CONTRA CLAYTON: TOWARD
AN AUGUSTINIAN MODEL OF ORGANISM

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In this essay, I examine Philip Clayton’s efforts to construct a philosophical theology that fits the current scientific view of organism. Clayton capitalizes on an evolutionary outlook, which sees organism as an emergent entity composed of lower organic unities, and which, at the highest level of organic development (brain), yields an emergent, non-physical phenomenon (mind). Presuming a bilateral relationship between mind and body, Clayton argues for a picture of God-world relations where world is analogous to body and God is analogous to emergent mind. Contrary to Clayton, I argue that panentheism does not naturally accommodate the current scientific picture of organic development, and as an alternative, I submit St. Augustine of Hippo’s theistic modifications to Plotinian Neoplatonism. My goal is to demonstrate that Augustine’s metaphysic offers a strong foundation for the construction of a theologically robust and scientifically satisfying philosophy of organism.

Introduction

In “Panentheism in Metaphysical and Scientific Perspective,” Philip Clayton submits that the best argument for panentheism is a “cumulative case.” Clayton’s sizeable and largely uncontested corpus exemplifies this cumulative approach by defending panentheism from a variety of angles, ranging from the history of Modern thought to matters of biological evolution and the emergence of mind. The aspect of Clayton’s case for panentheism I examine in this paper is Clayton’s strategy of constructing a philosophical theology that fits comfortably with the current scientific understanding of organism. More specifically, Clayton capitalizes on an evolutionary outlook, which sees organism as an emergent entity composed of lower organic unities, and which, at the highest level of organic development (brain), yields an emergent, non-physical phenomenon (mind). Presuming a bilateral relationship between mind and body, Clayton argues for a picture of God-world relations where world is analogous to body and God is analogous to emergent mind. This panentheistic analogy, Clayton believes, “provides the best available means, for those who take science seriously, to rethink . . . the immanence of God in the world.” In what follows, I will argue, contrary to Clayton, that panentheism does not naturally accommodate the current scientific picture of organic development. And while Clayton is skeptical regarding the staying power of classical theism in the light of contemporary science, I will demonstrate that St.
Augustine of Hippo's theistic modifications to Plotinian (panentheistic) NeoPlatonism offer a strong foundation for constructing a theologically robust and scientifically satisfying philosophy of organism.\(^5\)

The structure of this paper is simple. In section one, I offer an overview of Clayton's case for panentheism based on emergentism and the philosophy of organism displayed in biological evolution. In section two, I draw out a conceptual problem facing Clayton's project. Finally, in section three, I lay bare my defense of Augustinian metaphysics as a viable alternative for developing a contemporary model of organism. My argument, in a nutshell, is this: panentheism faces serious difficulties in its efforts to appropriate the contemporary picture of organic emergence because panentheism, with its notion of divine emanation, is most naturally conducive to a top-down picture of emergence—as opposed to the bottom-up emergence of modern science. While this framework can be adjusted, Clayton rejects what, I will argue, are the most viable options for inverting this model, thereby inhibiting his panentheism from properly paralleling the contemporary understanding of organic emergence. Augustine, by contrast, seeks to maintain a Creator-creature gap. In so doing, he envisions creation as emerging out of nothing and moving upward toward God. This modification to Plotinian metaphysics inverts the top-down emergence of panentheism, creating a metaphysic that naturally accommodates the contemporary understanding of organic development.

*Clayton's Emergent Panentheism*

As mentioned above, Clayton's particular form of panentheism is based largely on the philosophy of mind known as emergentism. Succinctly put, emergentism holds that the physical complexities of the brain give rise to higher, non-physical mental properties, and these emergent, non-physical properties, while dependent on and shaped by their physical ground, are not reducible to this physical ground. Rather, mind exists in bilateral relationship with body.

In the philosophy of mind, emergentism attempts to offer a middle ground between the dualism-materialism dichotomy by identifying mind as genuinely dependant on material complexities, while refusing to reduce mind to brain. Clayton holds that science—with its basic evolutionary assumptions\(^6\)—supports the emergentist model by telling a story of organic development akin to the one emergentism tells about mind. According to evolution, lower organic entities combine into more complex wholes, and from these complex unities, higher entities and phenomena emerge, which are not reducible to their lower organic members. Thus, Clayton contends, "The evolutionary perspective has fatally undercut both sides of the once regnant either/or: physicalism, with its tendency to stress the sufficiency of physics, and dualism, with its tendency to pull mind out of the evolutionary account altogether."\(^7\) If lower complexities give rise to higher entities and phenomena in biological development, then we can, with intellectual integrity, view mind as the highest level phenomenon to emerge out of organic evolution.

