admits that it cannot be done. Although he thinks that dualism is true, he admits that, as far as he can see, it might not be true, and that a man might only be a single substance with two general kinds of attributes, mental and corporeal. The seeds of doubt are first sown near the end of his discussion of personal identity where he says that we are "in the dark" when we take a man's soul to be an immaterial substance.<sup>19</sup> And he pursues the sceptical theme in his treatment of the extent of human knowledge when he says that he cannot clearly discern a contradiction in the suggestion that he is a single substance with mental and corporeal attributes. He admits the suggested state of affairs is "inconceivable" in the sense that he finds it difficult to conceive how it could arise. But he does not see that it is impossible and is quick to point out that his own dualistic view harbours just as "inconceivable" a situation when it tolerates interaction between mind and body: "since we must allow [that] he [God] has annexed effects to motion, which we can no way conceive motion able to produce, what reason have we to conclude that he could not order them as well to be produced in a subject we cannot conceive capable of them, as well as in a subject we cannot conceive the motion of matter can any way operate upon" (IV, iii, 6). In effect, although Locke is willing to accept the certainty of Descartes' *cogito*, he is unwilling to accept the certainty of *sum res cogitans* if this is taken as a dualistic slogan: "It is past controversy that we have in us something that thinks: our very doubts about what it is confirm the certainty of its being, though we must content ourselves in the ignorance of what kind of *being* it is." (IV, iii, 6).<sup>20</sup>

Although Locke denies that dualism is certainly true, he still seems to think that it is probably true and, moreover, that it is guaranteed by

## PHILOSOPHY

articles of faith. His view of faith is such that something is acceptable on faith only if it is not “contrary to reason”, i.e. is neither contradictory nor, all things considered, improbable. He apparently feels that dualism is guaranteed by faith because it is implied by personal immortality and the latter can be accepted on faith. But this implies that ‘A mind is immortal’ involves no contradiction and, assuming that immortality does not entail the continuous ownership of the same body, in turn implies the possibility of at least temporary separation from one’s body. Consequently, if dualism is in this way guaranteed by faith, the Cartesian argument (e) for dualism—i.e. the one which premisses the possibility of separation from the body—must be sound. Therefore, it appears, Locke’s claim that dualism rests solely on faith and probability is self-defeating.

This criticism may be a bit unfair to Locke, however. He does appeal to faith in personal immortality—although in stating his appeal he almost seems to be *deducing* immortality from God’s benevolence, which for him is not just a matter of faith—but his description of immortality does not strictly entail a separation of the mind and body. It simply requires a “resurrection” of the mind, which could coincide with the body’s resurrection. He writes:

“All the great ends of morality and religion are well enough secured without philosophical proofs of the soul’s immateriality, since it is evident that he who made us at first begin to subsist here, sensible intelligent beings, and for several years continued us in such a state, can and will restore us to the like state of sensibility in another world and make us capable there to receive the retribution he has designed to men, according to their doings in this life.” (IV, iii, 6).

Also, when he discusses personal identity and entertains the possibility of a mind’s being separated from its body, he concludes his discussions with the suggestion that the question of whether a mind can be separated from its body can only be answered *after* we answer the question of whether the mind is a body, which implies that Cartesian argument (e) begs the question.<sup>21</sup> Consequently, it is not the case that Locke says things which *definitely* commit him to underwriting argument (e) on behalf of dualism, and it may be the case that he holds beliefs which would prevent him from doing so.

As far as his claim that dualism is probably true is concerned, he offers no empirical evidence to support it, even though his own theory of probability requires him to provide such evidence. He does not mention, for example, any phenomena which a spiritualist or medium might try to introduce, nor does he discuss supernatural or extra-sensory forms of perception in this connection. He does at one point speculate about the possibility of disembodied minds communicating, but he offers no evidence for thinking that they probably communicate with embodied minds.

