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A Compound of Two Substances

1.

Cartesian or substance dualism is the view that concrete substances come in two basic kinds. There are material things, such as biological organisms. These may be either simple or composed of parts. And there are immaterial things--minds or souls--which are always simple. No material thing depends for its existence on any soul, or vice versa. And only souls can think.

Cartesian dualism is usually discussed as a theory of mind: as an account of the ultimate nature of the mental, and its relation to the physical. But it is also an account of our own ultimate nature: an account of what we are, fundamentally and metaphysically. There is disagreement, however, about what Cartesian dualism says that we are. According to some, it says that we are souls: wholly immaterial things. According to others, it says that we are things made up of a soul and a body. We have a dual nature: partly immaterial, but also partly material. Each of us is a compound of two substances.

I will call the first view pure dualism. It says that the material object by which you perceive and act in the physical world--the thing we call your body--may be as intimately connected with you as you like; but it is not a part of you. The second I will call compound dualism. It says that both soul and body are parts of you, though only the soul is essential to you: you could outlive your body if your soul continued to exist, but no one could survive the destruction of one's soul. Obviously enough, if you are a soul, you can't also be a thing made up of that soul and something else; so the two views are incompatible. And there seems to be nothing else that one could be, given Cartesian dualism.

There is little agreement about which is the right way way to understand Cartesian dualism. Undergraduates almost invariably state it as compound dualism. Professionals often do so as well, whatever their sympathies towards dualism per se. Here is a typical statement:

I understand by substance dualism the view that those persons which are human beings living on Earth, have two parts linked together, body and soul....On the dualist account the whole man has the properties he does because his constituent parts have the properties they do. I weigh ten stone because my body does; I imagine a cat because my soul does.
(Swinburne 1997: 145)

A smaller number take Cartesian dualism to be pure dualism. Many appear unaware of the difference between the two views. This may explain why so many respected philosophers say inconsistent or incoherent things about the matter. Ryle, for instance, says that on Cartesian dualism a person is both "a ghost mysteriously ensconced in a machine"--pure dualism--and "an association between a body and a non-body", which sounds like compound dualism (1949: 18, 189). Descartes himself, in the Sixth Meditation, says, "it is certain that I am really distinct from my body", and that "I and the body form a unit" (I and the body, not the soul and the body), yet describes himself a few lines later as "a combination of body and mind" (1984: 54, 56). Others describe Cartesianism as the view that a person is two things, a mind and a body--which taken literally would violate the logic of identity. [1]

The difference may seem trivial. I think it is extremely important. Pure dualism is often thought to be less attractive than compound dualism because it implies that we are wholly immaterial. We aren't really visible or tangible. We don't grow larger in our youth or more wrinkled in old age. Strictly speaking, we aren't even human beings--men or women. (I take it that a human being must be at least partly material.) The truth of the matter is that certain human animals relate to us in such a way that we call them our bodies, and it is those things that we see and touch and which bear those physical properties we naïvely attribute to ourselves. It may still be in some sense correct to say that Olson is a 150-pound human being; at any rate that is not the sort of mistake you would make if you were to say that I was an 800-pound walrus. But this is at best a loose and potentially misleading description of me. In sober truth I weigh nothing at all. Compound dualism, on the other hand, seems to imply that we are visible and tangible, and have the physical properties we ordinarily take ourselves to have.

For all that, I believe that there is no good reason for Cartesians to be compound dualists, and every reason for them to be pure dualists. I will argue that compound dualism faces two serious problems that have nothing to do with the usual criticisms of Cartesian dualism, and

that do not arise for pure dualism. The difficulties may appear at first simple and obvious, and can be stated briefly (sections 2 and 6). But many complex and unobvious things can be said in response to them, and these take up the bulk of the paper. Finally, I will argue briefly that the apparent attractions of compound dualism are unreal. (I won't discuss the merits of Cartesian dualism per se.)

2.

The problem with compound dualism is its claim that, although it is souls that think, we are not souls. How can the thing that "thinks in me" be something other than myself? [2] I will call this the problem of the thinking soul. In fact it is a cluster of problems, or perhaps one problem with many faces.