Clayton maintains that emergentism—contrary to reductive physicalism or dualism—is able to embrace the findings of neurophysiology,
while simultaneously leaving a window open through which freedom may climb. Given evolutionary assumptions of emergence, a significant dependence of mind on brain is expected; yet, because emergentism does not reduce mind to brain, emergentism is able to conceive of emergent, non-physical mind as freely supervening on its physical ground—hence giving rise to a bilateral relationship between mind and body. Clayton labels this position "emergentist supervenience."8

To the extent biological evolution presses us imaginatively beyond deterministic physics and toward emergent, non-physical properties, Clayton thinks we have a basis for moving from science to metaphysics in general and to theology in particular. Emergentism provides a "scientifically palatable" picture of physical-non-physical interactions, and in so doing, the emergentist model provides an analogy for God-world relations—a model that is decisively panentheistic: "The world is in some sense analogous to the body of God; God is analogous to the mind which indwells the body, though God is also more than the natural world taken as a whole." As Clayton sees it, "The strength of the panentheistic analogy is that it takes the highest level of emergence known to us and uses it as a model for the divine reality. The highest level we know is the level of human personhood: the emergence of mind . . . from the most complicated biological structure yet discovered, the human body and brain."10

Contrary to supernatural models of divine action, which see act principally as interruption in the natural order, emergentist panentheism "suggest[s] that there is no qualitative or ontological difference between the regularity of natural law and the intentionality of special divine actions . . . Instead, natural laws, when viewed theologically, will count as descriptions of the predictable regularity of patterns of divine action."11 With such a shift in perspective on God-world relations, Clayton suggests that we can readily conceive of God and world in bilateral relationship: rather than God simply affecting the world unilaterally, the world-in-God affects God.12 As Clayton puts it,

This way of conceiving the God/world relationship makes the relationship of Creator and created as close as it can possibly be without dissolving the difference-in-nature between the infinite God and the finite created world . . . God is always present within the individual human, knowing every thought and every desire and knowing it automatically and immediately—not as one listening in from the outside, but as one who is bound up with the very nature of the individual person.13

Much like the mind-body relationship in emergentism, we find here a genuine contingency in the divine life. God, in a very real way, "depends on the world because the nature of God's actual experience depends on interactions with finite creatures like ourselves."14 As in process thought, aspects of divine knowledge and experience are dependent upon creation—they could not exist without the world—and the nature of this knowledge and experience therefore hinges on the type of world God creates.15

The evolutionary understanding of biological life thus fuels the "scientific" side of Clayton's panentheism, giving legitimacy to the emergentist conception of bilateral physical-non-physical interaction between God
and world. Clayton, in short, understands evolution to point decisively toward an emergent model of mind, which may readily adapt to a robust theological model for God-world relations. The movement to emergence (and by extension, to emergent panentheism), Clayton submits, is "born in the crucible of the sciences, that can lead to the category of divinity or spirituality as an emergent property in evolution."^{16}

Testing the Analogy of Emergence

Clayton clearly views the analogy of emergence as the most capable analogy for explaining God-world relations. When applying the emergentist analogy to the God-world relationship, however, we find a somewhat queer result: God stands at the apex of the Chain of Being (in both classical and emergent panentheism), and from God all being flows. Yet, within the emergentist framework, the downward movement of this flow must be inverted.

In classical panentheism, such as that of Plotinus, the ontological top-down movement of the Chain of Being implies a chronological top-down flow of emergence. God, or The One, is the Being from whom all other beings derive their existence.\(^{17}\) Creation comes to be as the being of The One emanates or pours forth in a necessary super-overflow, and in this overflow lower entities emerge.\(^{18}\) The picture is of a flow from greatest to least, as if the being of The One pours forth with a funnel-like character. Conceptually we might say the greatness of an entity corresponds to the quantity of being it receives from The One, which is determined by where it stands in the overflow: entities that emerge early in the emanation process are greater than those that emerge later.\(^{19}\) Hence, in classical panentheism, creaturely beings emerge in a top-down order—greatest to least, not least to greatest, as in emergentism.

German idealism managed to invert panentheism's top-down conceptual framework by suggesting that the movement from potentiality to actuality applies as much to God as to creatures. Hegel argues that God, or the Absolute, contains within himself the perfections that comprise the Chain of Being. Yet, God bears the plenitude of perfections only implicitly, for in God perfections are without division.\(^{20}\) Seeing creaturely perfections as first implicit in God's own being—albeit without division—was not a Hegelian novelty. John Duns Scotus offered a very similar claim in his univocity doctrine long before Hegel.\(^{21}\) Yet, Hegel's uniqueness lies in his claim, "Consciousness . . . is a differentiating, a division within itself,"\(^{22}\) and therefore, neither consciousness nor self-understanding is possible for God unless God "finitize" himself. God must dialectically exegate his perfections, as it were, moving them from implicit to explicit. In objective idealism, this process of differentiation is simultaneously God's act of creation and God's movement toward self-actualization and self-understanding.\(^{23}\) As Eric Rust puts it, "history and nature are to be understood in rational terms as objects of that dialectical process in which the Absolute spells itself out in time and without which the Absolute would be 'lifeless, solitary, and alone.'"\(^{24}\)

Both divine and creaturely essence, therefore, has a teleological character in objective idealism. Because potentiality has priority over actuality
for the objective idealists, essence is not what is actual now; essence is what will be actual in the future and is only implicit in the earliest stages of existence. In this way, the objective idealists were able to circumscribe the Chain of Being with God on all sides: God stands at the lowest point in his potentiality as well as at the highest point in his actuality. The Chain of Being therefore proceeds from God in an upward movement: the God of the beginning, from whom primordial creation proceeds, lacks self-understanding and bears perfections only implicitly, and being unfolds in history toward the God of the future, who is explicit in perfection and in possession of self-understanding.