## VI

While discussing personal identity through time, Locke says things which come at least dangerously near to implying either that a man is composed of a mind, a body, and a "person", or that, while a man is composed of just a mind and a body, there exists in addition to a man a "person". He introduces concepts of 'mind', 'body' and 'person' such that, if a given mind (M) is connected to a given body (B) and to a given person (P) at a certain time, then at a later time it is possible for M to be connected to a body other than B and a person other than P;<sup>22</sup> similarly B can become connected to a mind and person other than M and P, and P can become connected to a body and mind other than B and M.<sup>23</sup> Now, whether his remarks imply a tripartite division of a man, or imply that in addition to men there are persons, depends upon whether he conceives the relation between person and man as that of part to whole or in some looser way. For example, he talks of a person existing "in" a body and this could suggest that, just as a mind exists "in" a human body and is thereby had by the man whose body it is, so a person is had by a man.<sup>24</sup> But at other times he leaves the connection between person and man less determinate; for example, he will say things like "But is not a man drunk and sober the same person" instead of "But cannot a man who is drunk and then sober *have* the same person", and this leaves room for denying that a person is in any sense a part of a man.<sup>25</sup> In view of the indeterminacy of Locke's remarks, I shall arbitrarily decide to consider whether he is implying that a man is composed of three things and not just two, with the understanding that I could have equally considered whether he is implying that persons are beings which exist in addition to men, where men are composites of minds and bodies.

Given that a person is something which is a part of a man, Locke's definition of a person as "a thinking intelligent being that has reason and reflection and can consider itself as itself, the same thinking thing in different times and places" (II, xxvii, 9) strongly suggests that a person is a mind, i.e. a thinking immaterial substance. Yet he is reluctant to make such a point explicit and his tolerating the possibility of a given mind becoming connected to a different person, and a given person becoming connected to a different mind, strongly suggests that a person is not a mind. Granted, he is tentative about the possibility of the same person becoming connected to a different mind, but all this means is that he seems committed to a tentative claim that a person is not a mind. And if he is really so committed, then at least one of his tentative views is inconsistent with dualism.

Attempts have been made to reconcile the possibilities which Locke tolerates with the view that a person is a mind and not a third component in a man. Locke himself indicates one way in which a dualist can accommodate the possibility of a mind's becoming connected to a different person. He mentions the "forensic" character of the concept 'person'

## PHILOSOPHY

and suggests that whereas saying that minds  $M_1$  and  $M_2$  at different times are the same does not require holding the men involved responsible for the same actions, saying that persons  $P_1$  and  $P_2$  are the same does require holding the men involved responsible for the same actions.<sup>26</sup> Consequently, in a case where two men at different times are the same man but are not responsible for the same actions (e.g. because amnesia has occurred), the minds involved may be the same but the persons are not. Thus, we have a case where a given mind becomes connected to a different person, even though at each time, the person involved just is the mind involved and nothing more. This situation is analogous to a case where a man at one time is a general in the army and at a later time is a general in the air force but not in the army. We might say that it is the same man but not the same general, although at each time the general involved is the given man and not an additional being.

Although appealing to the forensic nature of 'person' does enable a dualist to make room for the possibility of 'same mind but different person', it does not by itself enable him to make room for 'same person but different mind'. In a case where two persons are the same because the men involved are responsible for the same actions, it is not obviously possible for the minds to be different. Nevertheless, Locke thinks such a possibility exists because he thinks that in such a case it is possible for the second man ( $H_2$ ) to remember doing those particular actions the first man ( $H_1$ ) and only the first man did, even though  $H_2$ 's mind is different from  $H_1$ 's mind.  $H_2$ 's person is the same as  $H_1$ 's person because of  $H_2$ 's memories but their minds can be different. Yet  $H_1$ 's person just is  $H_1$ 's mind and  $H_2$ 's person just is  $H_2$ 's mind. Now, this means that the claim that  $H_1$ 's person and  $H_2$ 's person are the same person cannot entail that they are the same individuals. For,  $H_1$ 's person is  $H_1$ 's mind and  $H_2$ 's person is  $H_2$ 's mind and yet  $H_1$ 's mind and  $H_2$ 's mind are not the same mind and are therefore different individuals. Locke need not be deterred by such a consequence, however. He might draw an analogy with a use of 'same politician' such that we can say of two men at different times that they are numerically the same politician, although they are numerically different men, because they hold numerically the same office. For example, if you visit Ottawa in June and talk to the Minister of Finance and then return in September and talk to the Minister of Finance again, then, even though the office changes hands in August, you in a sense talk to numerically the same politician. An even closer analogy might be drawn with a society-oriented use of 'person' such that  $P_1$  and  $P_2$  are the same person if and only if their social relationships are the same. If  $P_1$  and  $P_2$  are the persons of identical twins, one twin dies and his social role is completely taken over by the other twin, then  $P_1$  and  $P_2$  are the same person, although the twins are different and the minds which  $P_1$  and  $P_2$  in each case may differ; in that case  $P_1$  and  $P_2$  are the same persons but different individuals.