First, compound dualism entails that there are at least twice as many thinking things as we thought there were. You are a compound of a body and a soul. But that soul is itself rational and conscious. So there are two thinking beings sitting in your chair, reading an essay that was co-written by a simple and a compound philosopher.

Second, compound dualism rules out any plausible account of what it is to be a person. My soul has all the mental properties I take myself to have. So why isn't it a person? It satisfies all the best-known definitions of the term. Surely there couldn't be non-people with the same mental properties as genuine people? Rational, self-conscious, morally responsible non-people that run for office, write novels, and fall in love, just as we do? That would make the difference between being a person and not being a person far less interesting and important than anyone thought. Yet if my soul were a person, we couldn't say that each embodied human person was a compound of a soul and a body, as compound dualism says. At most every second person would be such a compound.

Further: If souls aren't people, I ought to wonder whether I am a person. I could easily be mistaken. At least half of those who take themselves to be people are mistaken. More generally, on compound dualism I ought to wonder whether I am the compound of my soul and my body or just my soul. How could I ever know? My soul has the same reasons for believing itself to be a compound as I have for believing myself to be one. Yet if it has that belief it is mistaken. But then for all I know I am the one who is mistaken. If I were a soul and not a compound, I should believe that I was a compound all the same. So even if compound dualism were true, it looks as if no one could ever know that it was.

But the heart of the problem of the thinking soul is the idea that something numerically different from me does my thinking. That is what compound dualism says: the compound of my body and my soul, which is what I am, thinks only insofar as it has a part, the soul, that thinks. The soul thinks in a completely straightforward sense. You and I think only in a derivative sense. But surely I don't need anything else to think for me. I am the thing that thinks my thoughts in the strictest sense. That's what makes them my thoughts. Roderick Chisholm famously made the same point in a different context:

There is no reason whatever for supposing that I hope for rain only in virtue of the fact that some other thing hopes for rain--some stand-in that, strictly and philosophically, is not identical with me....If there are thus two things that now hope for rain, the one doing it on its own and the other such that its hoping is done for it by the thing that now happens to constitute it, then I am the former thing and not the latter thing. (1976: 104)

Naturally there are some properties that we have in a derivative sense. We are tattooed insofar as our skin is tattooed. What I object to is the idea that thought and other mental properties might be among them. When we think 'I', don't we mean the being, if there is one, who thinks that thought? Consider the Cogito. One could challenge the inference from 'I think' to 'I exist' on the grounds that there could be thought but nothing thinking it. Or one could challenge the premise on the grounds that there is no such thing as thought because the "folk" theory that notion is founded on is false. But no one ever suggested that, although something is thinking, strictly speaking it may not be I, but something else.

I'm not sure whether this counts as an argument for the claim that you and I think if anything does. But can you really believe that something else does your thinking for you?

We can see now why no analog of the problem of the thinking soul arises for pure dualism. You may wonder how any substance dualist could avoid the conclusion that there are twice as many thinkers as we thought there were, both souls and soul-body compounds. Or how the pure dualist can avoid saying that the compound, though not a person, is mentally indistinguishable from a person. Or how we could know that we are souls, if that is what we are. The answer is simple: it is only the soul that really thinks. At best the compound of the soul and its body can be said to think insofar as it has a thinking part. But then we might as well say that it doesn't think at all--any more than something made up of you and me, or of you

and your chair, would think. So there aren't two thinking things for every human being. No non-person is psychologically indistinguishable from you. The compound of your soul and your body doesn't mistakenly believe itself to be a person, or a soul. The pure dualist has worries enough, but not that worry.

That is the problem of the thinking soul. I will consider three possible replies on behalf of the compound dualist.

3.

We might deny that the soul can think. The compound thinks, but the soul doesn't. I don't imagine a cat because my soul does; at most I imagine a cat because my soul does something else, something non-psychological. Perhaps I think with my soul in something like the way that I see with my eyes: my eyes don't themselves see, but only do something necessary for my seeing.

