Is Hylomorphism a Neglected Option in Philosophy of Mind?*

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1. Two Basic Assumptions of Contemporary Philosophy of Mind

> How could the aggregation of millions of individually insentient neurons generate subjective awareness? We know that brains are the *de facto* causal basis of consciousness, but we have, it seems, no understanding whatever of how this can be so (McGinn, 1989, 349).

> The whole idea of objective physical reality depends on excluding the subjective appearances from the external world and consigning them to the mind instead (Nagel 1994, 66).

> On the most common conception of nature, the nature is the physical world. But on the most common conception of consciousness, it is not easy to see how it could be part of the physical world. So it seems that to find a place for consciousness within the natural order, we must either revise our conception of consciousness, or revise our conception of nature (Chalmers 2003, 102).

> How can there be such a thing as consciousness in a physical world, a world consisting ultimately of nothing but bits of matter distributed over space-time behaving in accordance with physical law? (Kim 2005, 7)

These paradigmatic quotes of leading contemporary philosophers of mind show that modern philosophy of mind is based upon two fundamental assumptions, (i) the dichotomy assumption and (ii) the privileged access assumption (I owe these terms to Jaworski 2006/7). Both assumptions, so the story goes, originated prominently for the first time in Descartes' distinction between *res cogitans* and *res extensa* as fundamental characterizations of the mental and the physical. Ever since, they shape Post-Cartesian reflection upon

matter and mind. For the course of argument in this article it is secondary whether it was really Descartes to bring these arguments on the table of philosophical discussion. I simply accept the thesis that modern philosophy of mind received its specific shape from Cartesian thought and therefore I refer to modern philosophy of mind as Post-Cartesian-philosophy. More important is a close characterization of the two assumptions:

(i) *The dichotomy assumption*. Generally, modern philosophers conceive the mental and the physical as two different conceptual frameworks that are not reducible to each other. Each framework is spelled out in terms of certain characteristics the other framework does not share. Take, for instance, Donald Davidson's claim of the anomalousness of the mental: According to Davidson, the conceptual framework for mental phenomena is anomalous, that is, there are no laws connecting mental processes. Mental processes are connected through intentionality. Physical phenomena, to the contrary, are described in a framework working essentially with nomological connections and are void of intentionality. These two conceptual frameworks are conceptually independent of each other. This conceptual independence does not imply, however, that phenomena described *as* mental or physical *are* necessarily mental or physical entities. The distinction is first of all epistemological. As is well known, Davidson himself argued that the anomalousness of the mental prevents any form of reduction of the mental to the physical (see, for instance, Davidson 1993). Nevertheless, he was not embracing any form of ontological dualism but arguing for a version of non-reductive physicalism.

(ii) *The privileged access assumption*. The privileged access assumption serves to characterise an essential feature of the mental side of the dichotomy assumption. Basically, this assumption says that the subject of mental states is in a better position than anyone else to know that these states are instantiated, for only the subject herself has an immediate direct access to them. Mental states are always somebody's states; they imply a subject of experience: There is "a 'first person', an 'I', that has these states". Physical properties, on the contrary, are public, that is, every cognizing entity enjoys the

same epistemological status towards them. This means that no "subject is necessarily better placed to know that it is instantiated than is any other subject" (Swinburne 1994, 311-2).

2. Problems Resulting from the Conceptual Divide

These two assumptions lead to various problems in modern philosophy of mind. Take the zombie-argument (see, for instance, Bealer 1994): According to this argument, a system is conceivable which is physically identical to a conscious being though it lacks the conscious being's mental states: It behaves the same way as the conscious being and from the outside none would suspect that this physical system is not experiencing conscious states at all. We might also assume that this system enjoys only some conscious states or completely different conscious states as conscious beings we know of. The point is that from a third-person perspective we cannot tell what the physical system is in fact experiencing: Its physiological states might be identical with those of the conscious being atom for atom and, nevertheless, things might look different from the first-person perspective. Whether such systems truly could develop is secondary for the argument. Important is that they are conceivable; and there seems to be no incoherence in assuming that there might exist a universe which is physically identical to ours but without consciousness. Therefore, so the argument goes, consciousness must be a further ingredient in the ontological furniture of the world, something non-physical accessible only from "the inside", for if it were something physical, then zombies would not be conceivable.
Similar to the zombie-argument is the so-called knowledge-argument. According to this argument from the knowledge of all physical facts we cannot make any deductions to facts about consciousness. Imagine a computer knowing everything about our physiological facts without being a subject of experience. Even complete knowledge and correct reasoning of what can be deduced from this knowledge about physical facts would not enable the computer to know "what it is like for us" to experience. If this computer comes to