While Germany was able to provide a form of panentheism that moves upward in both ontology and chronology, unclear to me is Clayton’s ability to adhere to this peculiar solution. Clayton, without question, appreciates the trajectory of German philosophy. In The Problem of God in Modern Thought, Schelling is the hero of the story, as it were. Yet, Clayton is not a pure Schellingian. Schelling stands out as the hero for Clayton because Schelling undoes (what appears to be) the deterministic/necessitarian implications of Hegel’s system, restoring both divine and human freedom to objective idealism’s panentheistic framework. But Clayton parts ways with Schelling in a key area, namely, Schelling’s speculation into the inner being of God. What I find problematic about this maneuver on Clayton’s part is that, if I understand Schelling correctly, such speculation is the very thing that allows him to retain freedom within an idealist framework. To understand why Schelling offered such speculation, we must briefly consider the philosophical context in which he writes.

Objective idealism emerged on the heels of a crisis in metaphysics. Having abandoned the classical form-matter distinction and substance categories of Aristotle, René Descartes reduced all substance to two: physical and mental. The former Descartes identified with extension, and in so doing. Descartes (and the Cartesians) were forced to deny the existence of empty space—wherever extension is, so is matter. As for the appearance of empty space in the plenum, this, argued the Cartesians, is in fact ether. Such a conclusion created a problem for physical-non-physical interaction: if matter is extension, where does mental substance reside, and how does it relate to or interact with matter? Few candidates emerged for again conjoining the newly separated spheres of mind and body. Two options presented themselves: make physical and non-physical substances independent spheres that are programmed by God to look as though they interact, even though they do not (per occasionalism); or collapse physical and non-physical by asserting that only one substance exists, namely, God (per Spinoza’s pantheism).

A third escape route eventually presented itself in Immanuel Kant’s subjective idealism. By focusing on the thinking subject and making substance categories into categories of mind, Kant bypassed the substance crisis, and soon the objective idealism of Hegel and Schelling combined Spinoza’s single-substance solution with Kant’s turn to the subject: the Absolute Geist undergirds all things, making differentiation in creation and history the unfolding of God himself; yet, this differentiation is not differentiation of substance, but idealized differentiation in mind through finite, thinking subjects.
Objective idealism came at a cost, however. In embracing Spinoza’s single-substance trajectory, and in linking the finitizing of God with the history of thinking subjects, objective idealism invariably made the creation of world and its historical unfolding the necessary result of God’s movement toward self-understanding. Since the Chain of Being and its history are first implicit in the Absolute, so long as God moves toward self-knowledge, the Absolute will be finitized, and the dialectical progress of this chain in history will come to pass. Therefore, where God is, world and history must follow. Such was the plight of German idealism. Schelling understood this all too well.32

To make room for freedom, Schelling employed a bold strategy: he chose to make God the source of both Being and Non-Being (Grund and Ungrund). Schelling speaks of “the ground of [God’s] existence,”33 which is a type of primordial potentiality, not unlike the Platonic concept of matter. For Schelling, however, all exists in God.34 Therefore this potentiality sits within the bowels of the Deity as the ground of both creaturely and divine potentiality and existence: “since there can be nothing outside God, this contradiction [of a creature having a capacity for evil from a potency outside God] can only be solved by things having their basis in that within God which is not God himself, i.e., in that which is the basis of his existence.”35

God therefore holds within himself the full spectrum of ontology, for Schelling. Both Being and Non-Being are part of the divine, but neither can claim to be the Absolute. Schelling used this duality within God to create equilibrium in the Deity. The eternal Yes and the eternal No cancel each other out, and this equilibrium creates room for divine freedom as that which stands over both potencies. Since both Being and Non-Being have no will regarding what they move toward—they each constitute movement in only one direction—divine freedom must stand over both, as the only potency capable of ending the equilibrium. As Schelling puts it, “the first [nature can] only grow silent before something higher, before which it happily and voluntarily acknowledges itself as mere Being, as not having being.”36 Schelling thus argued that God faces the primordial decision whether to be or not be. This decision, argues Schelling, is the very thing that provides God with freedom regarding whether or not to create the world: if God possesses freedom in reference to his own existence, then the existence of the world that flows from God is also contingent on God’s willingness to choose Being.37

Clayton rejects Schelling’s speculation into the inner life of God, and argues in favor of retaining some notion of God’s robust pre-creation existence and actuality. While Clayton may be quite sober in his rejection of Schelling’s speculations, in so doing he moves contrary to the foundation of Schelling’s defense of divine freedom, namely, God’s primordial decision whether to be or not be. By ascribing to the Deity essential properties, not entirely unlike the divine attributes of classical theism, Clayton diverges from the implicit-explicit distinction of objective idealism; and by rejecting Schelling’s speculation into the inner being of God, Clayton parts ways with the very thing that enables Schelling to restore freedom within his panentheistic framework. The only remaining connection between Clayton’s views and Schelling’s (that I can see) is that both retreat
to panentheism in the wake of Descartes, and both attempt to affirm divine and human freedom amid panentheism. But unclear, to my mind, is how Clayton can retreat to the bottom-up movement of German idealism, given what he rejects in Schelling and what he keeps from orthodox Christian theology.