But why can't the soul think? Apparently because you need more than just a soul to produce thought, just as you need more than just eyes to see. Descartes thought that some mental activities required a body as well as a soul, so that a disembodied person would lack many of the mental capacities that embodied people enjoy. Perhaps all mental activity is like this. The soul and the body each produce something sub-psychological, and thought arises only when the two ingredients come together.

Well, maybe. But if the soul must cooperate with a body to produce thought, then all thought must be partly physical. Disembodied thought would be impossible. (At least for us, though gods or angels might manage it.) This would undermine the most common arguments for Cartesian dualism, which appeal to our ability to imagine becoming disembodied. If you couldn't possibly be conscious when disembodied, then you can no more imagine being disembodied than you can imagine being in a coma.

More seriously, if it took both a soul and a body to produce thought, the soul would not be in any sense a thinking substance or a mind. At any rate it would be no more a thinking substance than the body is a thinking substance. The soul would have no more to do with a person's ability to think than the body has. Although this view is a metaphysical dualism of some sort, it is not mind-body dualism. (And if the soul has neither mental nor physical properties, we can only wonder what sort of properties it does have.)

Or perhaps we don't need a body to think. The properties or activities of the soul, unlike

those of the body, are sufficient to produce thought. But the soul doesn't itself think. Rather, its activities confer thought and other mental properties on the person whose soul it is. The soul is not so much a thinking thing as a "thought-enabling" thing. It is a producer but not a subject of thought. I find this idea baffling. If a thing's activities are sufficient for anything to think, they ought to be sufficient for it to do so. What could prevent the soul from being the subject of the thoughts and experiences it produces? For that matter, what is the difference between producing thought and thinking? Until these questions are answered, there is little we can say about this proposal.

4.

Technically minded philosophers will point out that the problem of the thinking soul is not unique. Consider, for instance, the ontology of temporal parts, endorsed by such highly respected philosophers as Quine and Lewis.

On that view, persisting things are made up of different temporal parts that are just like those persisting things save for being temporally shorter. A persisting thing has a property at a time by virtue of having a temporal part or "stage", located at just that time, that has that property simpliciter. So if you imagine a cat at noon (assuming that you persist through time and are not yourself a momentary stage), you do so because the "noon" part of you imagines a cat. This means that, strictly speaking, there are far more thinking beings around than the census-takers report. We will have to ask why they aren't people, and how we could know that we aren't stages. Most importantly, you and I don't think in the strictest sense: something else, namely your current temporal part, does your thinking for you. [3] But if the "problem of the thinking person-stage" doesn't embarrass the temporal-parts theorist, why should the problem of the thinking soul worry the compound dualist?

Well, the ontology of temporal parts has all sorts of implausible consequences. No one ever accepted that view because it is intuitively obvious. Those who accept it do so because they think powerful arguments support it, and that the alternatives are worse. That suggests that dualists should be compound dualists only if they can argue that pure dualism is even worse. And they haven't.

5.

Here is a third reply: "The problem of the thinking soul is no more serious than the

analogous 'problem of the thinking brain' facing materialism. If you are a human animal (or something 'constituted by' a human animal), you think by virtue of the activities of your brain. Thus, by your argument, your brain does your thinking for you, ought to be a person, and so on. Since that is absurd, you must be a mere brain if you are a material object at all. But no materialist worries about the problem of the thinking brain. So presumably it has a solution. Why not apply that solution to the problem of the thinking soul? In any case, compound dualism is no worse off than materialism, and most philosophers are happy to be materialists."

This objection leads into deep waters. The problem of the thinking brain is hard, and it is not obvious what materialists ought to say about it. Three suggestions come to mind.

One is to deny the existence of such things as undetached human brains. The particles "arranged cerebrally" within your skull don't make up any larger material object (or a thing of any other sort). I know of no compelling reason for supposing that there are such arbitrary undetached parts of human beings as brains, and the problem of the thinking brain seems to me a good reason not to (Olson 1995; I mention another reason in section 8 below). Obviously the compound dualist cannot solve the problem of the thinking soul in an analogous way by denying the existence of embodied souls.