## LOCKE AND MIND-BODY DUALISM

Locke, of course, does not give 'person' a society-oriented use. But he does try to give his use of the word something of the same general logical structure. There is one important difference, however. Personal identity in a society-oriented sense does not require that the person involved be the same individual. Nor does it require that the men or bodies involved be the same. All it requires is an identity of social roles. Personal identity in Locke's sense, on the other hand, requires the identity of *some* individual, since it involves the continuity of moral responsibility and someone's remembering performing certain actions. And since the above argument insists that personal identity need not involve an identity of mind, then it must involve an identity of the man and hence an identity of the body. Yet Locke seems to want to tolerate the possibility not only of 'same person but different mind' but also of 'same person but different mind and body (and hence different man)'. So long as he tolerates the *complete* independence of 'same mind', 'same body' and 'same person', then, he is not in a position to make room for saying that a person just is a mind and he is committed to a tripartite division of man.

### VII

The preceding discussion shows, I think, that the problems faced by a compositional dualist are more damaging than Locke realizes. If, in the light of these problems, he had pursued the line of reasoning which he begins in his discussion of 'Is the will free?' and adopted a non-compositional dualism of type (4), then he would have strengthened his position considerably. To see this, consider how dualism of type (4) can withstand the following objections, raised largely by Antony Flew under the spiritual guidance of Gilbert Ryle.<sup>27</sup>

Objection 1. "We learn the word 'people' by being shown people, by meeting them and shaking hands with them. They may be intelligent or unintelligent, introspective or extraverted, black, white, red or brown, but what they cannot be is disembodied or in the shape of elephants. Locke's definition would make it a contingent truth about people that some or all of them are either embodied in or are of human form." (Flew, p. 59).

Reply. For a dualist, when two people (A and B) meet and shake hands, it is not simply a matter of A's meeting a certain body and doing something with its hand, A meets B and in so doing shakes B's hand. Granted, if the singular of 'people' is 'person' and if a person is regarded as something which exists "in" a man and hence inside his body, the person B seems hidden from A to such an extent that it is hard to understand what it can mean to say that A "meets" B or that A is "shown" B.<sup>28</sup> Moreover, since on this model it is not the person but the man who has the body, then we cannot even say that A shakes B's hand. All we can say is that A shakes the hand of the man whose person B is, and this does create a logical strain. Once we drop the compositional model,

## PHILOSOPHY

however, and regard a person as a mind which owns a certain kind of body, then a person is no longer inside a body and a person has a hand which someone else can shake. Granted, B is not known to A in the same way B is known to himself, since A must rely on observation in order to know that B exists and to know something about B. But this does not entail that A cannot be “shown” B.

A dualist can readily allow that persons may be intelligent, extraverted and black. ‘A person is black’ amounts to ‘A person has a black body’. ‘A person is extraverted’ amounts to ‘A person does, or is disposed to do, such and such things with his body’—though it does not amount to ‘A person has an extraverted body’. Ascribing intelligence to a person may or may not presuppose that the person has a body.

There *is* a sense of ‘person’ in which a person by definition must have a body of a certain kind. In this sense parrots and elephants cannot be persons because of their configuration. And in this sense a person cannot be disembodied. But all this means is that a person by definition is a mental being with a body of the appropriate kind. It does not entail that a mental being cannot have a parrot-shaped body or become disembodied (cf. ‘A military general by definition is a member of the armed forces but the man who is a military general can cease to be one and become a cook’).

Objection 2. According to dualism, human bodies are “controlled by mysterious internal shadow beings in a way similar to, but much less intelligible than, that in which ships are directed by their captains and vehicles by their drivers.” (Flew, p. 61).