Outside of idealism, few other panentheistic models allow for a bottom-up order of emergence. One remaining option is a radically emergent panentheism. That is, Clayton’s emergentism could fit the idea that God emerges out of the world. In this scheme, the most basic aspects of the world emerge first and evolve into more complex forms, giving rise to higher entities. Since science tells us “The highest level [of emergence] we know is the level of human personhood,” we would be justified in presuming that the world-organism may have, at some point, given rise to God—the highest emergent entity, produced by the vast complexities of the universe.

Samuel Alexander espouses this type of panentheism. The difficulty, however, is that Clayton rejects Alexander’s view outright, and regrettably, Clayton does not give clear explanation of the exact differences between himself and Alexander. Clear enough is that Clayton believes God retains essential attributes whether or not the world exists. What Clayton leaves unclear is how his view is in proper keeping with emergentism, despite his rejection of Alexander. Alexander’s view, even if odd and full of its own problems, is the most self-evident application of the emergentist analogy: higher phenomena emerge out of lower organic complexities; mind is the highest phenomena in human experience; therefore, we may presume that God is an emergent phenomenon resulting from the complexities of our universe. By rejecting Alexander’s view, and by maintaining, contrary to the objective idealists, that the essential divine attributes are explicit prior to creation, Clayton cuts off both of the most obvious avenues for which the emergentist analogy may serve as a proper analogy.

In this light, we may ask: in what sense is the God-world relationship properly analogous to the emergence of mind for Clayton? Clearly Clayton thinks the emergentist model helps resolve mind-body problems and thus may serve as a model for God-world relations. Yet, within Clayton’s understanding of panentheism, God, who is supposedly analogous to emergent mind, does not emerge out of the lower complexities that make up our world, nor is God somehow merely implicit prior to the world. Clayton’s God possesses essential attributes much like those of classical theism and faces a voluntaristic decision whether or not to create the world—a decision far more like what we find in orthodox Christianity than what we find in Schelling. In what way, then, may the emergentist analogy be applied to God-world relations?

Most likely Clayton wants it both ways: God creates the world (top-down), while what is analogous to emergent mind in the God-world relationship are the effects the world has on God (bottom-up). As mentioned in the previous section, Clayton maintains, in a way akin to process thought, that aspects of divine experience and knowledge are contingent on creation, and in this sense, features of the divine life would not exist without the world. Even if right, is this dimension of Clayton’s system adequate to make the God-world relationship analogous to the emergence of mind? I do not think it is. Certainly my experience of Kingsley is
contingent on the existence of and my interaction with Kingsley, but the experiences that "emerge" out of a relationship with Kingsley are hardly analogous to the emergence of mind out of physical complexities (that is, assuming an emergent view of mind is correct). If, therefore, the only aspect of God that is contingent on the world-within-God is God's experience and knowledge of the world, the emergence of mental properties out of physical conditions is hardly the best analogy for God-world relations.

Perhaps, in light of the foregoing, the most charitable read of Clayton is that he intends, not to develop an exact parallel between God-world and mind-body relations, but only to forward an analogy that has some generally scientific appeal. That is to say, maybe all Clayton really intends to argue is that just as mental properties (which are non-physical) are able to interact bilaterally with physical properties (per an emergentist model), so the non-physical God is able to interact with the physical world. If such is Clayton’s intent, the claim is broadly consistent, but it can hardly be said that the mind-body analogy in this form points decisively toward either emergentism or panentheism, as Clayton claims. A theistic dualism may just as well affirm that divine interactions are like the interactions between non-physical mind and physical body. In fact, if one affirms, as Clayton does, that God exists and possesses actuality prior to the existence of the world, the mind-body analogy is more appropriately utilized by a thorough-going dualist than by an emergentist.

What we see, in short, is that the emergentist analogy, as employed by Clayton, is little help in explaining God-world relations. Clayton’s presuppositions regarding the Deity’s pre-creation actuality speak against the assumptions of emergentism—both against its basic assumptions of bottom-up ontology and chronology, as well as against the idea that mind and personality are contingent on the existence of lower complexities. To whatever extent the emergentist analogy is meant to be a model for panentheism, it should point toward either the implicit-explicit movement of idealism or the radically emergent panentheism of Alexander. Yet, Clayton foregoes both paths to the detriment of the analogy.