Another idea is to accept that there are undetached human brains but deny that they can think. We use our brains to think. The goings-on in our brains are causally necessary for us to think, just as what goes on in our eyes is necessary for us to see. But our brains don't themselves think, any more than our eyes see. The thing that thinks and sees is the whole human being. Why, then, if the brain is in some sense causally sufficient to produce thought, doesn't it itself think? Well, what is the most salient candidate for being the subject of what we naïvely call a human being's thoughts and experiences? The brain? But what brain? There are many things that could with equal justice be called your brain. (Consider the fact that anatomists must divide the brain arbitrarily from the upper spinal cord.) Surely the best candidate is the whole human being. Whatever the merits of this reasoning, the analogous solution to the problem of the thinking soul would be to deny that the soul can think, which as we have seen is not an option for the compound dualist.

Failing that, one might accept that the brain thinks, but deny that the whole human being thinks only in the derivative sense of having a brain that thinks. The brain and the human being both think in the strictest sense--as, presumably, do any other undetached parts of the human being that include the brain. One way to argue for this would be to ask why anyone should

suppose that the brain alone thinks, and not the whole human being. Presumably it is because the human being has parts--hands, for instance--that are in some sense not directly involved in producing thought. I could think without hands, but not without a brain. But it will not be easy to say in what sense my brain alone is "directly involved in producing thought". I can no more think without a heart or lungs than I can without a brain. Of course, I could think if my heart and lungs were replaced with inorganic substitutes. But then I may be able to think if my brain were replaced with an inorganic substitute. Moreover, the thing the anatomists call the brain has many structures that are no more directly involved in producing thought than the heart is. And anyway, why suppose that a genuine thinker may only have parts that are directly involved in producing thought?

Naturally this view would not solve the overpopulation problem, the personhood problem, or the epistemic problem; but it would at least avoid the absurdity of saying that you and I think only insofar as some other thing thinks in itself. In any case, there is no help here for compound dualism, which states explicitly that the compound thinks by having a part, the soul, that thinks.

So the compound dualist can take little comfort in the fact that materialists face something analogous to the problem of the thinking soul.

6.

Now for the second problem. Suppose that my body is destroyed at the end of Monday and that my soul continues to exist without a body on Tuesday. If Cartesian dualism is true, this must be possible, for the soul doesn't need to be attached to a body to exist. And if my thinking soul could survive this, surely I could survive it. But in what form should I survive? As a soul, of course. What else could I be, after the destruction of my body, if not my soul? It is the only serious candidate for being me that still exists on Tuesday. But I couldn't be my soul, for according to compound dualism I wasn't my soul on Monday, but a compound of my soul and my body. Compound dualism has the absurd consequence that one could come to be identical with something that was previously only a part of one.

We can put it like this. According to Cartesian dualism, I could survive the destruction of my body at the end of Monday; that is,

(1) The thing that is I on Monday is the thing that is I on Tuesday.

In that case, I should be my soul on Tuesday:

(2) The thing that is I on Tuesday is the thing that is my soul on Tuesday.

But obviously

(3) The thing that is my soul on Tuesday is the thing that is my soul on Monday.

From this it follows that

(4) The thing that is I on Monday is the thing that is my soul on Monday,

which contradicts compound dualism. I will call this the problem of disembodied survival.

Obviously it doesn't arise for the pure dualist, who says that I was identical with my soul all along.

7.

Can the problem be solved?

Someone could subvert the logic of the argument by relativizing identity to times: I am not identical with my soul now, but I shall be identical with it after my death.

Or one might reject the possibility of disembodied survival, denying (1). My soul could exist without my body, but I couldn't. It won't do to say only that I couldn't survive this in the course of nature, or that I couldn't survive it as a person. It must be absolutely impossible for any human person to carry on existing after the destruction of her body. But then my body would be essential to me, contrary to compound dualism.