make an experience itself for the first time, let's say it feels pain, then it gains new knowledge—it learns "what it is like" to feel pain. Thus, omniscience regarding all physical facts is not omniscience *simpliciter*, for there are further facts to be known that are neither physical themselves nor deducible from physical facts.

These and other arguments in contemporary philosophy of mind begin by establishing an epistemic gap between the physical and the mental. As the dichotomy assumption underlines, there is no epistemic relation between the two domains. From this supposed epistemic gap an ontological gap is inferred: From the zombie-argument one is to infer the conceivability of zombies—that is the conceivability of a world that is metaphysically distinct from ours though being identical in physical terms. From the knowledge-argument one is to infer that since mental states cannot be deduced from physical states, there is an ontological difference between these states.

The validity of the epistemic part of these arguments is widely accepted; the drawn ontological conclusions, instead, are hotly disputed because they present an unwelcome consequence to many philosophers. Dualism is a price most philosophers are unwilling to pay; and therefore much energy is concentrated on how one might resist the conceptual divide and its possible ontological consequences.

Reductive physicalism as an alternative, however, appears as well to be rather unattractive, for there are no models convincingly showing how the mental might possibly be reducible to the basic material constituents of our world. Even most elaborated versions of reductive physicalism such as Jaegwon Kim's *Physicalism or Something Near Enough* confess that a global reduction of the mental to the physical appears to be untenable: Even though there are prospects to reduce the intentional and cognitive features of the mental, qualitative properties seem to resist reduction (Kim 2005, chap. 6).

The remaining possibility is to argue for a new notion of matter being in nature both physical and (proto-) conscious. Though this approach seems to be on the upswing (see e.g. Brüntrup ^{3}2008, chap. 8) it appears to be rather speculative given our current knowledge about the material world (see Chalmers 2003, 129-133).

No matter which alternative we embrace, all of them are based upon the mental/physical divide and its corresponding distinctions: inner/outer, subjective/objective and privileged/public. The Cartesian *res cogitans* and *res extensa* set the categories in terms of which philosophical reflection still takes place.

3. Aristotelian Hylomorphism as a Non-Dualist and Non-Physicalist Alternative?

In the light of the current cul-de-sac in philosophy of mind it is understandable that quite a few philosophers wish to overcome the divide between the mental and the physical and its corresponding ontological commitments. Very often these philosophers argue that Aristotelian philosophy provides a salutary alternative for understanding reality in neither physicalist nor dualist terms. According to their understanding Aristotelian philosophy accounts for a more holistic and commonsensical understanding of living beings in general and the human person in particular.
Proponents of the Aristotelian approach argue that the mind-body problem as most persistent Cartesian legacy plaguing modern philosophy can be overcome, if Aristotelian ontological categories are re-introduced in modern philosophical discussion (see, for instance, Wilkes 1992; Frede 1992; McGinn 2000, Jaworski 2004/5; Kläden 2005; Runggaldier 2006; Jaworski 2006/7; Hacker 2007, 21-28).
Before discussing the claimed advantages of the Aristotelian framework in more detail, I would like to present the Aristotelian understanding of soul and matter as conceptual alternatives to the Post-Cartesian notions of the mental and the physical.

3.1. The Aristotelian Notion of Soul

Aristotle defines the soul as the form of the body: It is the source of all characteristic activities of the living being—the 'principle' of life that makes the living being of the kind it is (De Anima 412a15-21).