Toward an Augustinian Philosophy of Organism

Prior to moving into my proposed alternative to Clayton, a preemptive remark is in order. Clayton’s corpus makes the following criticism readily available against a proposal like mine: substance metaphysics is dead, and therefore, even if Augustinian metaphysics fit more comfortably with the current scientific picture of organism, Augustine’s NeoPlatonism is a non-option in our Late-Enlightenment era. In both The Problem of God in Modern Thought and “Panentheism in Metaphysical and Scientific Perspective,” Clayton traces the collapse of substance metaphysics in an effort to show why, given this history of ideas, we must go the panentheistic route. The story Clayton tells was briefly sketched in the above discussion of Schelling. As the story goes, in Descartes substance metaphysics found itself incapable of offering a basis for physical-non-physical substance interaction. Philosophy was thus pressed decisively away from substance metaphysics toward occasionalism on the one hand and single-substance pantheism on the other, only later finding an escape route in idealism.
Clayton's narrative is not unique. But regrettably, discussion rarely centers on why Descartes's (rather problematic) definition of substance should be taken as definitive. I agree that the movement from Descartes to Spinoza and on into idealism (both subjective and objective) makes a good deal of sense given Descartes's bungle, but if physical-non-physical interaction was not a problem for pre-Cartesian philosophies, why presume Descartes's bungle was the inevitable culmination of substance metaphysics? What happened in the sixteenth and seventeenth century that made classical substance categories taboo? In keeping with historians of science like Marie Boas, I believe the answer to this question lies in the sixteenth-seventeenth century tendency to seek purely empirical foundations for science, which ultimately resulted in an anti-Aristotelian, anti-substantial-form movement.44

Three points are noteworthy about this movement, however. First, the bias against substantial form was not rooted in a sudden realization that substance metaphysics was problematic. The aim of the anti-substantial-form movement, as embodied in figures like Nicholas Hill, Pierre Gassendi, Walter Charleton, and Isaac Beeckman, was to enhance the explanatory power of the mechanical, atomistic philosophies of Hero, Epicurus, Lucretius, and Democritus. Scientific experimentation was employed with a view to bolstering or debunking metaphysical claims.45 It was thought that if atomism could be made to explain the plentitude of empirical phenomena (even if its explanations were only speculative), science could move ahead without resorting to Aristotle's non-empirical notion of substantial form.46 In short, the movement rejected substantial form out of a desire for a purely mechanical and empirically-based philosophy. If one is not sympathetic to the empiricism of Descartes's era, however, the rejection of substantial form by such figures, and the subsequent history on which Clayton builds, is anything but inevitable.

Second, the anti-Aristotelian, anti-substantial-form sentiment was not unanimous in the sixteenth and seventeenth century. A strong and influential contingent persisted, which continued to affirm and defend the importance of retaining some version of Aristotle's categories. This contingent included figures such as Julius Caesar Scaliger, Gottfried Leibniz, and Christian Wolff; and Kant and the post-Kantian idealists are arguably the offspring of this school, rather than the children of the anti-Aristotelian empiricists.47 In addition to this more overtly philosophical contingent, it is worth pointing out that confessional theology, such as found among Dominicans, Franciscans, and Reformed orthodox, also retained classical scholastic substance categories, despite whatever trends to the contrary in philosophy and burgeoning "scientific" movements.48 I think this significance since a great many confessional theologians still exist to this day, despite rumors to the contrary.

A third and final point worth noting is that among the contingent that chose to abandon Aristotelian form out of a so-called "scientific" bias, this anti-Aristotelian maneuver was rooted in a bias against immanent form.49 As Leroy E. Loemker points out, many within the sixteenth and seventeenth century continued to feel that disciplines like mathematics would become unstable if all the references to form were abolished. Therefore, in the seventeenth century, common was the retreat to some type of Platonism,
where “archetypal” Ideas exist in God, rather than immanently in matter.\textsuperscript{30} Even where Aristotelian substantial form was considered suspect, the importance of some type of transcendent, Platonic form was, thus, often retained as essential to human reason in general and to the basic disciplines on which science stood in particular.

While delivering substance metaphysics from the tyranny of Clayton’s all-too-common narrative is not my concern here—and I will, therefore, not belabor the point—suffice it to say I believe the death of substance metaphysics is a myth, and while Cartesian metaphysics may go the way of the dodo, I see no evidence that classical Hellenistic/Christian substance metaphysics are condemned to the same fate. I find such classical models perfectly defensible, desirable, and even necessary both historically and philosophically.\textsuperscript{31} Moreover, and perhaps just as important when considering a project like Clayton’s, insofar as classical (as opposed to Cartesian) substance metaphysics come ready-made with, not only the possibility, but the givenness of material-immaterial interaction—form and matter are both necessarily present wherever empirical objects exist—I think this a much better candidate for retaining a connection between empirical and non-empirical realities than any project that attempts to work its way out of the empirical box from the ground up. Hence, when considering alternatives to Clayton’s panentheism, I believe I am perfectly within my intellectual rights to turn to a pre-Cartesian model of metaphysics, which does not abandon classical form-matter distinctions. The model I draw on here is the modified (theistic) NeoPlatonism of St. Augustine of Hippo.