Perhaps I could survive without this body, but not without without any body at all: I could survive the destruction of my body only by acquiring a new body. Though this may be consistent with the letter of compound dualism, it certainly goes against the spirit of Cartesianism. It would mean that every human person was essentially made up of parts, and essentially partly material. (Hart [1988: 5] defines substance dualism as the view that we can become disembodied.)

But these are drastic measures. A more conservative solution would say that I could survive the destruction of my body as a wholly immaterial thing numerically different from my soul, contrary to (2) (but without resorting to the ontology of temporal parts discussed earlier). Let us consider this.

I should have to survive it as a substance: I take it that nothing can be a substance at one time and a non-substance later on. So there must be at least two immaterial substances on Tuesday: my soul and I. The soul, of course, was always immaterial. The other substance was formerly made up of my soul and my body. (Something will have to make one of those immaterial thinking things a person and the other a non-person. But we've been through that already.)

The challenge will be to explain how the disembodied person relates to her soul, if they are not one and the same. It seems clear that the person must at least continue to have her soul as a part. Surely nothing can survive the loss of all its parts in one go. I may be able to survive gradual replacement of parts, but if all of my parts go at once, that is the end of me. So if I am made up of a body and a soul throughout Monday, and I exist at the beginning of Tuesday when neither that body nor any of its parts are parts of me, then my soul, at least, must remain a part of me then. Moreover, it is hard to see how the existence of my soul could be essential to me, as Cartesian dualism says it is, if I could survive without having it as a part. If the survival of the soul is essential to my survival, then destroying it would necessarily destroy me. But how could the destruction of one substance logically entail the destruction of another, unless they at least share a part? And since my soul has no parts other than itself, the only part we could share is the soul itself.

Suppose, then, that I can survive the destruction of my body as a wholly immaterial substance that continues to have my soul as a part. In that case a disembodied person would have to have some other immaterial part besides her soul. Nothing can have just one part--one "proper" part, that is, one part other than itself. The whole must be greater than the part. It belongs to the very idea of parthood that if x is a proper part of y, then y must also have some other part or parts that don't share a part with x (see Simons 1987: 26). So a disembodied person must be made up of her soul and at least one other immaterial thing. To survive death, I must exchange my material body for some new immaterial part: a "spiritual body", we might say.

Where could this new, immaterial part come from? The only players on the stage before my

death are my soul, my body and its parts, and myself. Afterwards my soul is still a soul, my body has perished, and I, supposedly, am made up of the soul and something else. The destruction of my material body can't logically entail the existence of some new immaterial thing. It seems that disembodied survival would require some sort of deus ex machina. That might fit naturally with the Christian doctrine that we cannot survive death in the course of nature, but only by a divine miracle. We could then say, in part at least, what that miracle would have to involve: for me to survive the destruction of my body, the Higher Powers would have to provide me with a spiritual body to take its place.

This proposal is implausible at best. First, what would make the spiritual body a part of the disembodied person? What makes your material body a part of you, according to compound dualism, is presumably the special causal relations you bear to it: you can move it just by intending to do so, and alterations to it affect you in an especially direct way, so that you can perceive and act through it. Other material objects--your shoes, say, or my body--are not parts of you because they don't relate to you in this way. This suggests that your spiritual body is a part of you when you are disembodied because you bear some analogous causal relation to it that you do not bear to any other immaterial thing. But what relation could that be?

The proposal implies that some immaterial substances (souls) are essentially wholly immaterial, while others (disembodied people) are only contingently and temporarily so. I should have thought that any immaterial thing was essentially immaterial.

Another implication is that, although souls may be simple and indivisible, each of us--each human person--is necessarily composite and divisible. But the Cartesian thought that the soul must be indivisible is just the thought that you and I are indivisible. Such arguments as there are for the simplicity of the soul are also arguments for our simplicity.

Our having an immortal and substantial soul is usually taken to imply that we are immortal. The current proposal denies this. Although the survival of your soul may be necessary for you to survive, it is not sufficient. Your soul could survive without a spiritual body, in which case you would perish. Your soul could outlive you. In fact your soul could survive without any intrinsic alteration whatever, continuing to think and be conscious, retaining its apparent memories of your life, and so on, without your surviving. But why should your survival require anything more than the survival of the thing that thinks in you? The natural view for the Cartesian to take, surely, is that the survival of the soul is both necessary and sufficient for the person to survive.