Thus, the soul, as Aristotle construed it, is the set of capacities the actualisation of which is typical of the living being. Consequently, the concept of soul was not reserved exclusively for mental capacities but it embraced all living processes. The general concept of soul serves to draw the general demarcation line between living and non-living entities. What distinguishes living beings from each other are different kinds of souls. A human soul is different from the soul of a plant, for instance, because along with vegetative faculties such as nutrition and growth, it incorporates sensitive faculties such as perception, motion and appetite, and finally rational faculties such as thought and decision. The differences among organisms in terms of functional organisation, vital faculties and behaviour are not due to the presence or absence of a soul but due to its different levels of complexity. Plants have a less complex soul than animals and animals a less complex one than human beings.
As principle of life the soul defines the existence and persistence conditions of a living being: Though the material constituents of an organism change over time, the soul remains the same and guarantees the functional organisation of the organism and the exercise of its faculties. Martha C. Nussbaum writes:

> The lion may change its shape, get thin or fat, without ceasing to be the same lion; its form is not its shape but its soul, the set of vital capacities, the functional organization, in virtue of which it lives and acts (Nussbaum 1978, 71).

Hence, the soul is not an entity attached to the body but it is its form or nature. That is, Aristotle conceives all of the various faculties of living beings as having their sources within the organism, and as a consequence these faculties show the organism to be a (partially) self-developing, self-maintaining and self-moving entity.
From this it follows that the same faculty, viz. the same activity, would be of a different nature if it did not arise out of the same kind of soul: If a robot were able to reason like a human being does, then the process of reasoning, though being structurally the same, would nevertheless be of a different kind due to the fact that a robot and a human being do not share the same soul. What makes human rea-

soning the process it is, and thus essential to our understanding of it, is that it is the actualisation of the capacity of this particular kind of entity to reason.

3.2. The Aristotelian Notion of Matter

The Aristotelian notion of the soul has a deep impact on the notion of matter. Understood as principle of life, the soul is not something separate that is added to a lifeless body, such that as a result of this 'synthesis' an organism comes into being. The concept of soul is essentially related to the concept of matter: There is no formless matter but each parcel of matter is already formed to a specific natural body endowed with certain faculties.

Frank A. Lewis speaks of a "top-down view" of matter, that is, the form or nature 'reaches down' as a whole and determines all the parts of which the entity consists (Lewis 1994, 250). Hence, where organisms are concerned, their matter is always "living matter" (Ackrill 1979, 68) because "the body we are told to pick out as the 'material constituent' of the animal depends for its very identity on its being alive, in-formed by psychē" (Ackrill 1972/73, 126; for a congenial account see Whiting 1992).

As a consequence the Aristotelian notion of matter varies from case to case: Each kind of living being has a specific kind of (proximate) matter that is characteristic for this kind of being. Aristotelian matter is not physical matter in terms of which basic physical particles build up all material reality. Aristotelian matter is not prior to specific things but 'last' in the sense that it is closest to the form. It is that of which the form is the first actualisation (De Anima 412a29ff.), that is, the living body.

Hence, primary to an Aristotelian understanding of living beings is to capture them as strong organised unity, not as physical body which can be partitioned into smaller particles. Marie McGinn underlines that

> "[t]he significance of the Aristotelian distinction between form and matter is that it enables us to conceive of individual natural bodies, not

> as complex collections of material parts, but as autonomous, real things possessing an intrinsic unity quite different from that of an aggregate." (McGinn 2000, 308)

According to this understanding, the analysis of matter ought to occur posterior to the analysis of the living being itself. Starting from the living being, so to say, one can proceed to its parts and finally reach the ultimate material constituents of the organism. These material constituents are the product of a continuous process of abstraction because the organism itself and its specific form are not taken into consideration anymore when the ultimate constituents are investigated.
Such a procedure is legitimate; but it has to be kept in mind that these ultimate constituents are not primary but, ontologically speaking, ultimate. To investigate basic material constituents we have to 'remove' them from the organism they are part of in a process of abstraction; and through this process of abstraction they are seen as (more or less) 'formless' particulars void of any specific nature and actualisation.