There is nothing *prima facie* mysterious about saying that you exist and that you have but are not your body. It is only if the pilot-ship or driver-vehicle model is taken so far that you are somehow located “inside” your body, hidden from the view of others, controlling your body from within by acting directly on your central nervous system, that the view becomes unintelligible. Granted, non-compositional dualism creates questions which philosophers can and should pursue—e.g. ‘What exactly does the concept “having a body” involve; in other words, what is the relationship between a person and the physical world such that he can be said to have one body but not others?’; ‘When a person manipulates his body, in what way can events in his central nervous system be causally involved?’. But to create questions of this sort is far different from creating unintelligible mysteries.

Objection 3. It is a mistake, indeed a category-mistake, to hold that because we can be said to have a mind, there is “something in us which has the power to think.” (See Flew, p. 62).

This objection succeeds against compositional dualism but not against all forms of dualism. A dualist can acknowledge that people, or human beings, do the thinking without being forced to admit that people are bodies of a certain sort. He need only admit that in the case of human beings, it is beings who have bodies of a certain sort who do the thinking.

## LOCKE AND MIND-BODY DUALISM

Objection 4. There is a legitimate distinction between one use of 'person' and 'personality' such that a person can be said to have a personality and to change his personality. But 'personality' should not be reified.<sup>29</sup>

Compositional dualism may be guilty of reifying 'personality' or concepts of a similar nature, but not all forms of dualism are. A dualist can allow that the given distinction between 'person' and 'personality' does not fall between two different kinds of beings and still insist that a person, i.e. the kind of being who can be said to have a personality, is not a body. Moreover, he can maintain that the distinction between 'person' in the sense of a mental being and 'person' in the fuller sense of a mental being who has a body of a certain sort is not simply a distortion of the distinction between 'person' and 'personality', since a person in either sense can be said to have a personality.

Objection 5. Dualism must accept purported memory claims as a criterion of personal identity and this has unwelcome consequences.

A dualist need not accept purported memory claims as a criterion of personal identity if this means that he must regard purported memory claims as either necessary or sufficient for the ascription of personal identity. Memory claims must be considered relevant, but they need not be the only relevant factor. In addition, for example, there is bodily continuity, similarity of character, similarity of specialized knowledge and the realization of expressed intentions. No one factor is universally necessary or sufficient, although in a *given* situation, the introduction of purported memory claims can help to establish personal identity beyond reasonable doubt. A dualist must therefore admit that bodily continuity is not theoretically necessary for personal identity but, contrary to some recent views, there is nothing wrong with this. Indeed, a dualist might plausibly argue that preserving bodily continuity as necessary for personal continuity is to fall into the same general trap that someone like Locke falls into, viz. the trap of looking for some *single* thing which will provide a necessary, and possibly even a sufficient, condition for personal identity. This issue warrants fuller treatment than I can give it here, however.<sup>30</sup>

Granted, a dualist who accepts the possibility of disembodied existence implies the possibility of a situation in which we should have no way of telling whether two mental beings,  $M_1$  and  $M_2$ , are the same, even though they are the same and we can know of their existence and something about each of them. Such a situation would arise if  $M_1$  were embodied and  $M_2$  disembodied and  $M_2$  experienced both complete amnesia and a radical character change. But to tolerate this contingency is to tolerate nothing worse (e.g.) than the possibility of our being unable to tell whom  $x$  was about to name as chief beneficiary in his will if only two men,  $x$  and his lawyer, know what  $x$ 's decision was, no record of the decision was made,  $x$ 's lawyer has died, and  $x$  has suffered complete amnesia. The

## PHILOSOPHY

fact that such a situation can arise does not mean that certain things which either x or his lawyer might have said or done if neither amnesia nor death had intervened cannot reliably indicate what x intended to say in his will.