Finally, if your soul can survive without your surviving, why suppose that the person made up of your soul and a new body, spiritual or otherwise, would be you? For all you know, your soul might have once been the soul of someone else. Locke apparently held this view. But he was able to hold it only because he denied that people were substances. In any case he didn't make many converts.

None of these worries arise for pure dualism.

8.

As far as I can see, these are the options open to the compound dualist. But someone may object: "The problem of disembodied survival has nothing to do with compound dualism per se. It is an instance of what we might call the 'amputation paradox'. Suppose you lose your left hand. How would you (or, if you like, your body) then relate to your 'left-hand complement'--the thing previously made up of all your parts save those that share a part with your left hand? Your argument about disembodied survival implies that you would have to be identical with it. But you couldn't be: you are not your left-hand complement before the amputation, so you can't be it afterwards. A thing can't come to be identical with something that was previously only a part of it. And because this has nothing to do with any special features of you or your left hand, your argument implies that nothing could survive the loss of any part. A similar argument would show that nothing could ever gain parts. Since this is absurd, your argument must be wrong. Presumably it goes wrong at the same place as the 'hand' argument goes wrong. So any solution to the amputation paradox--and there must be one, since almost no one accepts its conclusion--will equally solve the problem of disembodied survival."

Well, let us see how the amputation paradox might be solved, and whether this suggests a solution to the problem of disembodied existence.

We could relativize identity to times, or adopt an ontology of temporal parts (on the latter see Heller 1990: 19ff.). These are open to the compound dualist as well. A third option is to grit our teeth and deny that anything can ever have different parts at different times (Chisholm 1976: 145ff.). Even more drastically, we could deny that there are any composite objects. These are both inconsistent with compound dualism.

Another solution is to deny that there was ever any such object as your "hand-complement" (van Inwagen 1981, Olson 1995). The idea is not that your hand complement is something other than an "object", or that it is not a part of you. It would be an object, and a part of you, if

it were there at all. But there simply are no hand complements, or other arbitrary, undetached parts of human beings. Why suppose that there are? More generally, you have no proper part that you could "survive as": no amputation that you could survive would result in your coming to coincide exactly with an object that was formerly a proper part of you. This doesn't mean that you have no parts at all. You may have non-arbitrary parts, such as cells or elementary particles. (Because of this solution I prefer to call the amputation paradox the "problem of undetached parts".) The analogous solution for the compound dualist would be to deny the existence of the soul, which is of course not an option.

At least one philosopher solves the problem by denying that your hand-complement could survive the amputation of your hand (Burke 1994). For if it could, something that is first a mere hand-complement could come to be something of a radically different kind--a person--which is impossible. To adopt this suggestion, the compound dualist would have to deny that one's soul could survive the destruction of one's body, which is incompatible with Cartesian dualism.

So far we have found no help for the compound dualist. But there may be another solution. Some philosophers believe that when you lose your hand you come to occupy the same space and to share all of your matter with your hand-complement, but without being identical with it. The amputee relates to her hand-complement as a person relates to her body (if people are material), or as an organism relates to the mass of matter that coincides with it any moment, or as a clay statue relates to the lump of clay it is made out of. The hand-complement constitutes the handless person.

This metaphysic is just as contentious as the other proposed solutions to the problem of undetached parts (see e.g. Burke 1992, Olson 1996). But let us suppose for the sake of argument that there is such a thing as "material constitution", and that the solution works. Could we then solve the problem of disembodied survival by saying that after my body's destruction my soul constitutes me without being identical with me? This is a hard question. Constitution is poorly understood. If we go by what the philosophers of constitution typically say, though, the answer is clearly No.