Augustine, with Plotinus, maintains that being is identical with goodness and vice versa. Moreover, Augustine, like Plotinus, maintains that God is Being itself: Being proper is innate and natural to only God, and the same is true of Goodness, for the two are interchangeable and innate in God alone. Creaturally being is therefore always derivative—as is creaturally goodness. Unlike Plotinus, however, Augustine seeks to retain a Creator-creature gap when building on this metaphysical foundation. To achieve this end, Augustine parts ways with Plotinus in two key areas: (1) Augustine rejects the idea that creaturally being/goodness is derived directly from God through emanation or an overflow of Being, and (2) Augustine denies that primordial, uninformed matter is eternal. Beginning with the former, Augustine affirms the orthodox Christian doctrine, \textit{creatio ex nihilo}: creation is called into being out of nothing. And to be sure, Augustine denies outright the notion that because we have the noun “nothing” (\textit{nihil}), it must refer to some-thing: nothing indicates the absence of anything in eternity other than God himself.\textsuperscript{32} As for the “existence” of primordial matter, Augustine maintains that matter, like all else distinct from God, is created.\textsuperscript{33} Unlike Plotinus, eternity does not hold both pure actuality (God) and pure potentiality (matter); eternity belongs to only the pure actuality that is God, while all of creation is called into being by the voice of the Deity.\textsuperscript{34}

Augustine’s affirmation of \textit{creatio ex nihilo}, rightly understood, should not conjure images of creatures simply popping into existence within a dark void. Augustine understands the divine call to existence to manifest temporally in a gradual process of forming: matter begins in an unformed state; it is informed; ontic qualities manifest in matter, analogous to the
way a seed develops; and in due course creatures manifest their proper form. To help parse this picture, I will take my cues from Augustine by causally dividing God's creative activity into the creation of matter and the forming of matter. (This division is causal, rather than temporal, because Augustine holds that form and matter, while distinguishable, cannot actually exist separately.)

Beginning with matter itself, Augustine holds, as stated above, that God creates matter ex nihilo. Matter, in itself, is neither good (since goodness is a quality of being) nor evil (since Augustine defines evil as a privation of goodness or being, which primordial matter has yet to possess). Matter is therefore conceived of as metaphysically neutral or, at best, good in a qualified sense, given its potential to bear form. This potential for form is a given in this scheme because Augustine presumes, with the bulk of early Christian thinkers, that matter is properly defined as pure potentiality, which, as such, is mutable (it is capable of taking on any number of forms and continually changes for either better or worse) and necessarily temporal (for Augustine equates time with the successive motion, or mutation, from one state to another).

Regarding the forming of matter, we may characterize Augustine's vision as a divine act of drawing. Within the Word or Wisdom of God, there exist the Ideas that serve as archetypes for God's creation. That which God chooses to create is "made" in an instant—God calls the heavens and the earth into being as an entire world-system—and in this sense matter is informed by the full plentitude of natures that will come to be in our world. But this informing is what we might describe as a seedling deposit. Matter must still move from its unformed state to its formed state. God draws matter toward himself (ontologically speaking), pulling it up from the lowest possible level of ontology—pure potentiality—toward the highest pole of ontology—the pure actuality that is God. In this drawing process, matter manifests the once-foreign properties of being—measure, form, and order (modus, species, ordo)—in a way that mirrors the Ideas in God. Matter takes on ontic qualities in increasing measure as it moves from the most humble modes of being toward its divine source. The manifest being/goodness of creation is therefore a responsive being/goodness: as matter moves toward God it becomes ontologically more like God, taking on order, manifesting actuality, and displaying numerous perfections. Creation images the various ontological perfections stretching between the nothinness from whence it came and the God toward whom it is drawn. In this process, the Chain of Being informs matter by providing it with its divinely ordained telos, but this chain is manifest backwards in a bottom-up fashion, rising up from primordial matter through the ontological hierarchies until it reaches the highest order of angels—though never merging with God directly.

Notice that Augustine's concern to sustain a Creator-creature distinction is the very thing that pushes his metaphysic toward a vision that fits the basic picture of organic development in contemporary science. If Clayton is right in his assessment that modern science presses our understanding of organism in general and of mind in particular toward a bottom-up picture of emergence, then Augustine's metaphysical vision offers all the philosophical tools needed for theology to anticipate this conclusion. If
Augustine's metaphysic is right, we should expect the most basic forms of organic life to come into existence first, followed by more complex organisms. Moreover, the imagery of God drawing matter up out of the depths of mere potentiality is conceptually fitting for a gradual process of development in which the species of our world are manifest. Creaturally development in the science of organism is in perfect keeping with this conceptual outlook: out of primordial simplicity emerges an ontological hierarchy of fully formed, distinct species, which display increasing complexity. Rather than organic development being a blind process, determined solely by natural mechanisms, however, Augustine bids us to see in this development the very hand of God, drawing matter up from its primordial depths to higher, more majestic levels of existence, until each species, in due course, arrives at its divinely ordained telos.

Augustine's vision also offers a corrective, however. It cautions against an empiricism that presumes organic development points toward creaturely or material autonomy, sustained and driven by the empirical side of reality. Augustine calls us, instead, to see "natural" processes as the empirical manifestation of God's eternal Wisdom. Matter, in its developments, is driven by teleology and the very will of God. Lying behind material development are the Ideas within God; driving matter is the hand of God, which nurtures immanent form; and manifest in matter are and the ontological perfections that take shape in our world as God draws matter toward himself. The plentitude of species that appear in our world are not merely the surviving fit, but the diversity of fully formed links in the Great Chain of Being, chosen and ordered by the Deity.