3.3. Aristotelian Lures

If this account of Aristotelian thought is correct, then its purported superiority over Post-Cartesian philosophy becomes apparent: Within the Aristotelian framework, the separation of body and mind can hardly arise, because the living being itself and not its material constituents and their properties are seen as the primary subject of metaphysical investigation. As actualisation of the body, the soul guarantees the organism's unity and tells us its specific existence and persistence conditions, that is, what it is to be this specific kind of organism synchronically and diachronically. Obviously, the faculty of reason is distinctive for human beings and therefore of most interest. Nevertheless, also this faculty has its source in the soul in the same way as all other less complex biological faculties do.
Most importantly, if each organism is considered as an inseparable living entity, then from an Aristotelian perspective, our modern

account of matter as last physical particles of reality looks not only impoverished but also seems to be something which is not real stricto sensu. As mentioned, the notion of a single, uniform matter accessible to quantitative means of measurement is the result of a thought process abstracting from the notion of form as internal principle of organisation and change.

If, however, the organism's body is conceived in this way as nothing else than the structured sum of its material constituents, then the notion of form as internal principle of organisation and development of the body becomes superfluous. As a consequence, the body and its functions are seen as the subject matter of natural science describable from a third-person perspective, whereas mental capacities apparently bound to a first-person perspective are not to be integrated in such a framework. Body and mind start drifting apart: The toehold for either dualistic thinking or for physicalist reductionism has been created.

Kathleen V. Wilkes, for instance, argues along these lines when she enumerates several dimensions of the Aristotelian concept of soul in order to demonstrate its superiority over Post-Cartesian conceptions of the mind. I would just like to mention: (i) the emphasis of the unity for all the brain and behavioral sciences; (ii) the emphasis on capacities or functions rather than individual mental items; (iii) the accentuation of the heterogeneity of the human soul; and (iv) the attribution of no particular importance to the mental (Wilkes 1992, 116-125).

For reasons of clarity I comment shortly on (i) and (ii). First, according to Wilkes, the insight that all faculties arise out of the soul underlines that human beings are just one species in the animal kingdom among others. The faculty of reason is not separated from our other faculties that we share with animals. Rather, the unity of the soul indicates their interlocking nature showing that we could not reason as we do without our sensory apparatus and that we could not sense as we do without our locomotion system. Modern science seems to prove this insight: Modern developmental psychology stresses the gradual articulation of the full set of vital capacities of an organism from less complex ones; and cognitive science dem-

onstrates the intimate connection between bodily and mental states, for instance, in studying motor cognition and neuro-psychological disorders (Wilkes 1992, 116ff.).

Secondly, Wilkes argues that the notion of soul focuses attention on faculties and capacities rather than on specific mental items, and on types of behavior rather than on single actions. In Post-Cartesian philosophy, instead, the epistemological concern is to find immediate conscious introspection of the contents of the mind. The mind is conceived as an inner space in which mental items are accessed from our inner eye similar to our observation of external objects with our senses. The human mind, however, is not a kind of entity; rather, it becomes apparent in human behavior. Talking about the mind is the result of an abstraction from our talk of human beings and their specific rational faculties.

William Jaworski also argues in a similar fashion as Wilkes. According to his understanding, contemporary psychological discourse analyses the observable behavior of persons in terms of postulated inner (mental) items which cause the observable behavior to happen (Jaworski 2004/5 and 2006/7). An instructive example for such a theory is Davidson's causal theory of action. It claims that reasons for action must be causes of action if reasons are to play an informative role in our action explanations (see Davidson 1963/2001).

Davidson's account starts from observable behavior and argues that a full explanation of this behavior can only be provided if the reasons given for it are part of the causal story resulting in the observed behavior. So the rather elusive nature of reasons ought to be transformed in the concrete and tangible nature of physical causes. Otherwise, reasons for the action might rationalize the behavior but not explain it because it is unclear how they could figure in the causal process effecting the observed behavior. It is apparent that such an analysis of human action works with Post-Cartesian distinctions such as inner ("causes in the agent")/outer ("behavior of the agent") and mental ("reasons for action")/physical ("causes of action").