It is supposed to belong to the nature of constitution that a constituting thing can outlive the thing that constitutes it. The lump of clay would outlive the statue it constitutes if it were crushed, for instance. If the soul constitutes the disembodied person, then your soul could survive without your surviving. Likewise, the same soul could constitute different people at

different times, much as the same lump of clay could constitute first one statue and later another. As we have seen, this is implausible at best. Worse, constitution theorists generally agree that a constituted thing can be constituted by different things at different times: different masses of matter subsequently constitute the same organism. If this belongs to the nature of constitution, then a person could be constituted by different souls at different times. Hence your soul would not be essential to you.

Nothing can constitute itself. And it seems to belong to the idea of constitution that a constituted thing must always be constituted by something. And constitution in the relevant sense is a one-one relation: two things cannot jointly constitute a third. So if your soul constitutes you after your death, some one thing must constitute you before your death: presumably another compound of soul and body, though one of a different kind from you. But that is absurd.

Finally, a constituted object must be made of the same matter, or have the same proper parts, as the thing constituting it. At any rate they must have the same parts at some level of decomposition: they must be made of the same elementary particles, for instance. But a soul and a disembodied person cannot share their matter or their parts. An immaterial soul isn't made of matter, or of some spiritual stuff analogous to matter. It isn't made of anything. And the soul, being simple, has no parts to share.

So much for constitution. Let us consider one final suggestion. Someone might say that the person simply has two parts before her death, a body and a soul, and one part afterwards, a soul. A disembodied person has a soul as her only proper part. The soul, all by itself, makes up two things, itself and the person. [4] As we saw earlier, this would mean giving up the natural idea that the whole must be greater than the part. There would then be two ways for something to be simple and uncompounded: it may fail to have any parts at all, other than itself; or it may merely fail to have any non-overlapping parts. A simple, uncompounded thing in the second sense could have as many parts as you like, as long as they all overlap: you could be made up of a soul, and the soul could be made up of some third thing, and so on.

This view seems to suffer from ontological double vision. When I try to contemplate it, I lose my grip on what it is for one thing to be a part of another. Whatever the relation of simple soul to simple person might be, it couldn't be that of part to whole. Or if it could be, then the notion of parthood is so poorly understood as to make the proposal almost uninformative. In any case, it seems to offer no real advantage over the proposal reached at the end of the

previous section.

Thus, despite their formal similarities, the problem of disembodied survival is considerably more difficult than the amputation paradox. And the latter is quite troublesome enough.

9.

I have shown that compound dualism faces two serious worries, neither of which arise for pure dualism.

Of course, pure dualism may have troubles of its own that compound dualism avoids. The most obvious place to look for them is our readiness to attribute physical properties to ourselves. Pure dualism implies that we have physical properties only in a derivative sense: we borrow them, so to speak, from things numerically different from ourselves. We don't have mass in the same straightforward sense as we are people, or as rocks have mass. But then compound dualism has the same consequence, for it says that we have physical properties only in the sense of having a body that has those properties straightforwardly. The tangible, visible thing that bears my physical properties in the strictest sense is not I, but something numerically different from me, just as it is on pure dualism. The only difference is that that thing is a part of me on compound dualism and not on pure dualism. But why should that matter?

Despite initial appearances, then, there seems to be little reason to prefer compound dualism over pure dualism, and the widespread tendency to do so is founded on confusion. The source of the confusion may lie in the unfortunate word 'mind', which suggests both "thinking thing" and "thing that one has". It is a word that philosophers would be better off without. [5]

NOTES

1. E.g. Ryle 1949: 11, Scruton 1994: 36, Taylor 1992: 14. Baker and Morris say that "Descartes characterized an individual person as a composite thing, a combination of a body...and a rational soul"; yet, for Descartes, "The logical form of any judgment that exhibits my conscientia must be that I (the soul) have a mode of thinking" (1996: 60, 110f.). Unless I am not a person, these views are inconsistent.
2. The phrase is Locke's. Much the same problem has been raised against his view that, although there are thinking substances, people are something else: see Noonan 1989: 71ff.

3. On "overpopulation" see Lewis 1976: 26ff. and 1993. On the other problems see Noonan 1989: 75f. and 1998: 316.
4. This suggestion was put to me by Richard Swinburne.
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