An Augustinian model of organism, in short, is a teleological vision of empirical reality, which sees in the science of organism the will, Wisdom, and hand of God. It takes invisible realities to be the more fundamental side of our world. Not only is nature or essence prior to the empirical manifestation of species, these invisible realities ultimately drive the process from the first. In such a model we can rightly expect that, from an empirical vantage point, emergence may appear to be bottom-up, as if higher, emergent entities were dependent upon lower entities. The chronology of emergence, combined with our limited empirical faculties, can give this impression. But in the end, Augustine beckons us to see such emergence as rooted, not in natural mechanisms, but in God's Wisdom and decrees.

To the extent the study of organism complements Augustine's metaphysical vision of creation, I believe Augustine would see such scientific insight as a grace from God, just as he did "certain books of the Platonists, translated from Greek to Latin," that compelled him from Manicheism back to the Catholic faith. But what an Augustinian model of organism also offers is a sober warning. Augustine sang high praise of the insights of natural reason, going so far as to say in his Confessions, "there [in certain books of the Platonists] I read, by no means in these words, but in many ways the very same intent and purpose, that In the beginning was the Word and the Word was with God and the Word was God”, and were Augustine still walking the earth today, his high view of natural reason may well prompt him to offer similar praise of the insights of natural science—especially those insights that testify to the bottom-up appearance of the Chain of
Being out of nothing. Yet, Augustine was also quite sober in assessing the limits of natural reason: “But the truth, he came to his own and his own did not accept him, but those who receive him, he gave power to become sons of God, to they who believe on his name, I did not read.” While Augustine maintains that natural reason may offer clear insights into the nature of our world and even, as in the case of the Platonists, draw the soul upward toward God, natural reason does not and cannot offer hope. Without the healing of the soul by Christ, the soul can, at best, only see where it ought to go, but it invariably lacks the capacity to rise and walk.

We must remember that the contemporary vision of organism, not only displays our creaturely rise from nothing to ever-increasing complexity; science also tells us that we inevitably breakdown, decay, and die. In Augustine’s view, this breakdown in and corruption of being is the very nature of evil. When creation, by its own willing, turns from God—the source of its being—the creature inevitably turns toward the void of nothingness, and retreats back to the abyss from whence it came. The perfections of our human species thus include our moral state, that is, our posture toward God, which is part of our proper form—a form our species should willfully actualize by moving ever closer to God. Yet, having been crippled by our fall in Adam, only by our union with him who, “amid the inferior, built for himself a humble house of our clay” can our inevitable retreat toward nothing be undone. For the Word, having taken on the frailty of our flesh, “By means of this [frailty], subdues those who would be his and transports them to himself, healing their swelling and nourishing their love, that they may no longer trust their own strength, but become weak, seeing before their feet the divine become frail by participating in our cloak of skin. In their weariness they fall prostrate before this [divine] weakness, which lifts and raises them up.” While science may testify to our emergence from, and even our retreat toward, nothing, before the question of hope, science invariably falls silent. And in this silence, Augustine bids the soul to turn to God alone, for only by union with the immortal life of God in Christ can we hope to find healing.

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NOTES


4. Ibid., p. 87.
8. Ibid., p. 127.
10. Ibid., p. 84.
12. Ibid., pp. 93–96.
13. Ibid., pp. 102–03.
17. See Plotinus, Enneads, I, 8, 1; IV, 8, 6; and V, 4, 1; see also W. R. Inge, The Religious Philosophy of Plotinus and Some Modern Philosophies of Religion (London: The Lindsey Press, 1914), pp. 32–35.
18. See Plotinus, Enneads, I, 8, 2–3 and 7; IV, 8, 6; V, 2, 1; and V, 4, 1; see also J. M. Rist, Plotinus: The Road to Reality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967), p. 117; and Inge, The Religious Philosophy of Plotinus, p. 32.
19. See, e.g., Plotinus, Enneads, I, 8, 7; V, 4, 1; and IV, 8, 6; see also B. A. G. Fuller, The Problem of Evil in Plotinus (London: Cambridge University Press, 1912), pp. 67–69.
23. See Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, I, p. 85f. The groundwork for this understanding of God and world precedes objective idealism proper, being already espoused by figures such as G. E. Lessing. See, e.g., Gotthold Ephraim Lessing, The Christianity of Reason (ca. 1755), esp. §§13–22.
26. See Rust, Evolutionary Philosophies and Contemporary Theology, p. 43ff.
28. See ibid., p. 483ff.
32. See, e.g., Schelling’s quip regarding the incompatibility of philosophical systems and free will in *Of Human Freedom*, p. 336.
33. Ibid., p. 358.
34. Ibid., p. 339.
35. Ibid., p. 359.
38. Clayton, “Panentheism in Metaphysical and Scientific Perspective,” p. 84.
42. See, e.g., Clayton, *Mind and Emergence*, chap. 5.
43. Clayton’s full treatment of this history can be found in Clayton, *The Problem of God in Modern Thought*. For the concise version of this history, see Clayton, “Panentheism in Metaphysical and Scientific Perspective,” pp. 77–81.
44. See Boas, “The Establishment of the Mechanical Philosophy,” pp. 412–541. See also Margaret J. Osler, *Divine Will and the Mechanical Philosophy*: Gas-
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45. See, e.g., Robert Boyle, A Defense of the Doctrine touching the Spring and Weight of the Air, first edition 1662; Works, I, p. 156f. Boyle’s experiment here cited centers on the possibility of a vacuum, a possibility that was taken to have metaphysical significance because the Cartesians associated extension with matter, making empty space impossible, and the Aristotelians felt matter of some kind must exist even in “empty space,” given that such space can be informed by light. If a vacuum could exist in a container without collapsing its walls, Boyle felt this would prove the existence of empty space. See Boas, “The Establishment of the Mechanical Philosophy,” pp. 412–22.