Objection 6. In discussing Descartes' defence of dualism, Norman Malcolm rightly says that the Cartesian claim 'I have a clear and distinct idea of myself as an unextended being' cannot be used to support dualism, since it is on a par with 'I am an unextended being'.<sup>31</sup> Thus, proving dualism required "an objective proof that he has a clear and distinct idea of himself as an unextended being", and according to Malcolm, such an objective proof involves for Descartes the premiss 'Someone is aware of himself when and only when he is aware of thinking'. Moreover, according to Malcolm, in the sense in which the latter premiss is true, it fails to support dualism. Now, Malcolm is right about the latter premiss, but he is wrong in suggesting that it is the only premiss which Descartes can plausibly fall back on, since Descartes can introduce a premiss like 'I have a clear and distinct idea of myself as a being who could still exist even though the body called "my body" ceased to exist' and this is a plausible premiss. Furthermore, although it is on a par with 'I as a mental being could still exist even if the body called "my body" ceased to exist' it is not on a par with 'I as a mental being am unextended'. It can be used to establish the latter statement, but its merit can be discussed prior to discussing the merit of 'I as a mental being am unextended'. Consequently, the argument 'I as a mental being am unextended because I as a mental being could still exist even if the body called "my body" ceased to exist' does not beg the question. Or at least a dualist is entitled to claim as much, and Malcolm offers nothing to *show* that he is wrong.

Malcolm is right when he says that 'I am an indivisible being' cannot be used to prove dualism without begging the question, since in this case the truth value of the premiss cannot be discussed without first establishing the conclusion's truth value. But by the same token 'I am a divisible being' cannot be used to disprove dualism without begging the question. Yet this is what Malcolm tends to do when he says:

"Descartes is saying that I am not divisible into spatial parts. But that is not so. I can be split in half. Descartes would reply that 'I' would mean here 'my body': when 'I' refers only to a thinking and unextended thing, I am not divisible into spatial parts. But does 'I' ever refer solely to a thinking and unextended thing? Descartes needs to establish that this is so" (p. 328).

If Malcolm were simply saying 'In order to show that dualism is true, Descartes must show that "I can be split in half" and "I" can refer to an unextended thing' are true', then his remarks would be correct. But he seems to be going further than this and saying 'In the absence of proof to the contrary, I, and not just "my body", can be split in half.' He is entitled



## LOCKE AND MIND-BODY DUALISM

to say such a thing, but in saying it he is not *disproving* dualism. He is simply saying that dualism is not true, and this is no *argument* against dualism. Moreover, its ultimate value depends upon whether there is no proof to the contrary and his discussion leaves considerable doubt as to whether no such proof is available.

Objection 7. If a certain kind of determinism is true, then dualism cannot be. According to this kind of determinism, for any bodily occurrence (B), given the physical conditions antecedent to B, B must occur. Determinism of this sort implies that in every case it is something physical which produces a bodily occurrence. Therefore, if the mind is not a body, then interactionism cannot be true. But theories like epiphenomenalism and pre-established harmony are just too implausible on first view. Consequently, dualism cannot be true.

Needless to say, the kind of dualism in question has not yet been established beyond doubt. But even granting its truth, a dualist can accommodate it by claiming that the physical conditions which causally determine a bodily occurrence in some cases do so by determining the mind who owns the body to move it in a certain way or to refrain from moving it.

Objection 8. If this were the case, then there would have to be a gap between the time the physical causal factors (P) occur and the time the eventual effect (B) occurs, since P must produce B by first producing a mental event (M) which in turn eventually produces B. But there is no discernible gap in the chain of physical causes, according to this form of determinism.<sup>32</sup>

Compositional dualism is committed to such a consequence, but not all forms of dualism. A dualist can insist that when P produces B by making the body-owner do B, it need not involve P's producing a mental event in the body-owner which in turn eventually produces B. He may have to acknowledge that in doing B, the body-owner also does something mental (say "purports to do B" in a special sense which is compatible with success and which does not entail a special effort).<sup>33</sup> But he does not have to acknowledge that this mental act is a time-consuming causal fact or in the process. Similarly, although he may have to admit that in doing B the body-owner first "causally brings about" certain other bodily occurrences (including neural ones), in a sense which is compatible with his not knowing anything about such occurrences, and that these occurrences causally intervene between P and B, he need not admit that there is anything mental which causally intervenes between P and such occurrences. Thus, he can say that P causes the body-owner causally to bring about certain bodily occurrences which eventually produce B, such that we can say of the body-owner that he does B. Granted, admitting this much is to admit a time gap between P and B, but it is not to admit a time gap in the chain of physical causes and to this extent the dualist need not be at odds with the physical determinist.