Within a hylomorphic framework, instead, these distinctions are sidestepped. Human actions are described neither as something

mental or physical but as the exercise of human capacities that are at once both psychological and bodily. The behavioral events which constitute the tipping of this paper exhibit a characteristic form of intentional human action. Reference to the firing of the neurons, the flexing of the muscles and their effects on my computer will not suffice for an adequate explanation of the behavior under discussion. These events take place as the realization of an intentional bodily performance. Their occurrence is determined by their being an integral part of a sequence of events which forms a unity by the meaning of the action that it physically realizes. A hylomorphic account of human behavior includes expressions that are action and body inclusive (Jaworski 2006/7, 213; McGinn 2000, 312-313, makes the same point speaking of the human body as psycho-physical unity). Such an approach underlines from the very beginning that a human agent is at once living being, cognizer and decider: The whole array of organic, sensitive and rational faculties a human individual is able to utilize is required for describing her actions adequately.

It becomes clear that a hylomorphic account is first of all descriptive, that is, the 'form' of the behavior is analyzed: It tells us what an individual can do, that is, with which capacities an individual is endowed. In a next step it can be asked which organic structures enable the exercise of these capacities. It is natural science which ought to investigate these structures and detect the material elements that make the organism's behavior possible. Hence, human action in particular and the behavior of organisms in general are conceived as multi-structured phenomena that can be accessed from different perspectives:

The 'formal' perspective tells us what array of behavior is constitutive of this organism, whereas the 'material' perspective tells us which elements work in which way for enabling the organism to perform it. By holding such a point of view, hylomorphism does not solve the mind-body problem—it sidesteps and thereby dissolves it (see also Hacker 2007, chap. 8 and 9).

4. Remaining Costs and Overlooked Problems

I just presented several reasons in the light of which philosophers prefer an Aristotelian over a Post-Cartesian framework for analyzing the human person (as well as organisms). It has to be kept in mind, however, that every philosophical framework comes packaged with certain costs of its own. In the remaining part of my contribution I would like to address some costs resulting from the Aristotelian framework. Indicating these costs shall help to determine whether a hylomorphic account truly is preferable over approaches influenced by Post-Cartesian reflections.

(i) One purported drawback of Post-Cartesian thinking is a dichotomous understanding of reality: inanimate quantitatively describable matter on the one hand, and experiencing mental subjects on the other hand. This dichotomy goes through organisms themselves, for not all organisms are on a par: Fungi, bacteria and plants—all organisms that are non-sentient and thus unable to have any experiences—would just be complex structured bodies functioning according to biochemical mechanisms. With the capacity to sense qualitatively, however, the ontological furniture of the world becomes enriched: All organisms capable of experience are not their bodies (at least the "are" needs further qualification) but are subjects of experience having a complex structured body (see, for instance, Lowe 2004, 853-856).

As seen, hylomorphism avoids such a dualist understanding of organisms endowed with certain faculties. Nevertheless, it is committed to a fundamental ontological dichotomy as well, namely between living beings and non-living beings: As the first actualisation of a living body, the soul makes a living being into a unified entity stricto sensu. In the light of our current knowledge about the evolution of life, however, this Aristotelian claim seems to be on unstable ground. The first living beings were nothing more than organic molecules which for some reason started to replicate themselves. Such primitive living beings are minimally distinct from other non-living macro-molecules. Both things are entirely analyzable in biochemical terms. It is unclear why we should assume that, ontologi-