48. I presume the ongoing Dominican and Franciscan commitments to Aquinas and Scotus are evident enough. For a thorough-going treatment of the continued influence of scholastic patterns of thought in Reformed orthodoxy, see Richard A. Muller, Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics: The Rise and Development of Reformed Orthodoxy, ca. 1520–1725, 4 vols. (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2003).


52. Augustine, nat. b., xxv.

53. Augustine, Gn. litt. v, 5; and f. et symb., ii, 2.

54. See Augustine, nat. b., xxv; Gn. litt. i, 2 and 4; iv, 35; and v, 5. To be sure “voice” should not be taken literally here. Augustine understands sound to be material and thus creaturely; hence the divine call is really the eternal decree of God. See Gn. litt. i, 2; v, 5.

55. Augustine, Gn. litt. i, 2 and 4–7; and v, 4. Augustine is sometimes understood to hold that the world was created simultaneously, as if the entire
creation burst into existence, fully formed, in a single moment (cf. Gn. litt. v, 3). For the purposes of this essay, suffice it to say that, while Augustine does maintain that creatures “were all made at once” (e.g., Gn. litt. v, 5), I take three issues to be key to a proper understanding of Augustine on this point. First, Augustine, with figures like Origen, holds that the eternal Word or Wisdom contained in eternity all forms, species, or archetypes after which empirical creatures would be modeled (cf. Gn. litt. i, 4 with Origen, De Principiis I, ii, 2; see also Augustine, div. qu., xxxvi–viii). Therefore, creation is not a temporal ad hoc conglomeration of particulars, but a chain of being or world system, eternally within the divine Wisdom. Second, Augustine understands time to be linked with mutation, and since God is not subject to mutation, Augustine holds that his existence is one of successionless duration (see, e.g., Gn. litt. v, 5; see also William Pearson Tolley, The Idea of God in the Philosophy of St. Augustine [New York: R. R. Press, 1930], 109). Thus, the divine decrees regarding creation and history, while manifest in creation in a successional manner, proceeds from God as an eternal, successionless whole, co-eternal with God (see, e.g., Gn. litt. i, 2 and 4; iv, 35; and v, 5). Third, and perhaps most important, Augustine distinguishes between the forming of creation and the making of creation. The former is a gradual process, while the latter is done simultaneously. There is a sense in which, for Augustine, the Chain of Being is placed within matter as a whole, even though matter must move through various unformed states toward its proper form, manifesting the Chain of Being in due course (see, e.g., Gn. litt. v, 4). Yet, Augustine is clear that, from the temporal, creaturely perspective, creation moved through unformed, or unfinished, states in its transition to form and the species were separated in due order (Gn. litt. i, 4–7).

56. See Augustine Gn. litt., i, 15; and v, 5.
57. Augustine, civ. Dei, xi, 10; xi, 22–23. See also conf., iii, 11–12; and ench., xi–xiv.
58. Augustine, nat. b., xviii; f. et symb., ii, 2; and ench., xiii.
60. Augustine, Gn. litt., i, 4–5 and 9; and v, 5; conf., i, 9; f. et symb., ii, 2. See also Tolley, The Idea of God in the Philosophy of St. Augustine, p. 109.
61. See Augustine, Gn. litt. i, p. 4; and div. qu. pp. xxxvi–viii.
62. See ibid. v, 3.
63. See ibid. v, 4; see also Gn. litt. i, 4–7.
64. Augustine, conf., i, 16.
65. Augustine, nat. b., vii, 7.
67. Augustine, Gn. litt., i, 4–5; f. et symb., ii, 2; and conf., vii, 7.
68. Augustine, Gn. litt., i, 4–5; and nat. b., xxv.
70. See Augustine, conf., vii, 1–2.
71. Exactly what sort of understanding of the mind-body relationship is most fitting for Augustine’s vision is debatable. Clearly, many within the Augustinian tradition are dualists, while others, such as Aquinas, have a much closer connection between body and soul—the soul is the (immanent) form of the body. Eleonore Stump suggests that the lines between dualism and materi-
alism have been misdrawn precisely because contemporary brands of dualism often echo Descartes, rather than older, more cogent substance metaphysics, such as what we find in Aquinas. See Eleonore Stump, "Non-Cartesian Substance Dualism and Materialism without Reductionism," *Faith and Philosophy* 12:4 (1995). The contemporary search for a close connection between mind and body, in my view, bids us to take Stump's point on this matter quite seriously.

74. Ibid.
75. Ibid., 10ff.
76. Ibid., 7. I do not mean to imply here that Clayton would disagree with Augustine on this particular point. I am certain Clayton, despite his affections for dialogue between religion and science, also concedes that hope must be found outside the evolutionary process.