## PHILOSOPHY

Further objections could be introduced and replies made but in the context of a discussion primarily devoted to Locke, prolonging the dialogue any further would be out of place. In any case, I think enough has been said to show that once dualism is divorced from compositionism, it becomes much more of a force to be reckoned with in the philosophy of mind.

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<sup>1</sup> See II, xxiii, 19–21, 28 (i.e., *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, 2 vols. ed. J. Yolton, Everyman's Library, 1965, Book II, chapter xxiii, sections 19–21, 28).

<sup>2</sup> See II, xxi 14–20.

<sup>3</sup> See also II, xxiii 18–20, 22, 28.

<sup>4</sup> See II, xxvii, 6, 14, 15, 23, 27.

<sup>5</sup> For the first alternative, see II, xxvii, 6, and for the second, see II, xxvii, 8.

<sup>6</sup> See II, xxvii, 15.

<sup>7</sup> See II, xxiii 19, 20. His remarks in section 19 contain a third argument, but it is strictly defensive. It is that 'An unextended mental substance exists in space and is at a distance from other unextended mental substances' is no more absurd than 'An unextended geometrical point exists in space and is at a distance from other points'. A dualist who thinks 'geometrical point' is in some sense necessarily "ideal" would find this argument unconvincing.

<sup>8</sup> This point meets the type of challenge offered by Locke in II, xxiii, 21.

<sup>9</sup> See II, xxiii, 106.

<sup>10</sup> See *Works*, 1823 edition, Vol. IV, pp. 8–9.

<sup>11</sup> Indeed, he thinks that a materialist faces special problems of his own, since a finite body is infinitely divisible (II, xxiii, 31) and the cohesion of its parts is fundamentally inexplicable (II, xxiii, 23–27).

<sup>12</sup> See HR I, 319 (i.e. *The Philosophical Works of Descartes*, 2 vols., eds. E. S. Haldane and G. R. T. Ross, CUP, 1931, Vol. I, p. 319).

<sup>13</sup> See HR I, 137–38.

<sup>14</sup> See HR I, 151–52.

<sup>15</sup> See HR I, 141.

<sup>16</sup> See HR I, 152.

<sup>17</sup> See III, vi, 4–6.

<sup>18</sup> See II, i, 9–19.

<sup>19</sup> See II, xxvii, 27.

<sup>20</sup> It is interesting to note that even in this context Locke still retains the dualistic locution "something in us which thinks".

<sup>21</sup> See II, xxvii, 27.

<sup>22</sup> See II, xxvii, 4.

<sup>23</sup> See II, xxvii, 13.

<sup>24</sup> See II, xxvii 15, 23.

<sup>25</sup> See II, xxvii 22.

<sup>26</sup> See II, xxvii, 26. A. Flew, in "Locke and the Problem of Personal Identity", *Philosophy*, XXVI (1951), and Henry E. Allison, "Locke's Theory of Personal Identity: a Re-examination", *Journal of the History of Ideas*, XXVII (1966), both acknowledge the forensic nature of 'person' and Allison appeals to it in an effort to show that a person is not a distinct entity but merely an "aspect of the concrete man".

## LOCKE AND MIND-BODY DUALISM

<sup>27</sup> See A. Flew, "Locke and the Problem of Personal Identity", and Gilbert Ryle, *The Concept of Mind* (London, 1949).

<sup>28</sup> Flew's subsequent remarks about not meeting "the fleshy houses in which they are living or the containers in which they are kept" (p. 59) clearly indicates that he has compositional dualism in his sights.

<sup>29</sup> See Flew, pp. 60-61, and II, xxvii, 20, where Locke does seem to be making such a mistake.

<sup>30</sup> Bernard Williams argues for the necessity of bodily continuity in "Personal Identity and Individuation", *Proc. Arist. Soc.*, LVII, (1956-57) and is supported by Terence Greenwood in "Personal Identity and Memory", *Philosophical Quarterly*, XVII (1967).

<sup>31</sup> In "Descartes' Proof that his Essence is Thinking", *Philosophical Review*, LXXIV (1965).

<sup>32</sup> See D. M. Armstrong, *A Materialist Theory of the Mind* (London, 1968), pp. 32-35.

<sup>33</sup> See G. N. A. Vesey, "Volition", *Philosophy*, XXXVI (1961).