cally speaking, something new comes into being with these self-reproducing biochemical molecules. This is not to deny that the evolution of these biochemical structures might be an astonishing fact in natural history. It seems much more astonishing, however, that at some point in natural history simple organisms began to experience "what it's like" to sense warm or cold, dark or light, loud or silent. If this reasoning is correct, then the Cartesian insight seems to be more fundamental than the Aristotelian one: It is granted to Aristotle that with the evolution of life new ways for describing the behaviour of the evolved organisms became necessary, and the concept of soul provides explanations of why living beings are categorized as the kind of things they are. With the evolution of organisms capable of experience, however, subjects came into being and with subjects the ontological furniture of the world changed: From now on there was someone in the world taking a particular stance towards it. What a dualist philosopher claims is that the Aristotelian emphasis on the biological does not yet hit ontological ground: There is something deeper, more fundamental about the world we live in than the rise of life—it is the rise of subjects of experience.

Advocating such a view does not imply rejecting the intimate connection between the various biological faculties of an organism and its faculties to sense and to reason. It implies that these faculties appear to be so essential and so fundamentally different from other biological faculties such as growth, photosynthesis or digestion that we seem to be justified in arguing for an ontological divide between the bearers of the former faculty and those of the latter ones. Bearers of sensations are organisms in a derivative sense: As said, they are organisms in virtue of having an organic body as opposed to non-sentient organisms being their body.

For Wilkes it is a merit of Aristotelian philosophy that it does not assign to consciousness the salient role it plays in modern philosophy. To me it seems that hylomorphism is able to maintain the unity of the human person (and of other sentient animals) exactly because a metaphysical analysis of consciousness is largely ignored. According to P.S.M. Hacker, it was a major misfortune for philosophy that in contrast to Aristotle no great philosopher in modernity was a

biologist (Hacker 2007, 24). In the light of the foregoing considerations, it seems correct to say that Aristotle's metaphysical conception of living beings was indeed so deeply influenced by biology that he skipped over a closer scrutiny of consciousness—contrary to Descartes. Descartes emphasized that consciousness presupposes a change of perspective for conceiving it; it presupposes a first-person perspective because there is someone being conscious and able to experience. Growth, photosynthesis, digestion and other vegetative faculties, to the contrary, are entirely describable from a third-person perspective in the same way as all other physical processes.

(ii) Here is a further argument raising doubts about the outstanding value of hylomorphism for metaphysical reflection: According to hylomorphism two identical processes in terms of their material components might be different in nature. Let's suppose that one process of digestion takes place in the stomach of an organism whereas the other process of digestion is an artificial reproduction of the first one for the scientific study of digestion. Both processes are identical in terms of biochemistry but only the first one would count as a process of digestion. This is so because what makes a process of digestion the process it is, is the actualization of the faculty of the organism to digest. For an adequate understanding, the digestion of food requires the reference to the actualization of the corresponding faculty of the organism which it has in virtue of its soul. The second, artificially reproduced process of digestion lacks, so to say, the soul as its grounding principle of actualization. Philosophers sympathetic towards hylomorphism underline that the soul or form of an organism does not add a mysterious vis vitalis to the organism; it adds, instead, a further level of understanding to what happens: Only due to the reference to the organism itself we realize that this case of metabolism covers the specific needs of a particular living being and not just the thirst for knowledge of scientists studying metabolisms.

Drawing a distinction in this way sounds reasonable. It is unclear to me, however, which role to the notion of soul is assigned in this case. It seems that the soul is not conceived as a metaphysical principle that is constitutive for living beings rather than as a mere heu-

ristic tool for explanatory purposes. An appeal to the soul would merely tell us that in one case the metabolism serves for the survival of an organism and is thus, a natural process, whereas in the other case no living being is involved and thus it is just an artificial reconstruction of a natural process. As informative as such an insight might be in terms of the circumstances in which both processes take place or in terms of their teleonomic features, it does not provide us with any ontological insight. As in my first criticism, hylomorphism seems to provide not so much a framework for metaphysical reflection as one for empirical investigation: It reminds natural scientists not to forget the larger context of their specific research.

(iii) Finally, I would like to rebut the claim that a hylomorphic theory of mind helps us to present the language we use to describe human action in a more adequate way than the Post-Cartesian distinctions between mental/physical and inner/outer. Wilkes and Jaworski are right that the emphasis upon singular mental items in the mind of an agent can be seen as an outcome of Cartesian thinking. To conceive reasons for action as causes of action presupposes a consideration of mental states as distinct entities in an agent's mind to which the agent presumably has privileged access. Such an interpretation of our mental states, however, is not the only viable conceptualization in the light of Post-Cartesian philosophy of mind. On the contrary, it appears to be a gross misinterpretation because our mental states are considered to be on a par with external objects; just their nature and location is different: The first ones are mental and accessible in virtue of our 'inner eye', while the latter are physical and accessible through our 'outer senses'. According to this picture, both kinds of entities are accessible externally–once from the perspective of an inner observer and once from the perspective of an outer observer.

The Post-Cartesian distinction between the first- and the third-person perspective does not commit us to this sort of interpretation of mental states. Rather, we should say that an agent has an intimate epistemological access to her mental states which is essentially first-personal. If, for instance, an agent makes one of her mental states (or a combination thereof), such as a determinate belief that p or a

determinate desire for y, her reason for action, then the agent has a particular relation to the reason she acts upon: Among the many mental states that qualify as possible reasons for action, the agent picks out a determinate one which becomes her personal reason for acting. The agent can only make a reason for action to her personal reason for action if there is intimate epistemological access to this reason from the side of the agent. The chosen reason is not something private in terms of its propositional content. Rather, the relation of the agent to this reason is something distinctively subjective for the agent chooses this (possible) reason for action to be her reason for action. As Jaegwon Kim notes:

> For when you deliberate, you must call on what you want and believe about the world—your preferences and information—from your internal perspective, and *that's the only thing you can call on*. The basis of your deliberation must be internally accessible, for the simple reason that you can't use what you haven't got (Kim 1998, 78).

It is a first-personal as opposed to a third-personal account that characterizes reasons for action in contrast to causes of bodily behavior. And this characterization of reasons for action is spelled out in a Post-Cartesian rather than an Aristotelian framework.

An Aristotelian framework construes the analysis of human action entirely different. There are two levels of discourse accounting for human behavior: Psychological discourse describes the structure of reasons in human behavior; whereas the natural sciences describe which physical substructures enable rational behavior to occur. Human action is conceived as a multi-structural phenomenon, natural science referring to the lower structures and psychology to the higher ones (see Jaworski 2006/7, 216ff.). Formulating human action as a multi-structured phenomenon appears to presuppose that human action is accessible from the 'outside'; we just ought to be careful which level of human action we are referring to with which framework.

Such an analysis of human behavior seems to neglect exactly the point that is crucial for Post-Cartesian philosophy: The true distinction between the framework of natural science and the framework of

psychological discourse is not a distinction in terms of "different levels or types of human behavioral organization or structure" (Jaworski 2006/7, 219). It is a matter of changing one's perspective—from the third-person to the first-person. If psychological discourse aims at explaining why an agent reasons, decides and acts as she does, then this context is necessarily a first-person context. Jaworski and Wilkes gloss over this point; it seems to be, however, the real reason why the framework of natural science and of psychology refer to different aspects of human action. Natural science is void of any first-person-access in contrast to psychology. It does not pick out a level of human action which is not complex enough, such as the neuron's firing and corresponding muscular movements. It is simply the wrong level for understanding human behavior at all.

5. Conclusion

I indicated some supposed advantages of an Aristotelian framework and discussed its drawbacks. According to my understanding, Descartes brought topics on the table of philosophical reflection that are essential for any metaphysical reflection about ourselves and other animals, such as subjectivity and the first-person perspective. Of course, Post-Cartesian philosophy has problems of its own which provoke the search for possible alternatives. My own opinion is that the costs of the Aristotelian alternative are prohibitive, and I tried to argue that this strategy is ultimately a failure. However, since many philosophers are sympathetic with the general moves underlying Aristotelian hylomorphism, I think it ought to have a rightful place at the table in serious discussions about how to conceive material objects, living beings and the human person.

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